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Abstract 
Secession has contributed to nearly 50 intra-state armed conflicts around the world, and 
remains a complex issue in public international law. Over the past 72 years, several cases 
stand out as providing evidence of state practice with regards to invoking a successful right 
to unilateral secession: Bangladesh, Croatia, South Sudan, East Timor, Eritrea and Kosovo, 
to name a few. However, apart from invoking a right to secession, these cases also share a 
common factor that legitimized their independence: their Unilateral Non-Colonial (UNC) 
secessions became legal as a result of two factors: (i) an invocation of a right to self-
determination which was systematically denied and, (ii) the denial of self-determination was 
followed by egregious abuses of human rights deemed as in extremis (ethnic cleansing, 
genocide and mass killings). A priori, should a putative state have the right to unilaterally 
secede based on human rights considerations alone? And if it secedes, should the use of force 
by the putative state or a third-party state in its defense be considered a violation of the 
prohibition on the use of force, if it is done in response to in extremis cases of human rights 
abuses?  
 
This thesis will defend the existence of three core suppositions of the principle of self-
determination: (i) that the principle of self-determination exists as a legal right under 
international law, (ii) that the principle of self-determination provides a qualified right of a 
UNC secession, and lastly, (iii) that, in cases where the principle of self-determination is 
systematically denied (combined with human rights abuses designated as in extremis), a legal 
right may be invoked to a military intervention by a third-state. In turn, the preceding 
suppositions will be examined in light of case studies that either justify or reject UNC 
secessions on the basis of the previously outlined criteria; demonstrating a legal exception to 
the use of force in humanitarian crises of a self-determination nature, as well as a framework 
for the consideration of the legitimacy of newly formed states by way of UNC secessions.  
Keywords 
International Law, Self-Determination, R2P, Humanitarian Intervention, Use of Force, 
Secession 
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Preface 
Secession has contributed to over 50 intra-state armed conflicts around the world, and 
remains a complex issue in public international law.1 Yet, apart from its devastating effects 
on international affairs, why does it pose such a challenge to the international legal order? 
The answer is layered and complex; however, one can start the enquiry by analyzing a 
corollary concept of international law that secession purports to violate: the principle of 
territorial inviolability.2 Consider this opinion by Brad Roth, which illustrates some of the 
primary legal challenges with the concept of secession: 
The Yugoslav and other cases [of secession] have inspired among many 
advocates and scholars a disparagement of the traditional territorial integrity 
norm for its insensitivity to claims based on considerations of democracy, 
constitutionality, history, or ethno-national coherence... By taking [such] 
considerations "off the table" in determinations of the admissibility of aid to 
secession, traditional norms against cross-border projections of coercive power 
transcend competing perspectives on the legitimacy and justness of internal 
arrangements. To predicate the foundations of the peace and security order on 
ideologically contested propositions would signal that an external use of 
coercion or force to revise sovereign boundaries amounts to just another 
political conflict, rather than an extraordinary breach requiring an emergent and 
coordinated international response.3 
 
Stated otherwise, the legal and political ramifications of secessions are a topic of an 
                                                
1 In 2012, the number of conflicts was at 50. The number has likely risen since then. See Joel Day, “The 
Remedial Right of Secession in International Law” (2012) 4:1 J Intl Pol’y Stud 19 at 19.  
2 The principle of territorial inviolability (otherwise referred to as the principle of territorial sovereignty) 
is a corollary principle of international law. See Samantha Besson, ed, “Sovereignty” in Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press) at online: <www.opil.ouplaw.com> 
(“[t]he principle of sovereignty, ie of supreme authority within a territory, is a pivotal principle of 
modern international law. What counts as sovereignty depends on the nature and structure of the 
international legal order and vice-versa. Most of the other, if not all institutions and principles of 
international law rely, directly or indirectly, on State sovereignty; it suffices to mention, for instance, the 
relationship between the conditions and attributes of statehood or the principles of territorial or 
personal jurisdiction, immunity, and non-intervention, on the one hand, and considerations of 
sovereignty, on the other. The 1945 United Nations (UN) system itself is based, albeit not directly on the 
principle of sovereignty itself, on a necessary corollary of that principle: the principle of sovereign 
equality of its Member States as guaranteed in Art. 2 (1) UN Charter (States, Sovereign Equality). 
Provided States have supreme authority within their territory, the plenitude of internal jurisdiction, their 
immunity from other States’ own jurisdiction and their freedom from other States’ intervention on their 
territory (Art. 2 (4) and (7) UN Charter), but also their equal rank to other sovereign States are 
consequences of their sovereignty” at paras 1-2).   
3 Brad R Roth, “The Virtues of Bright Lines: Self-Determination, Secession, and External 
Intervention"(2015) 16:3 Ger L J 384 at 386.  
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extensive debate in international law. As further explained by Glen Anderson, a scholar who 
has written extensively on the subject, “[i]ndeed the word ‘secession,’ is conspicuously 
absent from virtually all international legal instruments. This situation is explicable by the 
fact that secession represents a challenge to perhaps the two most fundamental principles of 
international law: the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.”4 In short, the legal 
parameters of secession outside of the colonial context5 have not yet crystallized under 
international law.6  
Outside of the legal parameters of secession, putative or emerging states that have 
thus far not succeeded in attaining statehood (such as South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), etc.)7 have further exacerbated how the concept is 
                                                
4 Glen Anderson, “Secession in International Law and Relations: What Are We Talking About?” (2013) 
35:3 Loy LA Intl & Comp L Rev 343 at 343 [Anderson, “Secession in International Law”]. 
5 See Anderson, “Secession in International Law”, supra note 4 (“[o]utside of the colonial context’ refers to 
“…a territory [that] is ‘geographically separate and is distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the 
country administering it’ the territory concerned is, prima facie, of a colonial nature Once it has been 
established that such a prima facie case of geographical and ethnical or cultural distinctiveness of a 
territory exists, other elements may then be brought into consideration. These additional elements may 
be, inter alia, of an administrative, political juridical, economic or historical nature. If they affect the 
relationship between the metropolitan State and the territory concerned in a manner which arbitrarily 
places the latter in a position or status of subordination, they support the presumption that there is an 
obligation to transmit information under Article 73e of the UN Charter” at 375). See also Declaration on 
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA Res 1514 (XV), UNGAOR, 15th Sess, UN 
Doc A/1541 (14 December 1960) [Declaration of the Granting of Independence].  
6 For evidence of support that the legal parameters of secession outside of the colonial context have not 
yet been clearly established in international law, see Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A 
Legal Reappraisal (New York: Cambridge University Press,1995) at 72 [Cassese, “Self-Determination of 
Peoples”]. See also Ved P Nanda, “Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to 
Secede” (1981) 13 Case W Res J Int’l L 257 at 258 [Nanda, “Self-Determination in IL”].  
7 South Ossetia and Abkhazia may eventually become successful secessions but have not as of the time of 
writing achieved statehood. Their bids for statehood have exacerbated the need to define the legal status 
of secession in international law. See Glen Anderson, “Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession and the Criteria 
for Statehood in International Law” (2015) 41:1 Brook J Intl L 1 at 4, nn 6–7 [Anderson, “Unilateral Non-
Colonial Secession”]. Chapter 4 will provide evidence of their statehood bids as being illegal under 
international law. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was deemed an “illegal secessionist 
entity” by a court ruling and referred to as a “purported state” in several General Assembly Resolutions. 
At time of writing, it has only been recognized by one state: Turkey. Additionally, with reunification talks 
underway between the TRNC and Cyprus (infra note 42), it can be inferred that the TRNC’s status as an 
entity, created through blatant violations of peremptory norms of international law, continues to impact 
its statehood formation process, and hence has obligated it to recount its illegal creation through a 
negotiated solution with the metropolitan state to which it belongs de jure. From this thesis’ standpoint, 
this provides evidence of the fact that illegal UNC secessions cannot ‘survive’ as states ad infinitum, and 
hence, will at some point (such as the case of TRNC), be forced to renegotiate their status under 
international law (ibid at 69, nn 254–57).  
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viewed in the contemporary world. In large part, a reliance on the strength of the territorial 
inviolability principle has done little to deter state actors from seeking to secede from their 
former metropolitan state.8 Given the lack of clarity in international law with respect to 
secession, this thesis intends to answer the following question: should the use of force by a 
third state acting in defense of a putative state or entity be considered a violation of 
international law if it is done in response to cases of human rights abuses deemed as in 
extremis?9  
This thesis will argue that, through the principle of self-determination, unilateral non-
colonial secessions (UNCs)10 have an established status under international law. It will do so 
by focusing on the principle of self-determination as the crucial factor in allowing for an 
entity to become a putative state in order to legally secede from an existing state under a 
particular set of circumstances. Additionally, it will provide a framework through which a 
third-state or collective of third-states could violate the prohibition on the use of force in 
cases of UNC secessions that involve human rights abuses deemed as in extremis. Hence, this 
thesis’ primary argument will be built on the existence of three core suppositions related to 
the principle of self-determination: (i) that the principle of self-determination exists as a legal 
right under international law, (ii) that the principle of self-determination provides a qualified 
right of a UNC secession, and lastly, (iii) that, in cases where the principle of self-
determination is systematically denied, combined with human rights abuses designated as in 
extremis, a legal right may be invoked to a military intervention by a third state. In turn, the 
preceding suppositions will be examined in light of case studies that either justify or reject 
UNC secessions on the basis of the previously outlined criteria. Lastly, it is important to note 
                                                
8 Catalonia’s bid to secede from Spain is a prime example of an ongoing dispute over the independence of 
the autonomous province.  For more on this situation, see “Catalan independence movement seeks boost 
with mass protest”, The Guardian (10 September 2016), online: <www.theguardian.com>. 
9 ‘In Extremis’ as defined by Glen Anderson refers to “…where a sub-state group, or people, has been 
subject to deliberate and sustained human rights abuses (ethnic cleansing, mass killings and genocide) by 
the existing state.” See Glen Anderson, “Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession and The Use of Force: Effect on 
Claims to Statehood in International Law” (2013) 28 Conn J Int’l L 197 [Anderson, “The Use of Force”]. 
at 197.   
10 For the purposes of this thesis, a unilateral non-colonial secession can be defined as a unilateral 
withdrawal of a non-colonial territory by an entity from an existing state. Upon withdrawal, the entity 
declares itself a state. For more on this, see Anderson, “Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession”, supra note 7 at 
8.  
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that this thesis will focus on the simultaneous examination of several, still-contested, areas of 
international law – the law on territorial integrity, legal and illegal use of force by states, and 
the right of peoples to self-determination – all of which will be considered collectively in 
order to come to the aforementioned conclusion. 
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Chapter 1  
Chapter 1: An Introduction 
1.0. Background 
Chapter 1 will be separated into three parts. First, a brief sub-section on the scope 
and the objectives of this thesis will define the parameters of the subject being studied, as 
well as the objectives that this study will aim to achieve. Subsequently, a contemporary 
definition of the sources of international law will be presented in order to establish the 
interpretations of international law as they pertain to this thesis. Lastly, a final subsection 
will present a thesis roadmap in order to allow the reader to understand the methodology 
used in support its primary elements.  
1.1. Objectives and Scope 
The relationship between military interventions11 and secessions invoked through 
the principle of self-determination has not been thoroughly defined under international 
law. On one hand, self-determination as a principle of international law should be 
respected given its status a peremptory norm12 of international law, on the other hand, a 
                                                
11 It is important to specify that the terms military intervention and humanitarian intervention are 
often conflated. Outside of the context of self-determination, military operations and interventions by 
third-states have largely been termed ‘humanitarian interventions.’ For the purposes of this thesis, 
the term ‘military intervention’ will be used as a primary term to define all military interventions 
(regardless of whether the intervention has been claimed as being ‘humanitarian’ in nature, or not.) 
A thorough study of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention will be presented in Chapter 3 which 
will demonstrate the legally accepted definition of ‘humanitarian intervention’. Another reason for 
using the term ‘military intervention’ is that it provides a neutral and objective context with which 
the act of the intervention can be analyzed without prejudice.  
12 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) states that “…[A] peremptory 
[jus cogens] norm of general international law is accepted and recognized by the international 
community of States as a whole, as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”  See 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, CAN TS 1980 No 37 art 53 
(entered into force 27 January 1980) [VCLT]. See also Anderson, “Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession”, 
supra note 7 (“[t]here are two overlapping schools of thought as to the content or scope of 
peremptory norms. According to the "substantive" school, peremptory norms are substantive rules 
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self-determination claim that purports to advocate for a separation of territory clashes 
with the principle of territorial inviolability, which is equally as corollary to the 
international legal order of sovereign states. 13 Thus, the dilemma of whether a hierarchy 
of principles can exist in the case of an external self-determination claim (such as a UNC 
secession) requires meticulous examination. 
 
The significance of studying the legality of military interventions in the context of 
in extremis abuses of human rights was identified as early as the Roman era by Cicero, 
and reaffirmed by classical international legal scholars such as Grotius and Kant.14 For 
example, Grotius introduced the concept of societas humana (the universal community of 
mankind) whereby a senseless attack by a “tyrant” on humanity would command a 
‘humanitarian’ intervention.15 Nevertheless, apart from its normative and philosophical 
meaning, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, which purports to support the 
obligatory concept of military intervention in all cases of systematic oppression of 
civilians, has had a complicated relationship with both classical and contemporary 
international law.16 As explained by Nardin, several issues can be clearly identified once 
one faces the reality of providing a legal defense for the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention under international law: 
[Humanitarian intervention] holds that armed intervention is morally 
[legally] justified when people are violently mistreated by their rulers, and 
                                                
of international law from which no derogation is permitted. According to this view, structural rules, 
such as pacta sunt servanda and pacta tertiis, which operate in the context of treaty law, are excluded. 
The "systemic" school, by contrast, defines peremptory norms as including substantive norms from 
which no derogation is permitted and structural rules” at 62, n 230).   
13 This thesis argues that the principle of self-determination should be respected on the basis of its 
status as a peremptory norm in international law.  For evidence of scholarly support of this position 
see generally, David Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2002) at 289; Cassese, “Self-Determination of Peoples”, supra note 6 at 140; Alexander 
Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 51 
[Orakhelashvili, “Peremptory Norms”]; Glen Anderson, “A Post-Millennial Inquiry into the United 
Nations Law of Self-Determination: A Right to Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession?” (2016) 49:4 
Vanderbilt J of Transnational L 1183 at 1185 [Anderson, “A Post-Millennial Inquiry”]. 
14 Susan Breau, The Responsibility to Protect in International Law: An Emerging Paradigm Shift (New 
York: Routledge Publishing, 2016) at 11.  
15 James Brown Scott, ed, Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925), 
Vol II at 584 [Scott ed, “Grotius, DJBP”].  
16 For a more detailed description of this statement, see infra note 330.  
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is reflected in the widely-held opinion that states, acting unilaterally or 
collectively, are justified in enforcing respect for human rights. It is this 
enduring tradition, not current international law, that best explains the moral 
basis of humanitarian intervention. In twentieth-century international law, 
a just war is above all a war of self-defense. But sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century European moralists justified war as a way to uphold law and protect 
rights, of which self-defense was only one. Rulers, these moralists argued, 
have a right and sometimes a duty to enforce certain laws beyond their 
realms.17  
As can be deduced from Nardin’s argument, the challenge with the European moralist 
claim for humanitarian intervention is that any argument could be applied to justify a 
humanitarian intervention if based on a temporal moral standard. As a result, the 
contemporary justification for humanitarian intervention has reached a standstill, 
supported by both justifiable and unjustifiable violations of international law that have 
preceded and succeeded it. More precisely, recent military interventions in Iraq and Libya 
for example, have demonstrated that “there is no denying that widespread and egregious 
violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law are no longer within the 
‘exclusive’ domestic jurisdiction of States but constitute a matter of concern of the 
international community as a whole.”18 All in all, the nature of military interventions as 
being conducted by self-interested parties without recourse or interest for the 
consequences of their interventions has led to a general wariness of accepting the legal 
justifications behind the concept.19 
With regards to the act of secession, a number of issues challenge its status in 
international law as well. As mentioned earlier, one of its primary issues is that it posits 
“a challenge to perhaps the two most fundamental principles of international law: the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.”20 With regards to the latter, as sovereignty 
                                                
17 Terry Nardin, “The Moral Basis for Humanitarian Intervention” (2002) 16:2 Ethics & Intl Affairs J 
55 at 55-6.  
18 Vaughan Lowe & Antonios Tzanakopoulos, eds., “Humanitarian Intervention” in Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press) at para 41, online: 
<www.opil.ouplaw.com>.  
19 Luke Glanville, “The Responsibility to Protect Beyond Borders” (2012) 12:1 Human Rights L Rev 1 
at 32.  
20 Ibid. 
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is considered a corollary concept of statehood,21 it is important to briefly define its 
relationship with self-determination and secession, as well as the challenges they pose to 
the creation of states in international law.    
 
The relationship between statehood and self-determination is an important topic 
of inquiry. Crawford posits that “[external] self-determination, is at the most basic level, 
a principle concerned with the right to be a State.”22 Although the process of state 
creation can take many forms in international law,23 secession is by the far the most 
complicated and underdefined form of state creation.24 This pertains in large part to the 
debate over whether secession is a process and an outcome, or a process that leads to an 
outcome.25 This thesis supports the argument that the latter is true, taking a different path 
of interpretation than Crawford with respect to the act of secession. This claim is 
supported by the fact that a process of a successful secession has an eventual outcome of 
a new state being created; however, the process by which that state is created is not 
uniform and can take on many forms that are “not always contingent on [territorial] 
withdrawal.”26 Kohen expands on this claim by observing that “[s]ecession is not an 
instant fact. It always implies a complex series of claims and decisions, negotiations 
and/or struggle, which may – or may not – lead to the creation of a new state.”27 This is 
important to note as the process by which statehood is achieved via secession can include 
forms achieved by peaceful and non-peaceful means; a fact that distinguishes secession 
as a process that leads to an outcome, rather than a process or an outcome on its own.  
 
                                                
21 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can TS 1945 No7 art 2 (1) [UN Charter].  
22 James R Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2006) at 
107 [Crawford, “The Creation of States”].  
23  Some forms of state creation include: discovery, prescription, abandonment, cession, etc. For a full 
list, see John H Currie et al, International Law: Doctrine, Practice, and Theory, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin 
Law, 2014) at 314-27 [Currie].  
24 Anderson, “Secession in International Law”, supra note 4 at 343-4. 
25 Ibid at 349. 
26 Ibid at 350. 
27 Marcelo Kohen, ed, Secession: International Law Perspectives (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006) at 14 as cited in Anderson, “Secession in International Law”, supra note 4 at 349.  
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Several scholars have argued against the fact that secession is a process that leads 
to an outcome. For example, according to Crawford, “secession is the creation of a State 
by the use or threat of force without the consent of the former sovereign…”28 In other 
words, Crawford sees secession as a process dependent on the use or threat of force. This 
dependency creates a reliance on seeing secession as a singular and unilateral 
predetermined act, rather than a process that can offer numerous options on what can be a 
peaceful or nonpeaceful outcome. This view has certainly found support in the legal 
academic community, with academics such as John Dugard and Alexis Heraclides 
defending its existence.29 The difficulty with accepting Crawford’s view of secession as a 
singular process is that it does not account for events that happen in the period between 
the initiation of the secession, and the ultimate success or failure of that secession. For 
example, Glen Anderson approaches Crawford’s definition somewhat differently by 
describing secession as “the withdrawal of territory (colonial or non-colonial)30 from a 
part of an existing state to create a new state.”31 Indeed, Anderson’s definition looks to 
counter the attempts made by restrictive definitions (such as Crawford’s), as in general, 
they narrow the scope of the definition of secession itself, while failing to provide 
explanations for the ongoing series of events that shape the nature of the secession ex 
post facto.32 In other words, this indicates that the process of secession is initiated once 
the withdrawal of territory is invoked; however, it does not end until the entity in 
question earns legal personality under international law, a process which can take place 
over an extended period of time.33 Needless to say, although the reality of any withdrawal 
                                                
28 Crawford, “The Creation of States”, supra note 22 at 375. 
29 See John Dugard, “A Legal Basis for Secession – Relevant Principles and Rules” in Julie Dahlitz, ed, 
Secession and International Law: Conflict Avoidance – Regional Appraisals (Hague: TMC Asser Press, 
2003) at 89 [Dugard, “A Legal Basis for Secession”]; Alexis Heraclides, The Self-Determination of 
Minorities in International Politics (New Jersey: F Cass Publishing, 1990) at 1 [Heraclides, “Self-
Determination of Minorities”] cited in Anderson, “Secession in International Law”, supra note 4 at 
350, n 32.  
30 Anderson claims that “secession can be validly said to occur in a colonial context, as any new 
assertion of sovereignty over a colonial territory involves a modification to the sovereignty of the 
metropolitan power.” See Anderson, “Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession”, supra note 7 at 7.  
31 Anderson, “Secession in International Law”, supra note 4 at 344. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid.  
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of territory relates to a consequential withdrawal of sovereignty as well, not all secessions 
are enforced through the threat or use of force and can in fact be executed through 
peaceful and legislated mechanisms. One such example is the secession of South Sudan 
from the Republic of Sudan in 2011 by way of a referendum and a legally-negotiated 
process.34 Therefore, “…once it is accepted that the specific process of withdrawal is 
separate from the outcome, it emerges that there are two basic secession types: 
consensual and unilateral.”35  
A consensual secession refers to the act of secession executed with the existing 
state’s consent, while a unilateral secession occurs without the state’s consent and may or 
may not include the threat or the use of force.36 Consensual secessions can further be 
broken down into constitutional and politically-negotiated secessions. With respect to 
consensual secessions, a constitutional secession refers to the creation or the existence of 
a provision within the constitution of an existing metropolitan state, which allows for an 
act of secession to occur by virtue of a domestic legal mechanism. Examples of such 
mechanisms include, for example, the 1921 Liechtenstein Constitution and the 2003 
Constitutional Charter of the State of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro.37 Equally, the 
Clarity Act 38 in Canada is an example of a statute created to provide clarification on the 
procedural mechanism of secession in the Canadian Constitution. In essence, the Act 
“[reaffirms] the constitutional process prescribed by the [Supreme] Court: a clear 
                                                
34 Although South Sudan is an example of a consensual secession per se, it is important to note that 
its secession was preceded by two bloody civil wars which had led to the deaths of nearly 3.5 million 
people.  Additionally, since the secession, a third civil war broke out in 2013 which caused another 
300,000 deaths, as well as the displacement of nearly 3.5 million civilians. For the purposes of this 
footnote, it is necessary to point out that the objective of this sentence is solely to establish an 
example of a legally-negotiated secession via a referendum; however, the atrocities that preceded 
and succeeded this secession cannot be disregarded as part of this example. For more on the civil 
conflict in South Sudan, see generally Douglas H Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars 
(Oxford: Indiana University Press, 2003); Mario Silvio, "After Partition: The Perils of South Sudan” 
(2015) 3:1 U Balt J Intl L 63; Salman Salman, "South Sudan Road to Independence: Broken Promises 
and Lost Opportunities" (2013) 26:2 Pac McGeorge Global Bus & Dev L J 343. 
35 Anderson, “Secession in International Law”, supra note 4 at 350.  
36 Anderson, “Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession”, supra note 7 at 7. 
37 Anderson, “Secession in International Law”, supra note 4 at 352. 
38 Clarity Act, SC 2000, c 26, s 3(1). 
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referendum vote in favour of secession, followed by negotiated agreement between 
Quebec and the rest of Canada, and finally the passage of a constitutional amendment 
lawfully effecting Quebec’s secession.”39 Although this type of legislation does not 
ensure a consensual separation,40 the mechanism allows for a legislated process to exist in 
the case that separation becomes necessary.  
On the other hand, politically-negotiated secessions are secessions that are 
completed through a diplomatic negotiation. As described by Anderson: 
It requires that the existing state and the secessionist entity be willing to 
politically negotiate the resolution of a secessionist situation [and] is most 
likely to occur when the existing state fails to provide any constitutional 
avenue for secession for constituent national groups and when relations 
between the existing sovereign and secessionist entity are amicable.41 
 
Examples of politically-negotiated secessions include such examples as the current 
unification negotiations between the Republic of Cyprus and the de facto Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC),42 or the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993 
through the peaceful secessions of the Czech and Slovak republics from the former 
federalist state.43  
Alternatively, unilateral secessions include the withdrawal of territory from a state 
without its consent. As expanded on by Thürer and Burri, “…what was formerly a 
constituent part of a State becomes independent—at least from a legal, though not 
necessarily a factual perspective. Rather than create a new State, the separating part of a 
State may choose to join an existing State.”44 As such, unilateral secessions can be further 
                                                
39 Anderson, “Secession in International Law”, supra note 4 at 351.  
40 Ibid at 344. It is impossible to claim that a legislated process for secession can ensure a consensual 
separation as secession has been linked to anarchy, separation, civil conflict and instability.  
41 Ibid at 352. 
42 See Sara Stefanini, “Cyprus reunification talks to resume in Switzerland”, POLITICO (11 November 
2016), online: <www.politico.eu>.  
43 Anderson, “Secession in International Law”, supra note 4 at 353. 
44 Daniel Thürer & Thomas Burri, eds., “Self-Determination” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (Oxford University Press) at para 1, online: <www.opil.ouplaw.com> [Thürer & 
Burri].  
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broken down into colonial and non-colonial secessions.45 The former refers to a secession 
that occurs as part of a ‘peoples’46 invoking their right to self-determination when their 
putative state is considered a colony of a metropolitan state; the latter refers to “the 
unilateral withdrawal of non-colonial territory from part of an existing state to create a 
new state.”47  
In addition to some of the major issues of the act of secession mentioned above, a 
lack of opinio juris48 and state practice with regards to the legal process of UNC 
secessions has also contributed to the gray area surrounding its legal status under 
international law. As it stands, there are few guidelines and even fewer legal instruments 
in international law to prevent a secession from turning into a militarized territorial armed 
conflict.49 Moreover, with secessionist movements citing the Kosovo declaration of 
independence50 in 2008 as justification for de jure recognitions of their respective 
                                                
45 Anderson, “Secession in International Law”, supra note 4 at 353-4. 
46  See Christopher J Borgen, “Is Kosovo a Precedent? Secession, Self-Determination and Conflict 
Resolution” (Paper, delivered at the EES Noon Discussion, 13 June 2008), (2008) 47 Int’l Leg 
Materials 461, online: <www.wilsoncenter.org > [Borgen, “Is Kosovo a Precedent?”] (“[a]t various 
points in international legal history, the term “people” has been used to signify citizens of a nation-
state, the inhabitants in a specific territory being decolonized by a foreign power, or an ethnic group” 
at 4). For more on the controversy surrounding the term ‘peoples’, see Chapter 2.  
47 Anderson, “Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession”, supra note 7 at 3. 
48 See Cornell Encyclopedia of Law, sub verbo “opinio juris”, online: <www.law.cornell.edu> ([i]n 
customary international law, opinio juris is the second element (along with state practice) necessary 
to establish a legally binding custom.  Opinio juris denotes a subjective obligation, a sense on behalf of 
a state that it is bound to the law in question”). See also Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 
June 1945, Can TS 1945 No 7 (in force 24 October 1945) art 38 (1)(b) [ICJ Statute] which affirms that 
opinio juris is a general principle and source of customary international law.  
49 The only legal guidelines that can prevent a secession from turning into an armed conflict (peaceful 
settlement of disputes) are outlined in the United Nations Charter. See also UN Charter, supra note 
21; “The Security Council & Mediation”, online: <www.peacemaker.un.org/peacemaking-
mandate/security-council>.  
50 See Stefan Oeter, ed, “Dissolution of Yugoslavia” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law by (Oxford University Press), online:<www.opil.ouplaw.com> [Oeter, “Dissolution of 
Yugoslavia”] (“On 17 February 2008, the Kosovo Assembly declared the independence of the 
Republic of Kosovo. The United States and a number of important Member States of the EU soon 
recognized Kosovo as an independent and sovereign State. Even within the EU, however, there was 
no consensus on the qualification of such a move, since some Member States had objections against 
recognition. Most UN Member States were even more reserved, which found its expression with the 
support for Serbia’s quest to ask the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for an advisory opinion on 
whether the unilateral declaration of the independence of Kosovo is in accordance with international 
law” at para 85).   
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secessions,51 the question of whether a ‘remedial right’ to secession exists outside of the 
colonial context continues to split the international legal community.52 
Overall, two theories exist that defend a right for remedial secession: the primary 
right and the remedial right. The dichotomy between the two theories is summarized by 
Thomas Simon in the following manner:  
Under the remedial view, secession is justified only as a remedy of last 
resort for persistent and serious injustices. Primary right theorists, in 
contrast, argue that a right to secession does not depend upon a finding of 
injustices. They claim either that a right to secede can be made on ascriptive 
grounds, such as the nationality of the peoples claiming the right; on 
democratic, plebiscitary bases that reflect the preferences of peoples living 
within a territory; or on administrative grounds that simply assess the 
capability to function as an independent state.53 
As can be deduced from Simon’s summary, the ascriptive nature of a population is 
difficult to define. In fact, it is one of the major challenges to accepting the primary right 
theory. After all, how can ascriptive distinctions be made in a globalized, multi-cultural, 
and multi-ethnic world? Alternatively, what is the threshold for the argument of the use 
of force as the ‘last resort’? Does this theory defend a remedial right to secession only in 
cases of egregious human rights abuses such as genocide or ethnic cleansing? What about 
cases of human rights abuses that are considered as less egregious than the rest? Clearly, 
many lacunae can be identified in the theoretical argument for the right of remedial 
secession;54 however, this thesis intends to prove that a right to a UNC secession exists 
                                                
51 See Steve Gutterman, “Russia Denounces Kosovo Declaration”, The Washington Post (17 February 
2008), online: <www.washingtonpost.com> (direct quotes from press releases by de facto leaders of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia after Kosovo’s declaration of independence).  For Transnistria, see 
Borgen, “Is Kosovo a Precedent?”, supra note 46.  
52 Thomas W Simon, “Remedial Secession: What the Law Should Have Done, from Katanga to Kosovo” 
(2011) 40:1 GA J Intl & Comp L 105 at 143. 
53 Ibid. 
54 One of the more important lacunae in the international law on secession is the question of whether 
“remedial secession” is a legal concept as part of a crystallized norm in customary international law 
or not. See Jure Vidmar, “Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice” 
(2010) 6:1 St Antony’s Intl Rev 37 at 37 [Vidmar, “Remedial Secession”]. See also Lee C Buchheit, 
Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (New York: Yale University Press,1978) 
(Contemporarily, a general ‘fear’ exists around the institutionalization of remedial secession. “…[t]his 
fear is known under a number of names, including Pandora’s Box, balkanization, ethnic domino 
theory, and indefinite divisibility…” at 28). Additionally, it should be noted that multiple scholars 
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under international law insofar as the principle of self-determination is egregiously 
violated and denied, which can also subsequently lead to a justification for a third-state 
military intervention. 55  
In sum, this thesis will use cases of third state military interventions in 
Bangladesh, Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia to identify a legal exception for the 
external use of force outside of the existing positive international law.56 More precisely, 
this thesis will argue that a right of the use of force by a third state outside of the current 
legal parameters57 exists only within the context of UNC secessions in which the peoples 
involved are suffering human rights abuses designated as in extremis. Additionally, this 
thesis will argue against the existence of an obligation of military intervention under 
international law (as supported by the doctrine of humanitarian intervention), pointing to 
a number of heterogeneous factors that support its rejection as a crystallized legal norm in 
                                                
have attempted to argue, with varying degrees of success, that a remedial right to secession should 
exist in international law. Unfortunately, their arguments largely approach the question of remedial 
secession from a theoretical or sociological perspective, which at-times can be questionable on the 
basis of its relevance with respect to codified international law. This thesis will not use a theoretical 
analysis of the subject matter, rather, it will opt to a legal one on the basis of existing treaty and 
customary international law. For examples of pro-remedial secession theorists, see generally, Harry 
Beran, “A Liberal Theory of Secession” (1984) 32:1 Pol Stud 21; Christopher Wellman, “A Defense of 
Secession and Self-Determination” (1995) 24 Phil & Public Aff 142; Robert W McGee, “The Theory of 
Secession and Emerging Democracies” (1991) 28 Stan J Intl L 450 [McGee, “The Theory of 
Secession”].  
55 It is necessary to note that the idea of a third-state military intervention as being justified under 
international law in cases of self-determination is not novel. Generally, this argument is made by 
defending its legality under the auspices of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Several 
scholars have pronounced on the idea as potentially existing or existing under a pretext of conditions. 
that typically reaffirm the legality of the interventions’ humanitarian nature. This thesis intends to 
expand on the existing scholarship with regards to the notion of third-state military interventions in 
the context of UNC secessions, providing a conceptualized legal argument for the existence of a 
developed right of military intervention in international law under the pretext of self-determination 
in a very particular set of circumstances. For examples of authors who have proposed similar ideas, 
see generally Thomas D Grant, “Armed Force in Aid of Secession” (2014) 53:1 Military Law and the 
Law of War Rev 69 at 91; Anderson, “The Use of Force”, supra note 9 at 240; Juan Carlos de las 
Cuevas, “Exceptional Measures Call for Exceptional Times: The Permissibility under International 
Law of Humanitarian Intervention to Protect a People’s Right to Self-Determination” (2015) 37:1 
Hous J Intl L 49.  
56 The existing international law on the use of force, as well as the current status of the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention will be analyzed in detail in Chapter 3.  
57 It should be noted that international law prohibits the use of force by states except in cases of self-
defence or through authorization by the United Nations Security Council. General prohibitions for the 
use of force can be found in UN Charter, supra note 21, arts 2(3)–(4), 39, 42,55. 
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international law.58 
1.2. Sources of International Law 
 
This thesis will rely on the consideration that sources of international law are 
considered binding without derogation. Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) sets out the sources of international law: 
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international 
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted 
as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.59 
In order to better understand these sources in toto; a brief definition of each must be 
presented.  
The most commonly-known source of international law is known as a ‘treaty’,60 a 
form of “international [“contract”] between states and /or certain international 
organizations, [which sets] out rules that bind, as a matter of international law, the parties 
to them in their relations with one another.”61 The second source of international law is 
“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law,” 62 usually 
                                                
58 The controversy relates to the legal status of humanitarian intervention in international law. An 
exception permitting the use of force as part of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention does not 
currently exist in international law, although some scholars have argued on its existence through the 
R2P (Responsibility to Protect) principle. This debate will be expanded on in greater detail in 
Chapter 3. For a description of the general controversy on the accept of a right to ‘humanitarian 
intervention’, see Lowe & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 18 at para 1. 
59 ICJ Statute, supra note 48, art 38 (1).  
60 It is necessary to point out that not everyone agrees with this statement. For a general description 
of this debate, see Currie, supra note 23 at 46.  
61 Ibid at 48. 
62 VCLT, supra note 12, art 38 (b).  
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referred to as customary international law.63 Customary international law is composed of 
two elements: opinio juris and the practice of states. Opinio juris “denotes a subjective 
obligation, a sense on behalf of a state that it is bound to the law in question,”64 while 
state practice refers to the practice of a particular custom by states. Customary 
international law is unwritten and is considered universally binding on all states.65  
Outside of the well-accepted notions mentioned above, this thesis will adopt a 
more contemporary interpretation of two important factors within the ambit of customary 
international law. First, the requirement of ‘state practice’ will be interpreted as evincing 
general and not consistent practice to become law, and second, the effect of General 
Assembly Resolutions will be interpreted as influencing the international law-making 
process where the answer to a legal question cannot be found through existing 
jurisprudence. With respect to the former, the traditional understanding of ‘practice’ 
requires state practice to be consistent, as set out the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (PCIJ) in the Lotus Case,66 and subsequently by the ICJ in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Case.67 On the contrary, this thesis will use an interpretation that 
accepts claims by states68 as well as physical acts and omissions, to underline the 
                                                
63 The author recognizes the existence of scholarship that questions, discounts or rejects the function 
of custom as a general source of international law. Although these challenges to the contemporary 
understanding of custom are important to point out, this thesis’ legal analysis will operate on the 
well-established precedent of customary international law as a general source of law as supported by 
the VCLT and the ICJ Statute. For examples of scholars questioning the normative function of custom 
in international law, see Emmanuel Voyaikis, “Customary International Law and the Place of 
Normative Considerations” (2010) 55:1 Am J Juris 164; Gerald J Postema, “Custom, Normative 
Practice and the Law” (2012) 62 Duke LJ 707.  
64 Supra note 48. 
65 It should be noted that there are three exceptions to the universality of customary international 
law. See Currie, supra note 23 at 116, 133. (“first…a treaty rule that is inconsistent with a rule of 
customary international law will generally prevail, as between parties to that treaty; second, rules of 
“regional” customary international law may displace, as between states within the relevant region, 
rules of general customary international law; and third, so-called persistent objectors may 
unilaterally escape the reach of customary international law” at 116).    
66 S. S. Lotus (France v Turkey), (1927), PCIJ (Se A) No 10 at 28.  
67 North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, [1969] ICJ Rep 3 at 44 [North Sea Case].  
68 This interpretation is supported by a number of ICJ Cases. For a few examples, see Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), Judgment, 
[1986] ICJ Rep 14 at paras 188-89, 191, 205 [Nicaragua ICJ Judgment]; Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, [1996] Rep 226 at paras 68-73 [Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
Opinion]. For a comprehensive summary of this interpretation, see Glen Anderson, “Unilateral Non-
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changing threshold for what constitutes ‘practice’ under customary international law.69 
To be succinct, a combination of textual General Assembly Resolutions, as well as 
concomitant state practice will be used to argue for the existence of a qualified right for 
UNC secessions under international law. As for the interpretation of the latter, its 
importance rests on the fact that, as mentioned by the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case, a lack 
of uniformity in state practice, especially if conflictual, can find support through textual 
elaboration as part of opinio juris; insofar as both are assessed simultaneously.70 Thus, in 
following this interpretation, this thesis will rely on the supposition that “Article 38(1)(b) 
of the Statue of the ICJ [which lists international custom, as evidence of general practice] 
includes statements such as those contained in declaratory General Assembly 
resolutions…”,71 which, in combination with physical acts and omissions, will reveal the 
existence of a qualified right to a UNC secession in customary international law.72 A 
more detailed summary of this interpretation as it pertains to UNC secessions will be 
presented in section 2.3. 
 
                                                
Colonial Secession in International Law and Declaratory General Assembly Resolutions: Textual 
Content and Legal Effects” (2012) 41 Denv J Int'l L & Poly 345 at 380-85 [Anderson, “Declaratory GA 
Resolutions”].    
69 For more on this see, Anderson, “Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession”, supra note 7 at 10. 
70 Nicaragua ICJ Judgment, supra note 68 at paras 188-9, 191, 202, 205.  
71 Anderson, “Declaratory GA Resolutions”, supra note 68 at 388.  
72 This interpretation of customary international law defends the view that “…statements, whether in 
relation to concrete situations or in abstracto, provided they are framed de lege lata, are capable of 
contributing to customary rules of international law.” See Anderson, “Declaratory GA Resolutions”, 
supra note 68 at 382. Such statements can include “…physical acts, claims, declarations in abstracto 
(such as General Assembly resolutions), national laws, national judgments and omissions [and] 
practice of international organizations…”. See Michael Akehurst, “Custom as a Source of International 
Law” (1976) 47:1 Brit YB Intl L 1 at 10. This view is equally defended by numerous ICJ decisions. See 
e.g. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (Belgium v. Spain), [1970] ICJ Rep 4, Judge 
Ammoun, separate opinion at 302-3; North Sea Case, supra note 67 at 38; South West Africa (Libera v. 
South Africa), [1966] ICJ Rep 28, Judge Tanaka, dissenting opinion at 291-22; Judgment 188-9,191; 
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 68 at 68-73. For scholarly support of this view see e.g. 
Rosalyn Higgins, Development of International Law Through Political Organs of the United Nations 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963) at 6-7; Gillian D Triggs, International Law: Contemporary 
Principles and Practices, (Sydney: LexisNexis Butterworths Law, 2006) at 62-70; Ian Brownlie, 
Principles of Public International Law, 7th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 6 [Brownlie, 
“Principles of IL”]; Mark E Villiger, Customary International Law and Treaties: A Manual on the Theory 
and Practice of the Interrelation of Sources, 2nd ed (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997) at 14-6.   
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The third source of international law is described as “general principles of law.”73 
These principles originate from one of two original sources: “meta-legal principles—i.e 
principles generated within a philosophical or ethical discourse [which are then] 
introduced into a normative system – or ... principles inherent in or developed from a 
particular body of law or law in general.”74 Largely, the latter is used by international and 
regional courts as “an interpretative tool or as a source of concrete obligations.”75 The 
existence of this source of law is valuable specifically where lacunae exist in 
international law.76  
 
The fourth and final source of international law refers to “judicial decisions and 
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law.”77 The ‘subsidiary’ aspect of this source of 
law does not allow for it to carry any binding capabilities; however, it can provide vital 
evidence of the law when necessary.78 In reference to the ‘highest qualified publicists of 
the various nations,’ a good example is the International Law Commission. The 
Commission, which is comprised of highly trained jurists of international law, “initiate[s] 
studies and make recommendations for the purpose of ... encouraging the progressive 
development of international law and its codification.”79 Contemporarily, they “have 
been relied upon extensively by international courts and tribunals as an authoritative 
statement of the law on state responsibility.”80 In this thesis, their contribution to the law 
on state responsibility will be used in relation to the concept’s conflation with the law on 
the prohibition on the use of force. 
Apart from the four formal sources of international law, a number of other 
                                                
73 VCLT, supra note 12, art 38 (1)(c).  
74 Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed, “Sources of International Law” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (Oxford University Press) at para 33, online: <www.opil.ouplaw.com>.    
75 Ibid at para 34.    
76 Ibid at para 36. 
77 VCLT, supra note 12, art 38 (1) (d).  
78 James Crawford, ed, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012) at 38 [Crawford, “Brownlie’s Priniciples of IL”].    
79 UN Charter, supra note 21, art 13 (1) (a).  
80 Crawford, “Brownlie’s Priniciples of IL”, supra note 78 at 44.  
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instruments are also consulted when considering the content of international law, though 
they are not considered binding. Examples of this include reports and studies by non-
governmental or international organizations,81 considerations of humanity82 and 
legitimate interests of states.83 Such sources improve the balance between formal and 
material sources by providing governments with ‘soft law’ power, which can adapt more-
easily to changing circumstances, and act as a starting point on controversial issues such 
as for example, the scope and the extent of the universality of human rights in 
international law.84 This proves to be a valuable asset in cases where the law requires 
flexibility, as well as subject-matter expertise; factors that international law considers 
extremely important.85 
Now that the sources of international law that will be used in thesis have been 
presented, it is necessary to introduce the outline of this thesis through a brief summary 
of its main arguments.  
1.3. Organization of Thesis 
Apart from this introductory chapter, this thesis consists of three main chapters.  
Chapter 2 will begin with an exploration of the principle of self-determination, starting 
                                                
81 This example refers to the use of ‘soft law’ through the expertise of non-state contributors to the 
source of a particular area of international law. An example of this is are “manuals and guidance 
notes prepared by expert bodies [such as] the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). See Currie, supra note 23 at 152. 
82 Crawford, “Brownlie’s Priniciples of IL”, supra note 78 “[c]onsiderations of humanity are the notion 
that “human values already protected by positive legal principles which, taken together, reveal 
certain criteria of public policy and invite analogy. Such criteria are connected with general 
principles of law and equity, and need no particular justification. References to principles or laws of 
humanity appear in preambles to conventions in GA resolutions, and in diplomatic practice. The 
classic reference is a passage from Corfu Channel, in which the Court relied on certain ‘general and 
well-recognized principles’, including ‘elementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in 
peace than in war’. On occasion, the provisions of the UN Charter concerning the protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms have seen use as a basis for the legal status of considerations of 
humanity” at 46).   
83 By legitimate interest of states, it is meant that “in particular contexts the applicability of rules of 
law may depend on criteria of good faith, reasonableness, and the like. Legitimate interests, including 
economic interests, may in these circumstances be taken into account.” See ibid.  
84 See Currie, supra note 23 at 151-2. 
85 Crawford, “Brownlie’s Priniciples of IL”, supra note 78 at 44-7.  
 
16 
 
with its history and continuing through to its contemporary meaning in international law. 
The focus on self-determination will allow for a thorough analysis of the separate roles 
that secession and recognition play in both international law and international relations.86 
Subsequently, this chapter will demonstrate the existence of a right to a unilateral non-
colonial secession (UNC) through the principle of self-determination, as well as 
concomitant state practice which defines the terms under which a unilateral secession is 
possible. The overall objective of this chapter will be to establish the factors necessary 
for a legal separation of territory on the basis of self-determination.  
Chapter 3 will focus on examining the use of force in international law. 
Specifically, it will first delve into the general doctrine on the use of force in positive and 
customary international law. This summary will include a historical analysis of the jus ad 
bellum, as well as expound on the concept’s ties to the just war doctrine through its 
beginnings as part of the notion of iustum bellum (the concept of a just war.). 
Subsequently, the chapter will shift to the use of force and the creation of states, defining 
under which circumstances is the use of force legal, as well as what type of third-state 
support is permitted in circumstances where a right to self-determination is systematically 
denied. In doing so, this chapter will comb the use of force in self-determination disputes 
in both the colonial and non-colonial settings. The objective of this comparison will be to 
demonstrate the legal arguments that support the use of force in cases of external self-
determination, as well as the threshold for the interference of third-states in such 
conflicts. Lastly, a final subsection will elucidate the theoretical aspirations of the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) concept. This will be completed in order to dispute any 
connection between the argument of an obligation to and the right of military 
intervention in territorial disputes.  
                                                
86 Generally, it is challenging to separate the notion of realpolitik from a territorial dispute that 
necessitates a secession. External influences, regional location and geo-strategic interests are only 
some of the many factors that can influence a purported or completed secession in international 
relations. Therefore, this thesis will analyze both the international legal ramifications of each 
secession presented through a case study, as well as point out the inevitable self-interests of third-
states in their respective military interventions. The exact tenets of state interests in a third-state 
military intervention will be provided at the end of Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 4 of this thesis will present a detailed case study comparison that will 
incorporate all of the elements presented in Chapters 1, 2 and 3. The case study will focus 
on four territorial disputes, examining the path to their potential statehoods and clarifying 
their contemporary status’ under international law. The four case studies in question will 
be respectively: Kosovo, Bangladesh and South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The methodology 
of the case study will ensure that each territorial dispute includes an external self-
determination claim, as well as a path to statehood87 which included a third-state military 
intervention justified by an alleged commission of human rights abuses deemed as in 
extremis. At the conclusion of the case study, its most important elements will be 
combined into an analytical framework, which will outline the elements that may be used 
to justify or reject the legality of a third-state military intervention on the basis of four 
principal requirements.  Lastly, Chapter 5 is the concluding section which will provide a 
summary of the primary arguments examined in each chapter, as well as clearly define 
the exception to the prohibition on the use of force in the context of UNC secessions.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
87 By path to statehood, it is not meant that the entity in question is in fact a sovereign state. Rather, it 
is meant that the entity has invoked its right to external self-determination and subsequently, has 
requested for it to be accepted as a state under international law.  
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Chapter 2 
Chapter 2: Self-Determination, Statehood and Secession: From 
Classical to Contemporary International Law88 
 
Self-Determination is a complicated concept in international law. Although this 
thesis will be built on the well-accepted premise that “self-determination is widely 
regarded as a peremptory norm (jus cogens)”89 in international law, the applicability of 
self-determination in the face of the principles of territorial integrity and state sovereignty 
remains unclear and is often contentious.90 In fact, as the principle of self-determination 
seeks to allow ‘peoples’91  to “…freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
                                                
88 The author recognizes the existence of the ‘Third World Approaches to International Law’ (TWAIL) 
school which conducts the study of international law from the perspective of third world states. 
Although the author recognizes the importance of the TWAIL school in analyses related to euro-
centric-derived concepts such as statehood, recognition and self-determination, it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to include such an analysis for each concept. Therefore, the author recognizes that 
they are basing their historical and legal analyses on the basis of international legal concepts derived 
from euro-centric scholarship which has been influenced by imperialism and colonialism. For more 
on the TWAIL school, see Katz Cogan et al eds., The Oxford Handbook of International Organizations 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016) at 123-5.  
89 For an extensive list of scholarship supporting this claim, see Anderson, “A Post-Millennial 
Inquiry”, supra note 13 at 1185-7, n 4.  
90 The issue is divisive in that by virtue of state dismemberment contributing to regional 
destabilization, the threshold for when that dismemberment becomes legally acceptable has not been 
firmly established in international law. The remedial right theory of secession claims that a secession 
is justified when an identifiable group secedes unilaterally from its mother state on the basis of grave 
breaches of human rights committed against it (irrespective of other considerations). See Daniel H 
Meester, “Remedial secession: a positive or negative force for the prevention and reduction of armed 
conflict?” (2012) 18:2 Can Foreign Pol’y J 151 (“[t]he case against remedial secession runs along five 
main lines of argument, in that remedial secession would lead to (1) increased incentives for 
secessionism and minority persecution; (2) not requiring the consent of the predecessor state for 
secession, which has been a condition for peaceful secession historically; (3) vulnerability of such a 
system to exploitation by regional hegemons and irredentist governments; (4) practical problems 
with implementation and enforcement; and (5) unintentional undermining of efforts to increase 
internal self-determination” at 156). Contemporarily, a general ‘fear’ exists around the 
institutionalization of remedial secession. See also Crawford, “The Creation of States”, supra note 22 
at 108. 
91 The definition of the term “peoples” within the context of self-determination can be controversial. 
The author shares Glen Anderson’s opinion that “…paragraph I declares that "all peoples” enjoy the 
right to self-determination, which prima facie indicates that "peoples" is an expression of broad and 
general applicability extending to the colonial and non-colonial context.” See Anderson, “Secession in 
International Law”, supra note 4 at 351. A more concise definition of peoples will be presented 
towards the end of Chapter 4.  
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their economic, social and cultural development,”92 the question can be asked, how far 
does the principle of self-determination impact the international law on self-
determination, and do the two share a connection that requires a separate analysis of 
each? With respect to the first part of the question, Crawford mentions that the 
international law on self-determination can be considered as both a lex lata and a lex 
obscura.93 In essence, Crawford points out that a paradox exists whereby the law of self-
determination exists, yet is obscured by how the international community continues to 
receive and perceive it in both a negative and a positive light. 94 This is correct to some 
degree, as it is necessary to clarify exactly, who are the bearers of this ‘right’ of self-
determination? Consider this response to this question by Stefan Oeter: 
The overview of the historical evolution of the right of self-determination 
has demonstrated that there is a clear core area where the bearer of the right 
is beyond dispute. This is the case of decolonization, where State practice 
has confirmed that non-self-governing territories (as well as trusteeship 
territories) enjoy a clear right to self-determination, understood as a right 
freely to determine their political status. The ‘people’ in the sense of self-
determination in these cases is the autochtonous population of the non-self-
governing territories that has been grouped together to a polity by carving 
out a certain territory in colonial times in order to form a distinct political 
entity. These territories became independent States on the basis of the 
principle of uti possidetis, which means that the geographical shape of the 
territories had been definitely established in colonial times—and they 
simply inherited the boundaries from their colonial rulers. Self-
determination did not mean that there was any scope for a decision of the 
local people concerned regarding whether they wanted to belong to the 
newly independent State, or to a neighbouring State. State practice clearly 
banned such a far-reaching claim, making the inherited territorial 
boundaries inviolable.95 
 
To expound on this point, it can be suggested that the original intention behind the 
international community’s acceptance of the principle was to tolerate the right of self-
                                                
92 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 11, Can TS 1976 
No 47, (1967) 61 ILM 368 (in force 23 March 1976) [ICPR].  
93 James Crawford, “The Right of Self-Determination: Its Development and Future” in Philip Alston, 
ed, People’s Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 10.  
94 Ibid. 
95 Stefan Oeter, “Self-Determination” in Bruno Simma et al. eds., The Charter of the United Nations - A 
Commentary, Vol I, 3rd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 325 [Oeter, “Self-
Determination”].  
20 
 
determination as a means to establish a legal process for decolonization of indigenous 
and colonized peoples around the world. Nevertheless, as the decolonization era passed, a 
renewed call for the interpretation of the principle outside of the colonial context has 
reinvigorated the debate surrounding its breadth and scope under international law. As 
further expanded on by same author, the issue of whether self-determination applies to 
‘peoples’ outside of the context of colonialism is a matter of fierce debate:  
An important strand in international legal scholarship argues that every 
group of persons bound together by common objective characteristics, like 
language, culture, religion, race, might be qualified as a ‘people’, as long as 
such a group has also a common (subjective) understanding of belonging 
together and being distinct from all the other surrounding groups. Such an 
understanding might be termed as a ‘naturalist’ concept of peoples. Another 
strand insists on the territorial element of self-determination. Self-
determination, thus the argument goes, has always been linked to 
historically pre-constituted political entities with a specific territory. 
‘People’ in this understanding is not simply a group of persons, one could 
also say an ‘ethnic group’, but the constituent people of a certain territorial 
entity formed by history…A careful analysis of State practice clearly 
supports the second understanding. Beyond the context of decolonization, 
there has never been any serious international support for a claim of self-
determination raised by a simple ‘ethnic group’ having no firm territorial 
basis in a pre-existing political entity.96 
 
Therefore, on the basis of understanding how self-determination posits itself within the 
tenets of contemporary international law, it is necessary to propound on its historical 
evolution in order to establish the extent of its applicability. Prior to doing so, a final 
point must be made with regards to the principle of self-determination. The principle can 
be further separated between internal and external self-determination. The former refers 
to the granting of a certain level of autonomy and self-governance to the peoples in 
question within the territorial boundaries of a sovereign state. The latter refers to an 
invocation of a right of absolute independence from the sovereign state through an act of 
unilateral secession, implying a simultaneous withdrawal of sovereignty and territory.97 
This is important to note as, for the purposes of this thesis, the focus will remain on 
external self-determination, specifically with respect to its invocation in the non-colonial 
                                                
96 Ibid at 325-6. 
97 Ibid at 328.  
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context. 
This chapter will demonstrate the interconnectivity between the principle of self-
determination and the concept of statehood in international law. Overall, the objective 
will be to establish how the principle of self-determination has been engrained as a 
crystallized norm in international law, clearing the way for how its applicability, when 
invoked through a separation of territory, can involve the use of force under particular 
circumstances. The second portion of this argument will be expanded on in Chapter 3 of 
this thesis.  
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section of this chapter will 
provide a summary of the history of the principle of self-determination. This will be done 
in order to present an interpretation of self-determination as a “progressive concept, 
counterpoised to the divine right of kings and associated with popular revolution and 
anti-colonialism.”98 The second section of this chapter will build on the history of the 
principle by identifying how it fits into the ambit of the concept of statehood in 
international law. More specifically, a detailed historical analysis of the notion of state 
recognition will elucidate how the legal conceptualization of statehood is challenged by 
the changing nature of UNC secessionist claims. The third and final section of this 
chapter will examine the contemporary applicability of external self-determination claims 
through the existence of a qualified right to a UNC secession.  
2.1. History of Self-Determination 
It appears that the initial use of the term ‘self-determination’ became popular 
sometime during the Enlightenment era.99 Derived from the German term 
selbstbestimmung, it originally “referred to the connections between reason, individuation 
and emancipation.”100 Although the use of the term may have become popular in the 18th 
century, its etymological origin as a liberalist concept can be traced back to nearly the 
                                                
98 Anderson, “A Post-Millennial Inquiry”, supra note 13 at 1189-90. 
99 Eric D Weitz, “Self-Determination: How a German Enlightenment Idea Became the Slogan of 
National Liberation and a Human Right” (2015) 120 American History Rev 462 at 469.  
100 Anderson, “A Post-Millennial Inquiry”, supra note 13 at 1191, n 15. 
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beginning of time. Consider this analysis of the early historical roots of self-
determination by Anderson: 
A possible starting point [to the historical roots of self-determination] might 
be indigenous hunter-gatherer societies in which the clan had collective 
input into decision making, law creation, and leadership. Alternatively, it 
might be postulated that self-determination arose with the Greek city-state 
and demos kratos, whereby citizens (male and property-owning) politically 
coalesced and determined their collective destiny. Other starting points 
might include Marsilius of Padua, a fourteenth century Italian scholar who 
suggested that the consent of the people was necessary to legitimize the 
powers of a ruler, or Stanislaw of Skarbimierz, a fifteenth century Polish 
scholar the President of the Cracow Academy, who postulated the then-
progressive view that non-Christian peoples were entitled to their own 
independence.101  
Indeed, the normative meaning of self-determination can be found in the last word of 
Anderson’s analysis: independence. After-all, the relationship that self-determination 
holds with independence is one of the primary factors that renders it contested in 
international relations, as well as under international law.102 In large part, this is due to 
the well-accepted notion that secessionist movements which invoke their right to self-
determination, inevitably clash with the metropolitan state from which they seek 
independence.103 Nevertheless, although the historical beginnings of self-determination 
may remain unclear, according to Anderson, the “contemporary doctrine of self-
determination can be traced to several key historical influences: the Glorious Revolution, 
the American Revolution, the French Revolution, the political theories of Vladimir Lenin, 
and the democratic ideals of U.S president Woodrow Wilson.”104 Thus, the following 
                                                
101 Ibid at 1192.  
102 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law, 7th ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 143-
7. 
103 Bertus de Villiers, “Secession – The Last Resort for Minority Protection” (2012) 48:1 J of Asian & 
African Stud 81 at 81.  
104 Anderson, “A Post-Millennial Inquiry”, supra note 13 at 1192.  A similar historical approach is 
taken by a number of other scholars, for examples of this see generally, Aleksandar Pavkovic & Peter 
Radan, eds., On the way to Statehood: Secession and Globalisation (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, 
2008) at 10; Crawford, “The Creation of States”, supra note 22 at 96; Juha Salo, “Self-Determination: 
An Overview of History and Present State with Emphasis on the CSCE Process” (1991) 2 Finnish Y B 
Int’l L 268 at 268; James E Falkowski, “Secessionary Self-Determination: A Jeffersonian Perspective” 
(1991) 9 BU ILJ 209 at 211-3.   
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sub-section will summarize the historical development of the principle of self-
determination in Europe by following Anderson’s historical timeline of influential events, 
which, in turn, will establish the foundation of the principle in relation with the concept 
of the Westphalian state. 
2.1.1. The History of Self-Determination before the 19th century 
 
There is no overarching agreement on the origins of the independence movement 
in post-Medieval Europe.105 However, as will be pointed out in detail in the next sub-
section, a starting point, from a euro-centric perspective, can be attributed to the fall of 
divine legitimism (also known as European legitimism), or the rule by divine monarchs in 
the early 17th century.106 Indeed, its fall from popularity must be briefly summarized 
through a historical analysis of popular revolutions. Specifically, it will be established 
how the concept of self-determination, coupled with the rising notion of liberalism, acted 
as a catalyst for the era of popular revolutions in Europe throughout the 17th and 18th 
centuries.  
The removal of the English monarch, James II, through the Glorious Revolution 
(1688-1689) and his subsequent replacement by a representative parliament,107 can be 
understood to be the first step in adopting the philosophical notions of liberalism as 
evinced by such scholars as John Milton and later by John Locke and Baron de 
Montesquieu.108 In fact, as argued by Anderson, the Glorious Revolution found scholarly 
support through the writings of such authors: 
The unofficial philosophical basis for the [Glorious] Revolution was found 
in John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, which posited that 
government was a trust instituted for the benefit of citizens and attended 
                                                
105 Infra note 120.  
106 Ulrich Niggemann, “Some Remarks on the Origins of the Term ‘Glorious Revolution’” (2012) 27:4 
The Seventeenth Century 477 at 477–87 cited in Anderson, “A Post-Millennial Inquiry”, supra note 13 
at 1193. 
107 For more on Locke’s writings in relation to self-determination, see Lois G Schwoerer, “Locke, 
Lockean Ideas, and the Glorious Revolution” (1990) 51 J Historical Ideas 531 at 535. For more on 
Montesquieu’s writings, see U O Umozurike, Self-Determination in International Law (Hamden: 
Archon Books, 1972) at 8-9.   
108 Anderson, “A Post-Millennial Inquiry”, supra note 13 at 1193. 
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with their consent. The overriding aims of government were to preserve the 
physical integrity of citizens, their liberties, and their property. Locke 
argued that if government violated these basic principles it would become 
illegitimate, and citizens could then establish a new government to achieve 
these ends. Such changes, however, were only justified following “a long 
train of abuses.” Something more than “great mistakes in the ruling part, 
many wrong and inconvenient laws, and . . . slips of human frailty” was 
required.109 
 
Therefore, if one is to accept the significance of the liberalist school in the relative 
success of the Glorious Revolution, it becomes clear that its theoretical underpinnings 
can be better explained through the lens of formalist independence in the then dynasty-
dominated Europe. Further, Anderson adds that although the nature of the Revolution 
primarily revolved around representative government, its emphasis on promulgating the 
illegality of the ‘divine right of kings’ make of it “an early progenitor of modern self-
determination, even if it was as yet unrecognizable through modern eyes.”110 
Following in the footsteps of the Glorious Revolution, a wave of change swept 
across Europe and the colonized world. Building on the ideals of government that 
represents the will of the people and is equally governed by it, the United States of 
America declared its independence from England on July 4, 1776. Upon a close review of 
the United States Declaration of Independence, the normative and textual meaning of 
self-determination becomes evident: 
When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people 
to dissolve the political bonds which had connected them with another, and 
to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to 
which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent 
respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the 
causes which impel them to the separation. We hold these truths to be self-
evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, 
and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are 
instituted among Men, deriving the just powers from the consent of the 
governed. That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of 
these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute 
new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing 
                                                
109 Ibid.  
110 Ibid at 1193. 
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its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their 
Safety and Happiness. Prudence indeed, will dictate that Governments long 
established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and 
accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to 
suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the 
forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and 
usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce 
them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off 
such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.111 
Indeed, the most salient message in the Declaration was its insistence on the right of the 
American people, as a collective group, to choose their destiny if an elected government 
transiently violated their trust. Generally, this is seen as the first instance, from a euro-
centric perspective, that a state codified the right of its peoples to self-determination in a 
domestic democratic constitution, alienating the notion of colonial and monarchical rule 
on the basis of conquest and a ‘divine right to rule’.112 Conclusively, “[t]he American 
Revolution…added a progressive constitutionally-based aspect to self-determination. The 
conservative shackles of the Glorious Revolution, which only viewed political change as 
a remedy of very last resort, were perhaps slightly relaxed.”113  
As will be demonstrated in the next section, the American Revolution would not 
hasten independence for the rest of the world seeking to end monarchical rule; apart from 
one state: France.114 In the early 18th century, French Philosophers such as Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau and Baron de Montesquieu contributed greatly to the literature that would 
influence the era of popular revolutions. For example, their writings were instrumental in 
supporting the work of American revolutionaries such as Thomas Jefferson, who used 
them to advocate for independence from England.115 With regards to the series of events 
                                                
111 “Declaration of Independence of the United States of America”, online: < 
www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript">. 
112 Thürer & Burri, supra note 44 at para 1. See also Raic, supra note 13 at 173. 
113 Anderson, “A Post-Millennial Inquiry”, supra note 13 at 1195. 
114 Infra note 173.   
115 George E Rudé, “The Outbreak of the French Revolution” (1955) 8:1 Past and Present J 28 at 33-6. 
See also Robert W McGee, “Secession Reconsidered” (1994) 11:1 The J of Libertarian Studies 11 at 
15-8; Francis D Cogliano, A Companion to Thomas Jefferson (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, 
2012) at 127.  
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that led to the French Revolution, as France found itself on the brink of civil war and 
facing grain shortages through a near-empty treasury, Louis XVI (the monarch at the 
time) began to slowly lose power with the French people and nobility.116 Once it became 
known that he would side with the nobility, furthering the economic suffrage of France, 
the middle-class represented by the ‘Third-Estate’ revolted in June, 1789.117 A power 
struggle ensued, and Louis XVI was eventually deposed and subsequently executed. 
Although the French Revolution would continue attempting to implement its reforms for 
many years following the initial revolt in 1789, the text it produced, also known as la 
Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen (the Declaration of the Rights of Man), 
would become one of the first documents in modern European history which codified an 
extensive, agnostic and humanistic purview of universal human rights.118 
Unfortunately, although the text of the Declaration of the Rights of Man created a 
positive precedent with respect to its support of universal human rights for French 
citizens, its interpretation by the newly-formed French state authorities demonstrated 
early how the concept of self-determination can be used to violate the same principles it 
theoretically strove to uphold. In particular, annexations of foreign territories by French 
armies became a popular interpretation of the Declaration’s ‘French revolutionary self-
determination’, which sought to ‘liberate’ any peoples under monarchical rule through 
the use of force.119 Nevertheless, the underlying achievement of the time was the fact that 
self-determination became intertwined with the notions of liberalism and independence, 
two important factors when considering how the principle of self-determination 
developed into a peremptory norm of international law.  
To conclude, it can be understood that the notion of a peoples’ right to self-
determination became engrained as a tangible concept as part of its promulgation through 
three popular revolutions (Glorious, American and French, respectively) between the 17th 
                                                
116  Jack R Censer & Lynn Hunt, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity: Exploring the French Revolution 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004) at 8-14. 
117 Ibid at 31. 
118 Ibid at 163. 
119 Thürer & Burri, supra note 44 at paras 1-2. 
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and 18th centuries. Consequently, a contentious debate on its true meaning began in the 
19th century. In particular, the question of whether self-determination is a legal concept or 
a political one shaped the sphere of its development in both classical and, subsequently, 
contemporary international law. The next subsection will briefly touch on this point, 
while also summarizing the inception of self-determination in post-19th century Europe, 
followed by its association with nationalism, as well as socialism, and ending with its 
eventual codification in the United Nations Charter in 1945.  
 
2.1.2. The History of Self-Determination after the 19th century 
 
After the Glorious, American and French Revolutions, the principle of 
nationalism began to slowly give way to the concept of self-determination. Although the 
exact timeline of when the principle of self-determination transitioned from a political 
concept into a legal one is unclear, the fragmentation of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman 
and German Empires in the wake of the end of the First World War certainly contributed 
to its rise in popularity in early 20th century Europe.120 Nevertheless, certain scholars 
have attempted to theorize on when the principle bridged the politico-legal divide. For 
example, Crawford separates the history of self-determination into two parts: prior to and 
after 1945.121 Although, as previously mentioned, some scholars attribute the codification 
of self-determination to being founded as far back as the French and American 
Revolutions,122 Crawford prefers to associate its inception as an “operative principle 
[which] dates from the Bolshevik revolution and the peace settlements at the end of First 
World War.”123 Indeed, he points to the fact that there was little legal development of the 
principle before 1945,124 even if it was considered in principio as early as 1920 in the 
Aaland Islands case.125 An alternative viewpoint to the origins of the principle is 
                                                
120 Oeter, “Self-Determination”, supra note 95 at 317-8.  
121 Crawford, “The Creation of States”, supra note 22 at 108. 
122 Lee Seshagiri, “Democratic Disobedience: Reconceiving Self-Determination and Secession at 
International Law” (2010) 51:2 Harv Intl LJ 553 at 553.  
123 Crawford, “The Creation of States”, supra note 21 at 108. 
124 Ibid at 110.  
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presented by Thürer and Burri, who suggest that the legal development of the principle 
occurred as early as 1941.126 Although both claims have validity due to the political 
situations surrounding the development of the principle during that time (i.e. the 
promulgation of self-determination claims during the Second World War), for the 
purposes of this thesis, the principle of self-determination can be considered as having 
been developed in the legal sense sometime between the start and end of the Second 
World War. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to recognize that, even if the principle of 
self-determination was first identified as being entirely political in nature,127 its influence, 
even as a political concept, on the wave of socialist revolutions which took place in the 
beginning of the 20th century,128 as well as its subsequent consideration in the League of 
Nations at the conclusion of the First World War, warrant its consideration as part of this 
historical summary.   
The principle of self-determination was attractive to socialist thinkers in large part 
due to the fact that it highlighted the inequalities of imperialism, as well as of 
monarchical rule and conquest.129 In other words, the imposition of government through 
imperialism, colonialism or monarchical rule naturally violated a peoples’ right to self-
                                                
126 Thürer & Burri, supra note 44 “[t]he principle of self-determination was invoked on many 
occasions during World War II. It was also proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter (1941) (Declaration of 
Principles of 14 August 1941), in which President Roosevelt of the United States and Prime Minister 
Churchill of the United Kingdom declared, inter alia, that they desired to see ‘no territorial changes 
that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned’ (Principle 2 Atlantic 
Charter), that they respected ‘the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which 
they will live’ (Principle 3 Atlantic Charter) and that they wished to see ‘sovereign rights and self-
government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them’ (Principle 3 Atlantic 
Charter). The provisions of the Atlantic Charter were restated in the Declaration by United Nations 
(United Nations (UN)) signed on 1 January 1942, in the Moscow Declaration of 1943 and in other 
important instruments of the time” at para 5).  
127 Crawford, “The Creation of States”, supra note 22 at 143. 
128  The wave of socialist revolutions refers to the Russian and Spanish civil wars in 1917 and 1936 
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For more on the rise of socialism in the early 20th century, as well as the influence of socialism on the 
development of international law, see Peter Lamb & J C Doherty, Historical Dictionary of Socialism, 2nd 
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determination, which (in the opinion of socialist thinkers such as Vladimir Lenin) could 
only be solved through a federation which encompassed the self-determination rights of 
all.130 This view, which was promulgated by Lenin in the early 20th century, sought to 
underline the importance of the principle. Anderson describes Lenin’s interpretation of 
self-determination as existing in three strands: 
First, self-determination could be utilized by nationalist groups to freely 
determine their political destiny, which, by necessity, included a right to 
UNC secession. Second, self-determination could be invoked in the 
aftermath of military conflicts between sovereign states to allow the citizens 
of conquered territories to determine by whom they would like to be ruled. 
Third, self-determination could be anti-colonial, intended to expedite the 
freedom and political independence of colonial peoples.131 
As can be formulated from Anderson’s summary, multiple problems can be identified in 
Lenin’s argument for a peoples’ right to self-determination. First, all three strands, even 
just in principle, did not come to fruition during the existence of the USSR (United Soviet 
of Socialist Republics) between 1922-1991. Second, although provisions for self-
determination were included in several versions of the USSR constitution,132 their actual 
invocation and execution were nearly impossible, overshadowed by the provisional and 
ultimate objective of implementing socialism.133 Therefore, it can be inferred that, 
although Lenin and the Bolsheviks propagated the idea of ‘national self-determination’ as 
an important political weapon to rid the world of imperialism, democracy and capitalism;  
the real intention behind it was most likely the spread of socialism, to which national self-
determination belonged mostly as a propagandistic tool.134  
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promoted by the Soviet authorities can be said to have contributed significantly to the decolonization 
movement in international law, as well as to the solidification of self-determination as a jus cogens 
norm. Therefore, the socialist self-determination movement can be seen as successfully lobbying for 
the right of self-determination to be expected as a universal right of all peoples. Nevertheless, it 
cannot be ignored that contemporarily, many former socialist states consider the period of 
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Self-determination was not solely limited to socialist thinking in the early 20th 
century. In fact, at the onset of the end of the First World War, it was officially codified 
through a mandates system introduced in the Covenant of the League of Nations.135 
Originally proposed by United States’ President Woodrow Wilson as part of the peace 
negotiations after the First World War,136 the principle defended the idea of 
independence, as well as the notion of peoples being able to select their future absent of 
any foreign claims of territory or interference.137 In other words, “Wilson…came to view 
self-determination as encompassing the notion that governments must be based on “the 
consent of the governed. Citizens were therefore to have a direct and meaningful input 
into who would represent them.” 138 Yet, even though Wilson’s intention was to provide 
autonomy to formerly conquered and colonized peoples, his ideals quickly unraveled 
once the potential consequences of his words became evident through their direct 
resistance against two core concepts of the euro-centric system of states: state sovereignty 
and territorial integrity.139 Thus, the liberal- democratic interpretation of self-
determination was eventually left behind in the face of the potential consequence of 
anarchy and civil wars should it be fully implemented on an international scale.140 In 
other words, it became evident that it would be better to live in a society with less formal 
independence for indigenous peoples and communities, but more collective peace, than in 
a society whereby each peoples can lay claim to a historic right of territory on the basis of 
oppression or colonialism, and demand self-governance and territorial independence. 
Largely, this assertion is true to this day given the fact that internal self-determination 
and greater autonomy is considered a much more desirable approach than acceptance of 
an external self-determination claim executed through secession. Additionally, as 
                                                
‘Sovietization’ as an era of foreign occupation and influence. For more on this see Oeter, “Self-
Determination”, supra note 95 at 317-8; Cassese, “Self-Determination of Peoples”, supra note 6 at 19.  
135 See Covenant of League of Nations, 28 June 1919, 225 CTS 195 at art 22 (entered into force 1 
January 1924) [Covenant of League of Nations].   
136 Radan, “On the way to Statehood”, supra note 132 at 26–8.   
137 Cassese, “Self-Determination of Peoples”, supra note 6 at 21.  
138 Anderson, “A Post-Millennial Inquiry”, supra note 13 at 1199-2000. 
139 Allen Lynch, “Woodrow Wilson and the Principle of ‘National Self-Determination’: A 
Reconsideration,” (2002) 28 Rev Int’l Stud 419 at 432-4.    
140 Radan, “On the way to Statehood”, supra note 132 at 27.  
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“international boundaries are constructions of humans at a specific point in time,”141 there 
can be very little room for argument that a return to historical boundaries should not have 
a set temporal standard. It should also be mentioned that contemporary international law 
addresses the contentiousness of historical territorial boundaries through the uti possidetis 
juris principle, which a priori, prevents territorial boundaries from changing in cases of 
self-determination.142 
 
Hence, all things considered, the principle of self-determination’s legal evolution 
can be attributed to the post-Second World War period, starting with its inclusion in the 
United Nations Charter.143 Eventually, treaties,144 international cases,145 and affirmations 
                                                
141 de Villiers, supra note 103 at 83.  
142  It should be noted that the principle of uti possidetis juris was established during the era of 
decolonization and was meant, above-all, to prevent newly decolonized states from claiming new and 
historical boundaries on the basis of their newly found independence. As can be deduced from this 
definition, it cannot be ignored that in superficie, the principle is an unfair concept whereby a 
peoples’ under colonial rule who achieve independence, must adhere to the same boundaries drawn 
up by the colonial states they fought for independence from. Nevertheless, the inevitable anarchy 
that would follow should newly independent states, whether former or colonies or not, be able to 
claim historical boundaries, prevents any considerations of alternative options to the principle. This 
argument has been reaffirmed in the Frontier Dispute judgment, where the ICJ held that “[uti 
possidetis juris] is a general principle, which is logically connected with the phenomenon of the 
obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent the independence 
and stability of new States being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of 
frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering power.” See Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. 
Republic of Mali), Judgment, [1986] ICJ Rep 554 at para 20.  For more on the debate surrounding the 
principle in international law, see Currie, supra note 23 at 217-21.  
143 UN Charter, supra note 21, arts 1 (2), 52,55.    
144 Some of these treaties are, respectively: Declaration of the Granting of Independence, supra note 5; 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res 2625 (XXV), UNGAOR, 25th Sess, 
5 UN Doc A/2625 (1970) Principle 5 [Friendly Relations Declaration]; International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3, Can TS 1976 No 46 art 1 
(entered into force 3 January 1976) [ICESR]; ICPR, supra note 92, art 1; African Charter of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981, 1520 UNTS 245 at arts 19–22 (entered into force 21 October 1986) 
[ACHPR]; Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, GA Res 48/121, UNGAOR, 48th Sess, UN Doc 
A/CONF 157/23 (12 July 1993) at para 2 [Vienna Declaration]; United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UN Doc A/RES/61/295, reprinted in UNGAOR, 61st 
Sess, Supp No 49, Vol III at 15-25 UN Doc/A/61/49 (2007)[Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples].    
145 See e.g. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect 
of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, [2010] ICJ Rep 403 [Advisory Opinion on Kosovo]; Reference Re Secession 
of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 [Quebec Secession Reference]; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a 
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through United Nations General Assembly resolutions,146 confirmed the crystallization of 
the principle into a peremptory norm of international law.147 Furthermore, the principle 
became cited by domestic courts. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada in the 
Quebec Secession Reference (1998), discussing the potential secession of the province of 
Quebec, stated that: 
…the existence of the right of a people to self-determination is now so 
widely recognized in international conventions that the principle has 
acquired a status beyond "convention" and is considered a general principle 
of international law. 148 
 
Similar examples of these affirmations can be found in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights149 as well as Articles 1 (2) and 55 of the United Nations 
Charter.150 As such, the importance of this principle must be examined through both a 
legal and a historico-political lens, in an effort to identify how it has come to be identified 
with the act of secession. Additionally, the consideration of the principle alongside other 
concepts that it touches on directly, such as statehood formation and the recognition of 
states, requires further inquiry. The next section will expand on these considerations by 
examining the post-Second World War development of the relationship between the three 
concepts, as well as their contemporary status’ under international law.  
 
 
                                                
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, [2004] ICJ Rep 136 [Wall Advisory 
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146 Inclusion in the International Covenant or Covenants on Human Rights of an Article Relating to the 
Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, GA Res 545 (VI), UNGAOR, 6th Sess, UN Doc A/Res/545 (1952).  
147 Thürer & Burri, supra note 44 at para 13. 
148 Cassese, “Self-Determination of Peoples”, supra note 6 at 171-2; K Doehring, "Self-Determination" 
in Bruno Simma, ed, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1994) at 70 as cited in Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 145 at para 114. 
149 ICPR, supra note 92, art 1(1).  
150 See UN Charter, supra note 21 (“[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate 
measures to strengthen universal peace… [w]ith a view to the creation of conditions of stability and 
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2.2. Statehood, Recognition and Self-Determination 
The legal challenges associated with the interpretation of the principle of self-
determination begin when attempting to understand it as part of the process of state 
creation. Moreover, whether the principle exists as a legal right or a political one remains 
a divisive issue. Principally, this contention can be attributed to the fact that “[s]elf-
determination as a legal right or principle threatened to bring about significant changes in 
the political geography of the world, not limited to the dismemberment of Empires.”151 
Thus, a potential change of ‘political geography’ prompts the study of the concept of 
statehood in international law. This section will do this by addressing the interrelatedness 
of self-determination, secession and statehood processes, specifically within the context 
of newly formed states through UNC secessions. Additionally, this section will expand 
on the act of secession – a corollary process in certain cases of self-determination – from 
which the notion of state recognition can be properly analyzed and its significance 
defined from both the legal and political perspectives.  
 
2.2.1. History of Statehood in International law 
The birth of independent states in Europe relates closely to the development of the 
concepts of statehood, recognition and self-determination in international law. Indeed, the 
rise in unilateral secessions in the 18th and 19th centuries provides a clear example of how 
the concepts evolved since the development of European statehood starting in early 17th 
and 18th century Europe.152 According to Fabry, a clear connection can be drawn between 
the birth of European states and their respective state recognitions through the Westphalia 
Treaties, which are “conventionally understood as ushering in sovereignty as a new mode 
                                                
151 Crawford, “The Creation of States”, supra note 22 at 108. 
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of political and legal organization.”153 Although this claim is not universally accepted,154 
Fabry points out that: 
Mindful of possible pitfalls of being too categorical about the exact date of 
origin of [state] institutions, two points can be made about the early phase 
of recognition of new states. It could emerge as a full-fledged and discrete 
practice only once European countries came to regard themselves as 
forming a large association of formally like entities and once positive law 
of this association gained a distinct foothold over natural law as its defining 
institution. 155 
As can be deduced from Fabry’s analysis, state recognition is not only connected with the 
birth of European statehood, but also with the general secularization of classical 
international law that began to take place towards the end of the 18th century156 (also 
known as the rise of legal positivism157). Thus, in order to better understand the geo-
political landscape of 18th century-Europe, it is necessary to present a short summary of a 
number of important historical events which furthered the development of the concept of 
statehood in relation to classical international law.  
The principle of European legitimism (also known as dynastic legitimism) 
dominated the nature of statehood up until the 18th century. Grant describes it as the 
“prevalent theory of sovereignty during the age of monarchy.”158 At its core, this model 
                                                
153 Mikulas Fabry, Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishment of New States 
Since 1776 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 23.  
154 Ibid (“[w]hile Martin Wight finds some evidence of modernity as early as the Council of Constant 
(1414-18), F H Hinsley argues that we can only talk about a fully formed system of independent 
states since the beginning of the eighteenth century…” at 24). 
155 Ibid at 23.  
156 The first “writings on recognition of new states can be traced to the German jurists Jacob Moser 
(1778), Johann von Steck (1783), and George-Friedrich von Martens (1789).”  Their works rose in 
importance due to an increased interest of legal positivism towards the end of the 18th century, 
which sought to define the practice of states as a way to formulate legal guidance for the creation of 
new states moving forward. See ibid at 24. 
157 See Currie, supra note 23 ([l]egal positivism is “[g]enerally characterized by three core 
suppositions. First, true law is created only by a “laying down” of that law, at a discrete point in 
history. Second, this “laying down” must be performed by a sovereign entity. Third, such laws are 
effective, even if unjust when measured against some other, moral (or natural law) standard. Thus, 
for extreme positivists, law exists only to the extent that it is effectively imposed by a sovereign 
power, and it persists as law even if viewed as unjust by some other measure” at 15).  
158 Ibid at 8. 
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rested upon the ‘principle of inheritance’159 – whereby the monarch had personal 
ownership of the land and had a “historic right to rule the state.”160 In essence, even if 
monarchs were to be dethroned, they would continue to reign as the rightful sovereign of 
their lands and properties. While this concept was firmly entrenched up until and 
throughout 18th century-Europe, it began to lose traction after the American and French 
Revolutions, and was abandoned altogether in 1918 after the disappearance of “the four 
great monarchies (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Turkey).”161 As mentioned in 
the previous sub-section, this disappearance can be attributed prima facie to the rise of 
liberalism. The liberalist school of thought, as promulgated by scholars such as John 
Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant, believed that citizens of states were 
the ‘source of political authority’162 rather than the monarch. This belief was based on the 
notion that humans had the ability to reason and were therefore “capable of determining 
the political direction of their countries.”163 Additionally, the liberalist school posited 
that, for a government to be legitimate, “it must be based on the will of the people – those 
subject to it – and not on the ‘benevolent will of kings.’164 According to Locke, a prolific 
scholar of the liberalist school, the consent of the people was the key element to the 
foundation of states.165 With the declining notion of dynastic legitimism in Europe, the 
notion of statehood became more and more secularized, and consequently developed as 
part of a custom of democratic and mostly-independent states. Additionally, the decline 
in the legitimacy of unprovoked foreign conquests (apart from the Napoleonic era) was 
also responsible for advocating for a system of independent states by way of 
recognition.166 Nonetheless, two major events are said to have been the primary catalysts 
for the development of the concept of state recognition from a political to a legal concept: 
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160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid at 9. 
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respectively, they were the American and French revolutions of 1776 and 1789.167 It is 
necessary to elaborate on  the circumstances that led to their commencement, as well as 
their subsequent influence on the Congress of Vienna168 which solidified the notion of 
independent states in Europe. 
The matter of recognizing an emerging state, created through a manner other than 
dynastic European legitimism, can be traced back to the proclamation of independence by 
the thirteen colonies to create the United States of America (US) on July 4, 1776. In 
particular, the issue of recognizing a former colony became a notion of concern for many 
European states, who were forced to consider the potential diplomatic and military 
implications of such an action. Hence, for nearly a decade after the proclamation, support 
for the US was only expressed by-proxy by powerful imperialist states such as France 
and Netherlands, which were favourable to the revolution, but in a bid not to inflame a 
new European conflict, promoted their interests and their support to the US 
revolutionaries through private companies or secret organizations.169 More specifically, 
while both states refused to officially recognize the sovereignty of the United States, they 
supplied it with advisors and military arms to support the American war effort against 
                                                
167 Ibid. 
168 “Congress of Vienna” in Britannica Academic, Encyclopaedia Britannica, online: 
<www.academic.eb.com> ([t]he “Congress of Vienna, [was an] assembly [which took place] in 1814–
15 that reorganized Europe after the Napoleonic Wars. It began in September 1814, five months after 
Napoleon I’s first abdication and completed its “Final Act” in June 1815, shortly before the Waterloo 
campaign and the final defeat of Napoleon. The settlement was the most-comprehensive treaty that 
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I, it was customary for historians to condemn the statesmen of Vienna. It was later realized how 
difficult their task was, as was the fact that they secured for Europe a period of peace, which was its 
cardinal need. The statesmen failed, however, to give to international relations any organ by which 
their work could be adapted to the new forces of the 19th century, and it was ultimately doomed to 
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Britain.170 Eventually, the Netherlands recognized the United States in 1782 by 
“admitting Adams [US representative] as minister plenipotentiary and thus 
acknowledging the United States as a sovereign state.”171 Subsequently, Britain conceded 
and recognized US independence in a peace treaty in 1783. The consequences of this 
example of recognition are summarized by Fabry: 
The United States became widely recognized and thus admitted into 
international society only after it had become acknowledged as independent 
by its parent country. To treat it as a sovereign state before this 
acknowledgment was considered by most states to be a hostile act violating 
the rights of the British crown…The American case revealed other 
important things in regards to state recognition. It demonstrated the fate 
awaiting unrecognized entities: before its acknowledgment and despite the 
assertions of the Declaration of Independence, the United States could not 
sign international treaties, have diplomatic relations, form formal military 
alliances, raise foreign loans, join international organizations, or benefit 
from regularized trade and commerce. Its survival depended almost solely 
on its internal strength.172 
 
Finally, France recognized the United States through a treaty with US commissioners in 
1788.173 Although the recognition of the United States established a precedent in dynastic 
Europe for the creation of states through ‘consent of the governed’,174 another event in 
the same century created a lasting effect that would impact European dynastic legitimism 
in particular: the French Revolution of 1789. The French Revolution was a further 
disruption to the “order based predominantly on the rule of legitimate royal houses.”175 
As previously mentioned, actions such as the passing of the Declaration of Man and of 
the Citizen which acknowledged the right of peoples to freely choose their government, 
were not readily accepted by the rest of the European community. On the contrary, as a 
result of Napoleonic defeat, such notions were disregarded entirely until the early 20th 
century.176  
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Although the French Revolution espoused the notion of self-determination, 
contradictions persisted with respect to how it could be administered as a principle of a 
newly secularized and universal customary law. By acknowledging that the principle of 
self-determination was valid not simply for France, but for the entire world, the French 
revolutionaries decided that they had the ultimate obligation to propagate this right to the 
peoples of the world. In other words, they believed that France had a right to interfere in 
the affairs of foreign states so long as it meant the reinstitution of the ‘will of the 
governed’.177 Although, as previously mentioned, this idea failed in large part through the 
defeat of Napoleon in 1815; a consensus on allowing new states to be formed without the 
consent of their original sovereign state was disavowed entirely if such ‘independence’ 
came as a result of a foreign invasion or occupation. Fabry suggests that this claim 
confirms two points with regards to the concept of statehood in the 19th century:  
International legitimacy in the pre-1815 period clearly centered on the 
notion of state rights in customary international law, which, given that most 
states were hereditary monarchies, was taken to imply dynastic 
rights…[and] the insistence on these rights despite changes in effective 
statehood (i.e., appearance and disappearance of de facto states) shows that 
the ability to take effective control of a territory, whether from within or 
without, could not, by itself, establish legitimate titles.178 
Stated otherwise, the pre-1815 history of state recognition began through a reverberation 
of dynastic legitimism, leading to the development of certain precedents as a result of the 
subsequent revolutions in the United States and France. Additionally, the occupation of 
territory, which occurred frequently during this time on account of multiple intra-state 
armed conflicts in Europe, did not lead to an acquiescence of de jure land rights.179 These 
two points should not be disregarded with respect to state recognition. In fact, they could 
be said to be precursors to the ensuing dissolution of euro-centric colonial empirical 
model of statehood and the extensive decolonization of the world which took place 
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towards the end of the 19th and 20th centuries.180 The next sub-section will explore the 
impact of these two points as a result of the conceived pre-1815 understanding of state 
recognition, leading to analyze the concepts that emerged as a result of its relative 
success in Europe: self-determination and secession.  
The American and French Revolutions of 1776 and 1789 led to an overturn of the 
European dynastic order; however, it was another area of the world that would usher in a 
new era of sovereignty. Between 1810 and 1830, Central and South America “witnessed 
the birth of twelve new countries.”181 In fact, according to Fabry, it was here (and not in 
Europe) that dynastic legitimacy received “its first sustained blow.”182  More precisely, as 
colonies seceded from their colonizing states, a debate raged around the question of 
whether an existing state’s recognition was a sine qua non for statehood or not.183 For 
example, multiple scholars at the time could not come to a consensus on whether an 
existing state’s recognition legitimized a secession in the eyes of the classical 
international legal system. As per Anderson: 
[For example,] Pufendorf maintained that the existing state's recognition 
was necessary for a secessionist entity to obtain statehood. A priori, an 
entity created by consensual or unilateral secession must enjoy the existing 
state's recognition before statehood could be legally conferred. Other early 
scholars, however, such as Vattel, took a different view, arguing that the 
existing state's recognition was unnecessary.184 
 
Nevertheless, even as scholars were unable to come to a consensus on the legal strength 
of state recognition, one potential theory observes that the debate on the legitimacy of 
state recognition as a legal requirement for statehood could be considered as settled from 
1809, as “various Spanish colonies declared their independence from Madrid and 
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functioned without any effective Spanish opposition for over a decade.”185 It goes on to 
claim that although the US feared a potential military conflict with Spain, it felt pressure 
to recognize the former Spanish colonies in an effort to encourage the secession of 
colonized states from colonial rule. Subsequently, in June 1822, “contrary to Spanish 
desires, U.S. President James Monroe extended recognition to Colombia. Similarly, the 
British extended recognition to Argentina in February 1825, Colombia in April 1825, and 
Mexico in December 1826.”186 It is clear from these examples that the consent of Spain 
was not considered by the US in recognizing its former colonies, thereby changing the 
previous custom which dictated that recognition be granted to a seceding colony only 
after the official recognition of the secession by the colonizing state. On a side note, even 
though the de facto recognition of secessions became an “undisputed standard of 
recognition in America and the Americas,”187 its challenge to legitimist powers 
established a new standard in customary international law which assumed that the newly 
formed state would observe and be bound by all international treaties concerning it, prior 
to its accession to statehood.188 Although this notion imposed a respect for a legal system 
derived from the same colonizing states that conquered territories in the first place, the 
challenge to the status quo imbued the first step in throwing off the yolk of legitimist 
powers in former colonies. 
Nevertheless, the disagreements on the legitimacy of de facto and de jure state 
recognitions had not been resolved towards the end of the 18th century.189 It was only in 
the middle of the 19th century, and with a crumbling Ottoman Empire, that states began to 
realize that state recognition plays an important role in the political formation process of 
statehood. As further explained by Frowein: 
In the 19th century some examples of collective recognition became 
important. Art. 7 Paris Peace Treaty (1856) ([1855–56] 114 CTS 409) was 
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generally seen as a collective act with regard to admission and recognition 
of Turkey as a member of the European legal order. [Additionally,] the 
Berlin Congress (1878) amounted to the collective recognition of territorial 
changes and the independence of several States formerly under Turkish 
sovereignty.190 
Through the Paris Peace Treaty, the debate around state recognition now remerged with a 
focus on collective recognition of statehood, and whether it provided legal status to a 
newly formed state or not. Eventually, this debate led a congregation of states to sign the 
Convention on Rights and Duties of States adopted by the Seventh International 
Conference of American States191 (commonly known as the Montevideo Convention) in 
1933. The Convention set out four criteria as necessary for a state to achieve legitimacy 
under international law. According to the Convention, 
[t]he state as a [legal] person of international law should possess the 
following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; 
(c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other 
states.192  
Nonetheless, the vagueness of the four criteria, coupled with their applicability to a 
changing dynamic of statehood in the 20th century, has not solved the issue of 
determining a strict set of rules required in order for an entity to become a state under 
international law. In many ways, this has left the emergence of new states in the 20th and 
21st centuries, a matter of open and contested debate. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
extent of the Conventions’ influence has been a matter of contested debate,193 it must be 
noted nonetheless that it continues to serve as the cornerstone of modern statehood in the 
21st century, with the ‘classical criteria’ of statehood continuing to define the 
effectiveness and existence of a ‘state’ under international law.194 
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As the Montevideo requirements set out the only codified legal guidelines for 
obtaining statehood in the early 20th century, an important question began to be posed 
after the First World War: under what conditions should an entity be refused statehood. 
In other words, are there conditions or circumstances under which a state should refuse to 
recognize an emerging state?195 Frowein explains the importance of considering this 
question, as the actions of an emerging state and its relations with other states cannot be 
ignored if its statehood claim of may be illegitimate. He explains this dilemma in the 
following manner: 
To establish what States consider to be the essential criteria for statehood, 
it is more expedient to consider under which circumstances they refuse 
recognition as a State (Non-Recognition). There are two main reasons why 
States have withheld full recognition although, at least on the face of it, 
some entity resembling a State existed. The reason most frequently given is 
lack of independence in relation to a State which has brought the new entity 
into existence by unlawful intervention… It is this reason which was 
advanced for the non-recognition of Manchukuo as a Japanese ‘puppet-
State’ in the 1930s or of Croatia as a German creation of that sort in the 
1940s… A second reason, which was used to withhold recognition in the 
case of Rhodesia (Rhodesia/Zimbabwe), was the fact that independence had 
been brought about by a white minority government in a former colonial 
territory in the 1960s. The clear lack of any act of self-determination was 
seen as justifying non-recognition.196 
Put differently, the violation of peremptory norms of international law such as the 
unlawful use of force (military intervention and invasion)197 or denial of the right to self-
determination for all peoples within an emerging state,  could delegitimize the emerging 
states’ bid for statehood from an international legal perspective, and consequently 
alienate it from recognition by other states.198 The importance of complying with  
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peremptory norms as part of the statehood formation process will be expanded on in more 
detail towards the end of this chapter; however, the connection between the process of 
statehood formation and the concept of state recognition cannot be ignored when 
analyzing the principle of self-determination.  
 In sum, the history of state recognition emerged out of a dying European dynastic 
order. Although the revolutions in France and the United States disseminated the notions 
of self-determination and elected government, state recognition remained largely a 
symbolic measure until the early 19th century. Through the development of the definition 
of statehood in international law, a positivist campaign to codify its requirements ended 
with the signing of the Montevideo Convention in 1933. Although the Convention 
emerged as the foundation for the contemporary requirements of statehood, it failed to 
engender change in the legal interpretation of the statehood formation process in the face 
of decolonization and conflict (specifically, for ‘peoples’ seeking self-determination.)199 
Further, throughout and after the First and Second World Wars, the concept of statehood 
shifted from embracing self-determination, to its incorporation into the decolonization 
campaign orchestrated by the United Nations in the early 1960s. However, state 
recognition reemerged as a contested subject in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. In fact, through the adoption of the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States 
in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union,200 which set the stage for a more modern 
interpretation of statehood requirements for emerging states in Eastern Europe, it became 
less clear whether state recognition can continue to be interpreted as a symbolic rule 
under international law. In order to solve this issue, the next sub-section will explore the 
connection of state recognition with the act of secession, as well as its relationship with 
the principle of self-determination and the concept of state sovereignty. This will be 
accomplished through a brief contemporary analysis of the Montevideo criteria, as well 
as a summary of the issues posed by its applicability to secessions completed on the basis 
of self-determination. Subsequently, a summary of the three theories of recognition will 
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demonstrate the strength of the declaratory theory of recognition in cases of external self-
determination, establishing the importance of considering the legal aspects of a UNC 
secession, rather than relying on its recognition by other states as a way of legitimizing its 
existence.  
2.2.2. The “Montevideo” criteria explained 
The challenge of interpreting the four criteria of statehood outlined in the 
Montevideo Convention is that “…[i]nternational law does not impose rigid or arbitrary 
quantitative criteria when it comes to [their] requirements. There must be some territory, 
some permanent population, some effective government and enough independence to 
enter into international relations.”201 Therefore, when looking at each criterion 
individually, it becomes evident that their classical definition is viewed more as a flexible 
legal rule rather than a rule of law strictu sensu. In order to demonstrate this, as well as 
how the arbitrariness of the criteria impacts the act of secession, a careful study of each 
criterion is necessary. 
The first criterion requires a state to have a defined territory. The debate over 
what is meant by the term “defined” has led scholars to suggest that its most fair 
interpretation, is that a defined territory must be based on territorial boundaries that the 
state in question agrees upon (even if such territorial boundaries are contested by other 
states.)202 This is supported by two ICJ cases, North Sea Continental Shelf203 and 
Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad.204 The only instance where this claim 
could be challenged is where a state consistently changes its boundary claims for a 
‘defined territory’. For example:  
…Serbian Krajina's attempted secession from Croatia failed to satisfy the 
defined territory criterion, due to the constantly shifting nature of its 
external borders. It was unclear, for instance, which municipalities were 
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included within Serbian Krajina and which were excluded…205 
 
Therefore, as can be seen through this example, a defined territory can be claimed by an 
emerging state, under the condition that the original boundary claim cannot be changed 
once an act of secession is initiated. 
The second criterion requires that a state have a permanent population. 
Concerning the stringency of the term ‘permanent’, the Western Sahara206 advisory 
ruling pointed out that a population of a territory does not need to be permanent in the 
sense of its constant habitation within the confines of the claimed territory.207 This view 
has been supported by most scholars when analyzing claims of land title based on a 
permanent population criterion in remote communities such as the Arctic, Antarctic and 
northern parts of Greenland for example.208 Consequently, this criterion can be 
interpreted as requiring only that a defined population, considered as inhabiting within a 
defined territory, exist for a claim of statehood to be made legitimate.  
The third criterion requires a state to have an effective government. Out of the 
four criteria, this one has proven to be the most complex in its interpretation, in particular 
with regards to its applicability in cases of decolonization.209 For example, Anderson 
suggests that the challenge of the traditional definition of the concept can be seen through 
“two interrelated limbs: first, there should be a political, executive, and legal structure for 
the purpose of regulating the population; and second, this political, executive, and legal 
structure must be effective, which means that it must be able to project authority 
throughout the population…”.210 Of note is that this interpretation has shifted with the 
emergence of the principle of self-determination, which has affirmed that a government 
of a state does not have to be fully effective in order for this criterion to have been 
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satisfied. 211 Nevertheless, this interpretation has not been universally accepted by 
contemporary legal scholarship. For example, Crawford provides an alternative view, 
claiming that the effective government criterion is central to the existence of the state. 
This is evidenced by the fact that “…territorial sovereignty is not ownership but 
governing power with respect to territory.”212  The challenge with accepting that a state 
must have an effective government prima facie is that it becomes exclusionary in cases of 
unilateral secessions, specifically when an entity secedes to form an emerging state, yet 
whose government does not possess the capacity to execute its functions as a state 
(legislative, executive and/or judicial). As an entity invoking its right to self-
determination could unilaterally secede on the basis of that right, the effectiveness of its 
government could not meet the requirements of effectiveness, as interpreted by Crawford, 
at the time of the secession. Thus, the question can be asked: in that particular scenario, 
does the entity lose its legal personality as a new state on the basis of it not meeting the 
requirement of having an effective government? The answer may lie in the 
‘compensatory force principle’, which, as suggested by Raic and Anderson, can explain 
the exceptional status of a state government post-secession:  
In the second half of the twentieth century…the effective government 
criterion has been modified by the law of self-determination. This 
modification-termed by Raic the "compensatory force principle" has 
ensured that a state created by UNC secession and in conformity with the 
right of peoples to self-determination will not be required to strictly satisfy 
the effective government criterion. Conversely, contemporary international 
law indicates that a state created by UNC secession in violation of the right 
of peoples to self-determination will be simply unable to satisfy the 
effective government criterion. On this basis, it might be asserted that the 
effective government criterion has been reformulated as coextensive with 
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the right of peoples to external self-determination.213 
 
State practice has also supported the existence of the compensatory force principle. In 
fact, multiple cases of state secessions during the decolonization era of the 1960s, such as 
Guinea-Bissau, Algeria, Angola and Republic of Congo, provide evidence of how a state 
can be created without an effective government in place.214 Outside of the decolonization 
context, states created by UNC secessions on the basis of systematic denials of self-
determination such as Kosovo, Bangladesh and Eritrea have similarly been granted 
statehood without governments that were considered effective at the time.215 A priori, it 
can be concluded that a putative state must have at least a functioning government; 
however, full effectiveness of the government is not a stringent requirement in cases of 
self-determination, and must be carefully analyzed on a case-by-case basis, as in the case 
of Kosovo, where a complete absence of government did not preclude it from obtaining 
statehood.216  
 The fourth and last criterion requires that a state must have the capacity to enter 
into relations with other states. Crawford and Anderson both agree that this criterion is 
actually a combination of both the effective government criterion and a ‘fifth’ criterion of 
independence.217As independence is a crucial factor in cases of UNC secessions (even 
more-so in cases of self-determination),218 a consortium of scholars has advocated for its 
inclusion into the contemporary criteria for statehood.219 There is widespread agreement 
that the criterion can be divided into two categories, formal and actual independence. 
Formal independence refers to the seceding entity as being self-governed, deriving its 
rule of law from domestic legislation such as a constitution or a declaration of 
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independence. Conversely, actual independence stipulates that the state must take its own 
directives with regards to its independence. In other words, a bona fide statehood must 
exist which ensures that the state acts on its own will and in good faith without foreign 
interference.220 Stated otherwise, both categories of independence must exist 
concomitantly. Therefore, the criterion of having the capacity to enter into relations with 
other states relies on the requirements of formal and actual independence. This 
interpretation must be carefully considered, given that a state without independence or an 
effective government (even in the ‘not-entirely effective’ sense) will be unable to enter 
into relations with other states, and hence, may not earn legal personality under 
international law.221  
 In sum, the four criteria, although fundamental to the conceptualization of 
statehood in international law, are vague in their respective definitions while still 
representing a flexible legal rule under international law. The most convincing factor 
evidencing this claim is that independence, although not officially recognized under the 
Convention, “…remains a central criterion for statehood.”222 Nevertheless, it should also 
be noted that the concept of independence can be correlated directly with the concept of 
sovereignty, which “can be notoriously vexing to define.”223 In large part, this is due to 
the fact that state sovereignty should presumably acknowledge a state’s ability to act 
independently. The next sub-section will explain this correlation, as well as how the 
concepts of sovereignty and state recognition fit into the tenets of the modern 
conceptualization of statehood under international law.  
2.2.3. Sovereignty, Statehood and Recognition 
Identifying the characteristics of a state which grant it ‘legal personality’ is a 
challenging task. Apart from referencing the Montevideo criteria, no general agreement 
exists on the matter, leading one to rely on scholarly opinion to understand the concept of 
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a new state achieving sovereignty in both a legal and a political sense.224 As mentioned 
earlier, Sovereignty is of fundamental importance within the context of statehood as it 
defines the exclusive status of states within international law. No other entity possesses 
such an exclusive right and status. When consulting opinio juris on the subject, one is 
pointed to the words of Justice Alvarez who stated in his dissenting opinion in Corfu 
Channel that:  
By sovereignty, we understand the whole body of rights and attributes 
which a State possesses in its territory, to the exclusion of all other States, 
and also in its relations with other States. Sovereignty confers rights upon 
States and imposes obligations upon them…225 
Alternatively, in Customs Regime Between Germany and Austria,226 Justice Anzilotti 
interpreted sovereignty as factually being conflated with independence. He held that: 
The term independence is no more than the normal condition of States 
according to international law; it may also be described as sovereignty 
(suprema potestas), or external sovereignty, by which is meant that the State 
has over it no higher authority than that of international law.227  
As can be seen from both definitions, the concept of sovereignty surpasses any criteria 
that may formulate statehood and by that fact is considered jus cogens in international 
law. This view is further expanded on by Crawford to include ‘international rights of a 
state’ as well: 
In its most common modern usage, sovereignty is the term for ‘the totality 
of international rights and duties recognized by international law’ as 
residing in an independent territorial unit – the State. It is not itself a right, 
nor is it a criterion for statehood (sovereignty is an attribute of States, not a 
precondition).228  
In demonstrating the potency of sovereignty as an attribute only subject to the 
overarching limits of international law,229 Crawford confirms that it is in fact a qualified 
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and not an absolute right. In other words, a state can assert sovereignty and legal 
jurisdiction only over its own territory, and is restricted only by the limits imposed on it 
by international law through treaties, customs and general principles.230 Indeed, by 
concluding that sovereignty is not absolute, it can equally be inferred that a unilateral 
secession’s withdrawal of territory from part of an existing state to create a new one, by 
virtue of that separation, also leads to a withdrawal of sovereignty and legal title from the 
existing state’s territory.231 Thus, once the territory has withdrawn from the existing 
territory to create a new state, a final step looks to the recognition of the new territory as 
playing an important role in its existence. The next sub-section will explore the role of 
state recognition in greater detail, outlining the three theories of recognition, and 
establishing whether the role of state recognition in international law is simply a 
symbolic act acknowledging the legitimacy of the state or an absolute sine qua non for 
statehood under international law.  
2.2.4. Three Theories of Recognition in International Law 
As previously mentioned, the theoretical approach to recognition was initiated in 
response to the growing confusion surrounding the creation of new states. In other words, 
it was developed in order to establish an understanding of the requirements for statehood 
beyond the Montevideo Convention criteria.232 Additionally, as statehood in international 
law derives its roots from a euro-centric concept founded during the era of European 
imperialism, the understanding that states are not a creation of international law, rather 
that international law is premised on their existence, must be emphasized.233 Moreover, 
the practice of states towards recognition in the past century has consistently focused 
more on the grounds for non-recognition of emerging states, paving the way to suggest 
that statehood will not be granted if an egregious violation of international law was 
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committed as part of the statehood formation process.234 This section will briefly 
summarize the three main theories of recognition: collective-constitutive, declaratory and 
constitutive, with the objective of confirming the reasons for which the declaratory theory 
is considered as the primary theory that explains the role of recognition under existing 
international law.  
2.2.4.1. The Collective and Collective-Constitutive Theories 
The collective and collective-constitutive theories of international law stipulate 
that recognition by other states is a sine qua non for statehood.235 The most significant 
difference between the two theories is that the collective-constitutive theory suggests that 
collective recognition by states is a sine qua non for statehood, whereby the collective 
theory of recognition stipulates that any number of states (even individual states) can 
grant their recognition to acknowledge a state’s legal existence. Although both theories 
tend to focus on the creation of new states in the 20th century, no mention of support for 
the constitutive theory can be found when referencing international treaty law.236 On the 
contrary, in regards to the collective-constitutive theory, suggestions of recognition as 
being implicitly connected to membership in the United Nations (UN) do exist.237 One 
such suggestion looks at Article 4 of the UN Charter as evidence that “admission to the 
UN is tantamount to the conferral of statehood by collective means.”238 Several issues 
exist with this claim. First, the term ‘state’ was used specifically in the wording of Article 
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4 (1) of the UN Charter to contrast the wording in Article 1(2) of the League of Nations 
Covenant,239which granted membership to “any fully governing State, Dominion or 
Colony.”240 The exclusion of such entities was intended to avoid the admission of 
member-states not considered as having the status of a sovereign state. Second, as 
suggested by Anderson, when analyzing the travaux preparatoires of the UN Charter, a 
response to the “Norwegian proposal to endow the UN with the power to recommend 
collective recognition of statehood was discarded.”241In essence, both constitutive and 
constitutive-collective theorists see the consent of states as the ineluctable feature for 
obtaining statehood under the current system of states. Nevertheless, scholars have not 
entirely discarded support for the collective recognition theories. For example, Dugard 
indicates that there are several major issues with the arguments that interpret collective 
recognition as having weak legal standing under international law. First, the implication 
that a ‘state is a state through the recognition of other states’, suggests that there is no 
absolute existence of states.242 A primary example of this is Kosovo, which exists as an 
independent state (as confirmed through its acknowledgement by over 100 states);243 
however, its non-recognition by a number of powerful states such as Russia,244 India245 
and China246 implies that, to them, Kosovo does not exist as a state and thus cannot be 
granted the same international rights as other sovereign states. Similar issues occurred 
during the Cold War with the recognitions and non-recognitions of East and West 
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Germany, and North and South Vietnam and Korea by the US and the USSR. It should be 
noted that efforts were made to prevent this from occurring. Writing shortly after 1945, 
scholars such as Hersch Lauterpacht and Hans Kelsen suggested that an obligation must 
be imposed on states to recognize new states on condition that they fulfill the Montevideo 
criteria for statehood; however, their suggestions failed in large part due to the reluctance 
of states to impose rigid guidelines to the formation of statehood in the 20th century.247  
Second, the constitutive theory suggests that a non-recognized state has no rights 
or obligations vis-à-vis other states so long as it remains unrecognized.248 According to 
Dugard, this has also proven to be untrue when applied against state practice. For 
example, Israel, although not recognized by multiple states in the Middle East, maintains 
its international legal obligations and vice versa.249 In fact, a growing scholarship 
maintains that non-recognized states are being held accountable for violations of 
peremptory norms of international law.250 Additionally, an extension of this argument 
claims that the dissolutions of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union created a set of new 
guidelines for the recognition of states.251 In essence, “[t]hese Guidelines provided that 
recognition should only be granted to states that respect the provisions of the UN Charter, 
guarantee the human rights of any ethnic and national minorities, respect the inviolability 
of internationally recognized boundaries, subscribe to nuclear non-proliferation and meet 
international standards regarding human rights.”252 However, as discussed by Anderson, 
this interpretation has also been found to have no legal basis:  
The legitimacy of this claim, however, is highly suspect. To begin with, the 
long title of the Guidelines—Declaration on the Guidelines on the 
Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union—
inherently suggests that they are targeting acts of recognition and not the 
conferral of statehood. This view is also borne out by reference to the 
language employed throughout the Guidelines, which arguably suggests 
that new states may exist prior to recognition…Had the Guidelines been 
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intended to propound a constitutive approach to recognition, paragraph four 
would more than likely have employed the words ‘entity’, ‘territorial entity’ 
or ‘putative state’ in place of the word ‘state’.253  
 
As can be deduced from Anderson’s analysis, a close interpretation of the guidelines 
confirms that they are indeed nothing more than just that – guidelines – which are meant 
to serve as a threshold for considerations of recognition for newly formed states.254 In 
sum, the constitutive and constitutive-collective theories possess serious legal gaps. The 
leading legal theory – the declaratory theory of recognition – addresses those gaps by 
emphasizing a more juristic approach to the international law on statehood, rather than a 
reliance on the act of state recognition.  
2.2.4.2. The Declaratory Theory  
The declaratory theory rests on the premise that recognition of a putative state by 
other states is not a sine qua non for statehood.255 Stated succinctly, the declaratory 
theory of recognition establishes that the recognition of states, although an important 
symbolic gesture, is not a legal requirement of statehood. Although the UN Charter does 
not explicitly address this recognition, “[r]egional treaties…indicate support for the 
declaratory approach. [Specifically,] Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention and 
Articles 13 and 14 of the Charter of the Organization of American States suggest that 
statehood antedates recognition, thereby supporting the declaratory recognition 
theory.”256 Additionally, customary international law has historically insisted on the 
applicability of international law norms in cases of aggression or conflict by both 
recognized and non-recognized states:257  
In December 1974 the General Assembly adopted the nonbinding 
Definition of Aggression, Article 1 of which provided that "[a]gression is 
the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity 
or political independence of another State, ‘where "the term 'State' . . . [i]s 
used without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a State is a 
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member of the United Nations’.258  
This is important to note as the next three chapters will demonstrate that, although a right 
for a UNC secession is permitted under international law, the process by which an entity 
becomes a state is of equal importance as the act of secession itself. More precisely, the 
violation of peremptory norms as part of the statehood process by an UNC secessionist 
entity will lead to the rejection of its statehood as part of the obligation of non-
recognition. Prior to moving into a summary of the relative state practice with regards to 
UNC secessions, it is necessary to briefly expand on this point. 
As pointed out by Judge Skubiszewski in the Case Concerning East Timor 
(Portugal v Australia),259 in the context of a breach of a peremptory norm (in this case, it 
was the illegal use of force), the rule of non-recognition as a result of such a breach exists 
in a self-executing function.260 In essence, this signifies that “ individual states are legally 
obligated to not extend recognition to UNC secessionist entities that have violated 
peremptory norms during their formative process.”261 Additional jurisprudential evidence 
with regards to the legal obligation of non-recognition can also be found in the Namibia 
Advisory Opinion.262  In that Case, the ICJ opined that each state is 
Under obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in 
Namibia and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, 
and to refrain from any acts and in particular any dealings with the 
Government of South Africa implying recognition of the legality of, or 
lending support or assistance to, such presence and administration.263  
Fundamentally, the court imposed an obligation on each state to alienate and deny any 
legitimacy to a state which has breached a peremptory norm of international law.  If one 
applies this analogy to the case of a putative state committing the same offence, it can be 
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concluded that the notion of compliance with peremptory norms as a requirement of 
contemporary statehood has crystallized into a customary international law.264  
As can be reasoned from the statement above, the complexity of analyzing 
putative statehood inevitably comes back to the issue of collective-recognition of the 
putative state by existing states.265 In response to the claims by scholars such as 
Dugard266 or Devine267 that compliance with peremptory norms is not a requirement for 
statehood due to its legitimization via the collective recognition of states, Anderson 
points to the fact that this argument establishes a two-state system in international law; 
“first, those that exist in international law and have legal effect; and second, those that 
exist in international law and do not have legal effect.”268 This is problematic for several 
reasons. If a state can exist by virtue of satisfying the statehood criteria, but has no legal 
personality on the basis of its violation of peremptory norms as part of its formation 
process, the international legal order of sovereign states can be said to have had its 
threshold for statehood dissipated. This argument cannot be accepted for the simple 
reason that any UNC secessions that have been found to violate peremptory norms of 
international law are only granted legal effect by states that ignore international law on 
the basis of their foreign policies. In other words, Russia may grant legal effect to 
Abkhazia through the signing of cooperation treaties;269 however, this neither grants 
Abkhazia international legal personality, nor does it validate the illegality of the treaties 
                                                
264 The legal obligation of non-recognition is supported by ICJ rulings such as Case Concerning East 
Timor (Portugal v. Australia) and Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion). Support can also be found for this principle in Article 4 (d) 
of the 2005 African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact and Articles 40 and 41 of the 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001 by the International Law 
Commission. For supporting scholarship and jurisprudence on the legal obligation of non-
recognition, see Anderson, “Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession”, supra note 7 at 96, nn 355-9.  
265 John Dugard, “Recognition of UN”, supra note 212 at 130. 
266 Ibid.  
267 Derry J Devine, “Rhodesia since the Unilateral Declaration of Independence” (1973) 1:1 Acta 
Juridica 86 at 86.  
268 Anderson, “Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession”, supra note 7 at 69. 
269 See “Putin Signs Law Ratifying Russia-Abkhazia Strategic Partnership Treaty” RadioFreeEurope – 
Radio Liberty, (4 February 2015), online: <www. www.rferl.org> (See confirmation of ‘treaties’ 
signed and ratified by Russia and the breakaway Republic of Abkhazia, internationally recognized as 
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sub silentio. Similarly, the rejection of the TRNC as a state both through domestic law in 
Britain270 and through international law271 cannot be superseded by the fact that Turkey 
granted the TRNC ‘legal effect’ through its recognition. Without analyzing the details of 
the TRNC and Abkhazian secessions; one common factor can be identified which 
prevents either entity from being granted legal personality regardless of their claim to a 
right of external self-determination; the fact that multiple peremptory norms were 
violated as part of their respective secessions and subsequent annexations in Cyprus and 
Georgia respectively.  
In conclusion, it can be suggested that compliance with peremptory norms of 
international law is a precondition for a successful UNC secession to emerge as a state in 
international law. As pointed out by Anderson, major scholarly opinion supports this 
view, with prominent scholars such as Raic272 and Crawford273 enlisting their support to 
the establishment of a newly emerged international legal standard for statehood which 
states that "…the existence of a State under international law is to be determined on the 
basis of (a) criteria based on the concept of effectiveness (the traditional criteria) and (b) 
criteria based on legality [compliance with peremptory norms]."274  
Now that this point has been clarified, it is necessary to return to the issue of state 
practice with regards to the declaratory theory of recognition. Additional examples of 
state practice that reaffirm the declaratory interpretation include such incidents as Britain 
seeking compensation from Israel for a downed military jet (even though Britain still had 
not recognized Israel as a state), or several states in the Middle-East making claims 
against Israel’s alleged violations of the UN Charter while equally not recognizing its 
                                                
270 John Dugard, “Recognition of UN”, supra note 212 at 131. 
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status as a state. 275 In addition to most scholars supporting this view,276 multiple judicial 
decisions have reaffirmed the declaratory nature of recognition in international law.277 
Some of the more recent examples, 
…can be found in the decisions of the Badinter Arbitration Commission, 
established to advise the European Peace Conference on Yugoslavia. In its 
Opinion No. 1, handed down on 29 November, 1991, the Commission 
stated that “the effects of recognition by other states are purely declaratory.” 
This position was reiterated by Opinion No. 8, handed down on 4 July 1992, 
which held that “recognition of a State by other States [only has] declarative 
value . . . Support for the declaratory recognition theory is also arguably 
found within the Canadian Supreme Court advisory opinion, Reference re 
Secession of Quebec. There, the court noted that although recognitions 
would be politically advantageous for a newly seceded Quebec, they would 
not be a sine qua non for statehood. Indeed the court explicitly held that 
“recognition by other states is not . . . necessary to achieve statehood.”278 
 
Notwithstanding the popular support for the declaratory theory in international law, 
several issues have been identified as challenging its legitimacy which must be 
addressed.279  
First, as the declaratory theory relies profoundly on the Montevideo Convention 
criteria,280 two challenges can be raised to the fact that “[i]n the first instance, these 
criteria may be objectively ascertainable, but in practice, it is left to each State to decide 
subjectively whether the criteria have been met…[and in the second]…the Montevideo 
criteria are no longer the only criteria for statehood, but there is no certainty as to 
                                                
275 Anderson, “Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession”, supra note 7 at 55.  
276 Dugard, “The Law of State Secession”, supra note 152 at 47. 
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precisely what the new criteria are.”281 To summarize, the question of how many criteria 
exist in the modern conceptualization of statehood is often left unanswered by the 
declaratory theorists. Although such criticisms are salient in that they point out a general 
vagueness of the Montevideo Convention criteria, the obscure interpretations of existing 
law are prevalent in large areas of public international law and thus are not exclusive to 
the issue of state recognition. Moreover, the consistency of opinio juris through state 
practice with regards to state recognition, has exacerbated the notion that it exists de lege 
lata, denoting its existence as part of customary practice limited to the sovereign decision 
of each existing state.282 
A second major criticism of the declaratory theory is that it recognizes that a state 
may exist without the recognition of other states.283 In other words, if a state can exist 
without recognition by other states, this would indicate that, logically, it cannot enter into 
relations with other states, not complying with the fourth criterion of statehood under the 
Montevideo Convention.284 Although this claim has merit, an a contrario reading of this 
requirement suggests that the criterion for entering into relations with other states does 
not indicate a threshold for demonstrating a capacity to enter into relations with other 
States.285 Rather, a state can exist insofar as it meets the requirement of formal 
independence, meaning, for example, that the state in question must not be considered a 
proxy state or basing its actual independence on a foreign occupation. In other words, this 
indicates that, hypothetically, a state can exist, even if a number of other states do not 
recognize its existence. Kosovo and Israel are prime examples of states which remain 
unrecognized de jure by a number of states, yet remain active in the international 
community, which by majority, accepts their legal status as such.286 In essence, this 
criticism can be downgraded to the indication that a state can exist (regardless of how 
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many states recognize it),287 insofar as it meets the Montevideo criteria, and has not been 
created in violation of peremptory norms (via foreign state occupation, illegal use of 
force, violation of territorial inviolability etc.). In reality, a state created out of such a 
violation would be neither granted legitimacy nor be recognized by the international 
community, while a state created in accordance with international law would. Therefore, 
there is a very small probability that a state created in accordance with international law 
will be left alienated by the majority of the international community. Concerning those 
entities that were created through a violation of peremptory norms of international law, 
examples such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia (recognized only by Russia, Nicaragua, 
Venezuela and Nauru)288 or the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC – 
recognized only by Turkey),289 indicate that, apart from alienation by the international 
community, from an international law perspective, their status as ‘states’ is illegal and 
infringes on the territorial sovereignty of their metropolitan states (in this case, Georgia 
and Cyprus respectively).290  
A final criticism of the declaratory theory is how it interprets and explains the 
concept of failed states.291 It is claimed that the declaratory theory does not adequately 
explain how a failed state is able to fulfill the third and fourth criteria of the Montevideo 
Convention.292 Examples of perceived failed states include Somalia, South Sudan and 
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states around the world, retain their legal status’ as states due to their statehood formation processes 
not being in violation of peremptory norms of international law.  
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Yemen, among others.293 Although constitutive-collective theorists such as Dugard are 
correct in pointing out that a failed state will find it difficult to prove that it has an 
effective government or a capacity to enter into relations with other states, the 
preponderant legal issue in responding to this argument lies in the principle of 
effectiveness as applied to the two aforementioned criteria.294 In applying the principle of 
effectiveness to the individual cases of failed states, it can be seen that, regardless of the 
effectiveness of a government or its overall capacity to enter into relations with other 
states, there is yet to be a case of a pre-existing state that has not been able to fulfill either 
of the two criteria. This fact is applicable across the spectrum of failed states. Even in 
Somalia or North Korea, an internationally-recognized government, which represents the 
territory of the state, is able to enter into relations with other states through a functioning 
government (even if the effectiveness of that government can be questionable). 
Therefore, it can be suggested that this argument functions more on the basis of analyzing 
the legal status of the government of a state, a concept that has been rejected by 
international law as representing the legal status of the state itself.295 Moreover, as 
mentioned earlier, the issue of recognition of new states in the 21st century has been 
connected to the rise in unilateral secessions, and therefore the role of state recognition 
must be developed to focus on the legality of secession itself, rather than the act of 
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recognizing a state, which typically follows it. The next section will further address this 
point by identifying the circumstances under which a right of a UNC secession is 
permitted under international law.  
 
2.3. A Right to UNC Secession 
In 2016, while speaking to the European Subcommittee of the United States 
Congress, Paul Williams, President and Co-Founder of Public International Law and 
Policy Group, estimated that there were more than 60 ongoing national self-determination 
conflicts around the world.296 Additionally, he alleged that, since 1990, half of the 
world’s active armed conflict zones involved disputes related to self-determination, with 
an estimated civilian death-toll of over 20 million.297 Clearly, questions of the 
applicability and the use of self-determination have become prevalent in the 
contemporary world, and hence, call for a principled solution that can be justified under 
international law. 
As previously mentioned, the principle of self-determination has been affirmed as 
a legal right through both state practice and numerous international legal instruments. 
Although this has established the legal right to self-determination; it has not clarified 
whether that legal right encompasses the right to a UNC secession. One of the most 
difficult questions that the right to self-determination fails to clearly answer is: to which 
peoples can this right be applied to? In other words, although it is clear that such a right 
was granted to peoples requesting independence during the era of decolonization,298 the 
scope of its applicability to peoples outside of the decolonization context is less clear and 
hence, requires further examination. With that said, an approach to defining the right of a 
unilateral secession outside of the colonial context requires confirmation as well. 
Anderson approaches this issue in the following manner: 
Unlike many other human rights, self-determination is applicable to groups, 
or "peoples" (defined as a nationally-based substate group) that are 
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empowered to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development." This means that should a 
people within an existing state be systematically and egregiously denied this 
right, then the prospect of UNC secession will become available. Thus, 
should a people within an existing state be denied their right to internal self-
determination, then a right to external self-determination, or UNC 
secession, will arise.299 
 
Although Anderson provides a clear interpretation of the principle of self-determination, 
the right to secede under certain conditions must not be interpreted as an absolute right of 
secession in every instance of denial of internal or external self-determination. Indeed, 
the legal basis for a UNC secession can be found in customary international law as a 
qualified right which is permissible only under certain conditions.  
As part of customary international law, two requirements must be satisfied in 
order for the law to be deemed as admissible: state practice and opinio juris. Prior to 
moving forward, it is necessary to briefly propound on the two criteria, specifically with 
regards to their interpretation as it pertains to UNC secessions. In short, a 
…mere textual articulation of a qualified right to UNC secession in 
declaratory General Assembly resolutions, without other concomitant state 
practice, such as grants of recognition in response to UNC secessionist 
disputes, will not constitute a binding rule of customary international law. 
This is because the requisite element of opinio juris will not have been 
satisfied.300  
 
This component of customary international law is vital in understanding from where a 
qualified right to a remedial UNC secession derives its legality. As mentioned in the 
introductory section of this thesis, although it can be generally agreed that state practice 
is a vital component of customary international law, the threshold for the uniformity of 
that practice has changed over time. Anderson refers to this ‘change of threshold’ as the 
‘new species of opinio juris’.301 He explains that 
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This new species of opinio juris tailored to the context of declaratory 
General Assembly Resolutions would seem to contradict the more 
traditional formulation, as expressed in the Lotus Case and North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases, which provided that opinio juris could only be 
established after a train of consistent state acts or omissions attended by the 
requisite psychological belief that such acts or omissions were rendered 
legally obligatory.302 
Indeed, the nature of opinio juris first questioned and consequently overturned the 
previous notion of customary international law as requiring consistent state practice in 
order to become accepted law. As further explained by Oscar Schachter, 
…in place of a practice that began with the gradual accretion of acts and 
subsequently received the imprimatur of opinio juris, the Court reversed the 
process: an opinio juris expressed first as a declaration would become law 
if confirmed by general practice [instead of consistent practice].303  
 
This view of a more enhanced notion of opinio juris is also supported by Tullio Treves 
who suggested that 
…the practice relevant for establishing the existence of a customary 
international rule must neither necessarily include all States, nor must it be 
completely uniform. Whatever oppositions of behaviour and of opinion 
there may have been in the formative stage of the rule, the existence at a 
given time of the rule requires that the generality of States consider the rule 
as binding.304 
Fundamentally, apart from the general practice of states, other sources of law such as 
diplomatic correspondence, travaux préparatoires, procès verbaux, policy statements, 
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rule of customary international law?" at 10). 
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press releases, the opinions of government legal advisers, official manuals on legal 
questions [etc.], can be considered to formulate a customary practice alongside opinio 
juris. 305 Specifically, such forms of correspondence can be considered to formulate 
customary practice where the language of “key words and phrases of UN instruments 
remain[s] ambiguous and obscure.”306  This is vital to underlining the existence of a 
qualified right to a UNC secession under international law, and more importantly, a right 
to the use of force by a third state in cases of UNC secessions where human rights abuses 
by the existing state reach levels deemed to be in extremis. Therefore, in utilizing this 
understanding of both state practice and opinio juris as forming customary international 
law, it can now be established where the qualified right of UNC secession derives its 
legality from.  
The legal basis for UNC secessions finds its genesis in Principle 5 paragraph 7 of 
the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
(Friendly Relations Declaration). 307 A closer analysis of Principle 5 reveals that states 
found to be conducting themselves in violation of the principle of equal rights and self-
determination will inevitably not be protected by the beginning of paragraph 7, which 
reaffirms that there is no authorization for “any action which would dismember or impair, 
totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent 
States.”308 Thus, it can be concluded that the respect for the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of a state can only exist where the state represents its peoples’ internal self-
determination rights without distinction.309 Anderson explains this requirement in the 
following manner: 
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The Friendly Relations Declaration therefore allows self-determination to 
predominate over state sovereignty and territorial integrity in the event of 
deliberate, sustained, and systematic human rights violations against 
peoples. By doing so, the Declaration draws a link between internal and 
external self-determination: the neglect of the former provides justification 
for the invoking of the latter, which may be exercised by UNC secession. 
This is a seminal development, challenging—albeit modestly—the long-
entrenched incontrovertibility of state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.310 
 
Notably, Anderson is certainly neither the first, nor the only, scholar to perceive the 
Friendly Relations Declaration as allowing a qualified right to a UNC secession. For 
example, Cassese has equally suggested that 
…although secession is implicitly authorized by the [Friendly Relations] 
Declaration, it must however be strictly construed, as with all exceptions. It 
can therefore be suggested that the following conditions might warrant 
secession: when the central authorities of a sovereign State persistently 
refuse to grant participatory rights to a religious or racial group, grossly and 
systematically trample upon their fundamental rights, and deny the 
possibility of reaching a peaceful settlement within the framework of the 
State structure. Thus, denial of the basic right of representation does not 
give rise per se to the right of secession. In addition, there must be gross 
breaches of fundamental human rights, and, what is more, the exclusion of 
any likelihood for a peaceful resolution within the existing State 
structure.311 
 
As can be interpreted from both analyses, the implied authorization of a UNC secession 
can be found within the Friendly Relations Declaration. This analysis has been shared by 
an extensive list of legal scholars, albeit with varying levels of acknowledgement to the 
circumstances under which a right to a UNC secession exists, can exist or may exist.312 
The significance of the Friendly Relations Declaration has also been recently 
mentioned in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion by the ICJ. As part of the Advisory Opinion, 
an emphasis on the respect for the right of self-determination, as well as the 
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consequences of ignoring that right, become abundantly clear. For example, Judge 
Abdulqawi Yusuf held that  
…if a State fails to comport itself in accordance with the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, an exceptional situation may arise 
whereby the ethnically or racially distinct group denied internal self-
determination may claim a right of external self-determination or separation 
from the State.313 
 
Equally, Judge Cançado Trindade contested in a separate opinion that 
 
Recent developments in contemporary international law were to disclose 
both the external and internal dimensions of the right of self-determination 
of peoples: the former meant the right of every people to be free from any 
form of foreign domination, and the latter referred to the right of every 
people to choose their destiny in accordance with their own will, if 
necessary — in case of systematic oppression and subjugation — against 
their own government. This distinction challenges the purely inter-State 
paradigm of classic international law. In the current evolution of 
international law, international practice (of States and of international 
organizations) provides support for the exercise of self-determination by 
peoples under permanent adversity or systematic repression, beyond the 
traditional confines of the historical process of decolonization. 
Contemporary international law is no longer insensitive to patterns of 
systematic oppression and subjugation.314 
Nevertheless, the opponents of a qualified right to a UNC secession315 generally claim 
that the right is largely hypothetical and ‘is therefore limited to an obiter dictum’ reading 
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of the aforementioned ICJ case and UN declarations.316 Additionally, another argument 
claims that most legal scholars do not firmly admit that a qualified right to secession 
exists under international law, rather opting for the conclusion that it may exist instead.317 
For example, Jure Vidmar states that 
…the relevant judicial decisions and academic writings do not provide 
sufficient evidence to suggest that in international legal doctrine, remedial 
secession is a universally-accepted entitlement of oppressed peoples. 
But…the idea underlying remedial secession—the last resort for ending the 
oppression of a certain people— can still influence the recognition policies 
of states.318 
Vidmar’s point is relevant in that it provides a well-articulated opinion of those that argue 
for the existence of a right to a UNC secession. However, as previously mentioned in this 
sub-section, the obscure language of a UN document can find clarification through an 
assessment of secondary correspondence. Thus, when assessing such criticisms with 
regards to the right of a UNC secession as existing in the Friendly Relations Declaration, 
it is necessary to consider that  
…the answers [to the criticisms leveled by opponents of remedial secession 
such as Vidmar] lie in the declaration’s drafting, which, as the travaux 
préparatoires reveal, was split between opposing viewpoints: those states 
that favored the inclusion of a qualified right to UNC secession and those 
states that did not. The communist bloc, with its traditionally more open 
stance towards self-determination, argued in favor of an inherent right to 
UNC secession. This was opposed by many Western and African states, 
however, which felt that self-determination did not include such a right, 
qualified or otherwise. Confronted with these opposing viewpoints, the 
representative for the Netherlands suggested a compromise that allowed for 
UNC secession in circumstances where ‘basic human rights and 
fundamental freedoms . . . were not being respected.’ To satisfy the group 
of states opposed to any right of UNC secession, paragraph 7 was thus 
crafted to avoid any overt mention of UNC secession, even though an a 
contrario reading reveals that it was implicitly made under certain 
circumstances.319 
 
                                                
316 Vidmar, “Remedial Secession”, supra note 54 at 39. 
317 James Summers, Peoples and International Law: How Nationalism and Self-Determination Shape a 
Contemporary Law of Nations (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007) at 347. 
318 Vidmar, “Remedial Secession”, supra note 54 at 40.   
319 Anderson, “A Post-Millennial Inquiry”, supra note 13 at 1228. 
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If the Friendly Relations Declaration is interpreted in this manner, the evidence behind 
the negotiations of this Declaration become evident; the right to a UNC secession exists 
only insofar as the peoples of a particular state “are subjected to deliberate, sustained, and 
systematic discrimination on the grounds of ‘race, creed or colour’, which includes racial, 
religious, linguistic, cultural, and customary discrimination.”320  
Additionally, it is necessary to mention that the text of this Declaration has been 
“vicariously integrated into numerous subsequent General Assembly Resolutions [and 
Declarations].”321 Some examples include the Resolution on the Definition of 
Aggression,322Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International 
Disputes,323 Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of 
Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations,324 Declaration on 
the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten 
International Peace and Security and on the Role of the United Nations in this 
Field325and the Fiftieth Anniversary Declaration.326All of the aforementioned documents 
reiterate the text of Principle 5 (7) of the Friendly Relations Declaration mutatis 
mutandis, solidifying the existence of a qualified right to a UNC secession under 
customary international law.327 
                                                
320 Ibid at 1228-9. 
321 Ibid at 1229. 
322 Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, GA Res 3314 (XXIX), UNGAOR, 29th Sess, UN Doc 
A/Res/29/3314 (1974) art 7 (3) [Resolution on the Definition of Aggression].   
323 Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes Between States, GA Res 
37/10, UNGAOR, UN Doc A/Res/37/10 (1982) Art 2 (6). 
324 Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat 
or Use of Force in International Relations, GA Res 42/22, UNGAOR, UN Doc A/Res/42/22 (1987) art 3 
(3) [Declaration on the Threat or Use of Force].    
325 Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten 
International Peace and Security and on the Role of the United Nations in this Field General Assembly 
resolution 43/51, GA Res 43/51, UNGAOR, UN Doc A/Res/43/51 (1988) art 3 (3).    
326 Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, GA Res 50/6, 
UNGAOR, 56th Sess, Un Doc A/Res/50/6 (1995) art 1. It is crucial to point out that Article 1 of this 
Declaration reaffirmed the right of all peoples to self-determination, an important difference from 
the previous Friendly Relations Declaration text which purported to affirm this right based on creed, 
race and colour. A more in-depth analysis of the difference between the two texts and the definition 
of peoples’ will be done in Chapter 4 (section 4.4). 
327 Anderson, “A Post-Millennial Inquiry”, supra note 13 at 1229. 
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Lastly, it must also be mentioned that, although the aforementioned texts provide 
a qualified right to a UNC secession prima facie, they do so for cases of human rights 
abuses which can be considered as in moderato and in extremis. More precisely, human 
rights abuses such as systematic political oppression, which can be considered as human 
rights abuses deemed as in moderato, differs from the systematic denial of human rights 
coupled with their abuses that can include forced exile and migration, genocide and 
ethnic cleansing (that can be deemed as in extremis). This view is further expanded on by 
Christopher Borgen, who claims that 
Jurists who interpret the law of self-determination [in this view] generally 
contend that any attempt to claim secession as a remedy must at least show 
that (a) the secessionists are a “people” (in a sense recognized by the 
international community); (b) the state from which they are seceding 
seriously violates their human rights; and, (c) there are no other effective 
remedies under either domestic law or international law.328 
As the next paragraph will demonstrate, when analyzed side-by-side with state practice, 
only the qualified right to a UNC secession coupled with human rights abuses deemed as 
in extremis has been able to find support under customary international law.329 
Now that the ‘new species of opinio juris’ has been defined, it is necessary to 
recognize the concomitant state practice with regards to the right to a UNC secession. 
Over the past fifty years, several cases stand out as providing evidence of state practice 
with regards to invoking a qualified right to UNC secession: Bangladesh, Croatia, East 
Timor, Eritrea and Kosovo to name a few.330 These cases share two common factors that 
legitimized their actions; their UNC secessions became legal “in response to human 
rights abuses in extremis (ethnic cleansing, mass killings, and genocide) as opposed to in 
moderato (political, cultural, and racial discrimination),” as well as an invocation to a 
right of self-determination which was subsequently denied without significant 
                                                
328 Borgen, “Is Kosovo a Precedent?”, supra note 46 at 4. 
329 Anderson, “A Post-Millennial Inquiry”, supra note 13 at 1235, n 213. A more thorough clarification 
of human rights abuses in moderato vs in extremis will be provided in Chapter 5. For this Chapter, it is 
only necessary to keep in mind the concomitant state practice with the text in international legal 
instruments that confirms the right to a UNC secession.  
330 Anderson, “Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession”, supra note 7 at 11.  
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consideration. On the basis of these examples, it can therefore be concluded that a right to 
a UNC secession exists in international law only as an ultimum remedium.331 
Nevertheless, it is important to reiterate that the objective of this thesis is to build on the 
concept of a right to a UNC secession, by proving that a right to the use of force by a 
third-state in support of a UNC secession exists under international law. The next chapter 
will define the ambit of the use of force in international law in order to demonstrate how 
its development throughout history and in contemporary times can be applied to cases of 
UNC secessions.332 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
331 It should be noted that each case of UNC secession must be analyzed separately. Anderson, “A 
Post-Millennial Inquiry”, supra note 13 (Anderson explains that “…this is especially the case when 
resolutions “declare” the law—whether customary or general principles—and the resolution is 
adopted by consensus (as with the Friendly Relations Declaration) or by unanimous or near 
unanimous vote (as with the Fiftieth Anniversary Declaration). In such cases, there is a strong 
presumption that the rules and principles contained within the declaration are legally binding 
obligations” at 1238).   
332 It should be noted that philosophical analyses of the concept of self-determination exist in both 
classical and modern international legal scholarship. Although these approaches are important 
contributions to the existing scholarship, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to summarize them in 
detail or use them as part of a theoretical analysis. Nevertheless, a thorough analysis of the 
applicability of the just war doctrine and the jus ad bellum will be completed in Chapter 3. Examples 
of scholars who have attempted to defend the right of self-determination on the basis of legal theory 
include: Lauri Malksoo, “Justice, Order and Anarchy: The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination and 
the Conflicting Values in International Law” (1999) IV Juridica Intl 75 at 75; Patrick Capps, “Natural 
Law and the Law of Nations” in Alexander Orakhelashvili, ed, Research Handbook on the Theory and 
History of International Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011) at 72 ; Allen Buchanan, 
Theories of Secession, (1997) 26 Philosophy and Public Affairs J 31 at 36; Avishai Margalit & Joseph 
Raz, “National Self-Determination” (1990) 87:9 439 at 443-9; McGee, “The Theory of Secession”, 
supra note 54 at 463; Harald Borgebund, “Review Article: Modus Vivendi Versus Public Reason and 
Liberal Equality: Three Approaches to Liberal Democracy” (2015) 18 Critical Rev Intl Society and 
Political Phil 564.   
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Chapter 3 
Chapter 3: State Creation & The Law on the Use of Force in 
International Law 
 As mentioned in Chapter 1, state creation through unilateral secession is 
controversial in both its application under international law and its effectiveness in the 
face of growing discontent with the act of secession in the contemporary world. Although 
state creation occurred more frequently throughout the 20th century in large part due to a 
number of armed conflicts and a period of decolonization, the legal dilemma of whether a 
state can be created through the use of force continues to split the legal scholarly 
community.333 Questions such as ‘could an oppressed peoples use force in order to create 
their own state?’,334 or ‘how does state creation function when the entity in question is 
involved in an independence struggle?’, involve multiple layers of analysis, and hence, 
require a detailed study of the international law on the use of force de lege lada.  
 This chapter consists of two main parts. The first part will introduce the history 
and the general doctrine of the use of force in international law, as well as its current 
applicability as it pertains to the UN Charter. Subsequently, the second part of this 
chapter will focus on demonstrating how the contemporary doctrine on the use of force in 
international law can be applied to the creation of states, and consequently, its status 
within the context of direct and indirect third-state support of unilateral non-colonial 
secessions. Additionally, a clarification of how the use of force in self-determination 
conflicts is framed within the ambit of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention will be 
                                                
333 Crawford, “The Creation of States”, supra note 22 at 375. See also Peter Radan, “Secession: A Word 
in Search of a Meaning” in Aleksandar Pavkovic & Peter Radan, eds., On the way to Statehood: 
Secession and Globalisation (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishers, 2008) at 15-9.  
334 Internal conflicts typically involve an independence movement that uses force to fight against is 
oppressor (typically the state authorities). Since the conflict occurs within the confines of a sovereign 
state, it is usually classified as an internal conflict. For more on the difference between an internal 
and external armed conflict, see Kathleen Lawand, “Internal conflicts or other situations of violence – 
what is the difference for victims?” ICRC (12 October 2012), online: <www.icrc.org> (“A non-
international (or "internal") armed conflict refers to a situation of violence involving protracted 
armed confrontations between government forces and one or more organized armed groups, or 
between such groups themselves, arising on the territory of a State…In contrast to an international 
armed conflict, which opposes the armed forces of States, in a non-international armed conflict at 
least one of the two opposing sides is a non-State armed group”).  
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presented. This will be done in order to dispel the notion that an absolute obligation to a 
humanitarian intervention exists in international law, and further, to set the stage for the 
identification of the exception to the prohibition on the use of force as it pertains to UNC 
secessions. Accordingly, this will support the primary argument of this thesis: that an 
exception exists under international law for the external use of force by a third state in the 
event that a peoples’ right of self- is systematically denied, and is coupled with human 
rights abuses deemed as in extremis.  
3.1. General Doctrine of the Use of Force in International Law 
 The challenge of understanding the international law on the use of force begins 
with understanding its most enticing concept: that it “prohibits the use of force by states 
against other states, subject only to certain narrowly defined definitions.”335 The central 
international law on the prohibition on the use of force is found in Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter which states that: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.336 
Although states do not agree on the exact meaning of Article 2(4),337 the ICJ in Armed 
Activities on the Territory of Congo has proclaimed it to be a founding principle of the 
                                                
335 Currie, supra note 23 at 843. 
336 UN Charter, supra note 21, art 2 (4).  
337 Generally, this disagreement is around the threshold for the use of force and the thread for the use 
of force in international law. For more on this see Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of 
Force, 3rd ed, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) (“…there are disagreements between states as 
to the meaning of Article 2(4). There is a split between developed and developing states as to 
whether ‘the use of force’ includes not only armed force but economic coercion. There is also some 
debate as to what types of activities can amount to ‘use of force’ as opposed to intervention or mere 
law enforcement. The judgment in Nicaragua distinguished between, on the one hand, the arming 
and training of armed opposition forces, which could amount to an unlawful use of force, and on the 
other hand, the supply of funds, which could not. The recent arbitral award in Guyana v Suriname 
pronounced briefly and controversially on the distinction between threat of use of force and mere 
law enforcement. In another controversial ruling the Claims Commission held in Ethiopia’s Ius ad 
Bellum Claims that Eritrea had violated Article 2(4) through its use of force in defence of what a 
Boundary Commission subsequently decided to be its own territory” at 31).  
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UN Charter.338 Additionally it is suggested that “[s]tates and commentators generally 
agree that the prohibition is not only a treaty obligation but also customary law and 
even ius cogens, but there is no comparable agreement on the exact scope of the 
prohibition.”339 The questions surrounding the scope of the prohibition on the use of force 
inevitably fall within the category of territorial conflicts. After all, military incursions by 
Russia into Georgia in 2008, or military skirmishes in Nagorno-Karabakh between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2016, are only two of the more recent examples that 
demonstrate that inter-state armed conflicts persist to this day.340  Although such 
examples may demonstrate that the prohibition on the use of force in international law is 
not absolute, it is still important to note its extensive development and implementation 
throughout time. Thus, prior to exploring the applicability of the jus ad bellum in 
contemporary international law, it is necessary to briefly summarize its history and the 
developments which led to its codification in the UN Charter.  
3.1.1. History of Jus ad bellum  
Attempts to limit the indiscriminate and unilateral use of force by States can be 
traced as far back as the ‘iustum bellum’341 concept introduced by theologians such as 
                                                
338 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo 
v. Uganda); Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, [2005] ICJ Rep 168 at para 148 
[Territory of Congo Case].  
339 Gray, supra note 337 at 30. For evidence that the prohibition for the use of force has been 
construed as a jus cogens norm in international law, see Nicaragua ICJ Judgment, supra note 68 at 
para 190; Gordon Christenson, “The World Court and Jus Cogens” (1987) 81 AJIL 1 at 93; Natalino 
Ronzitti, “Use of Force, Jus Cogens and State Consent” in Antonio Cassese, ed, The Current Legal 
Regulation of the Use of Force (Dodrecht: Nijhoff Publishers, 1986) at 147. 
340 For literature on the territorial conflicts in the Caucasus region see Nina Caspersen, “From Kosovo 
to Karabakh: International Responses to de facto States” (2008) 56 Südost-Europa 1 at 58–83; 
Thomas de Waal, The Karabakh Trap: Dangers and Dilemmas of the Nagorny Karabakh Conflict 
(London: Conciliation Resources, 2009); Gregory Dubinsky, “The Exceptions That Disprove the Rule? 
The Impact of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on Exceptions to the Sovereignty Principle” (2009) 34 Yale 
J Intl L 241 at 241–6.  
341 It should be noted that the history between the just war doctrine and the history of the jus ad 
bellum can be considered as interrelated until the early 19th century. For a comprehensive history of 
the jus ad Bellum, see generally Stephen C Neff, War and the Law of Nations. A General History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); James Q Whitman, The Verdict of Battle. The Law of 
Victory and the Making of Modern War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012); Benedict 
Kingsbury & Benjamin Straumann, eds., The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili 
and the Justice of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).  
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Plato (428-527), Saint Augustine (354–430) and, later, Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225–
74).342 For example, Saint Augustine undertook the task of applying the notion of justice 
to armed conflict. In doing so, he attempted to connect the dialectical teachings of 
Christianity with the concept of a just armed conflict that in principio would lead to a 
peaceful co-existence of society.343 Virtually half a century later, Saint Thomas Aquinas 
“[sought] to reconcile the Greek concept of natural law with Christian theology. Aquinas 
[held] that natural law is that by which God governs the universe-and…that man as a 
creature has the eternal law imprinted on him and by it derives the natural inclination to 
proper acts and ends.”344 For Aquinas, law served as a measurement of human activity, 
with the corresponding action resulting in the rule of reason satisfying a moral 
obligation.345 Consequently, this allowed him to write extensively on the notion of a just 
war. As expanded on by Nick Vorster: 
…Aquinas’s classical discussion of just war is found in the Secunda-
secundae part of Summa Theologia that gives a typology of the various 
virtues. This indicates his concern to place warfare within the overall moral 
scheme of the Christian aim of salvation. Aquinas distinguishes four 
cardinal virtues, namely prudence that applies reason to practical situations, 
justice that directs the will to good acts, and courage that helps us to act in 
situations of danger and temperateness that controls our sensual desires.346 
Apart from the four cardinal virtues, Aquinas also outlined three criteria that should 
govern a just war: the war must be waged by a recognized authority (prince), the causus 
belli must be just (i.e. in response to an injury by an enemy) and lastly, the intent of the 
war must be done in good faith and to promote the common good, while negative 
consequences after the war, if egregious enough, could turn a just war into an unjust one 
ex post facto.347 These ‘criteria’ are important to keep in mind as they will re-emerge in 
                                                
342 Nico Shrivjer, “The Prohibition on the Use of Force” in Marc Weller, ed, The Oxford Handbook of 
the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) at 465.   
343 Brownlie, “Principles of IL, supra note 72 at 329.  
344 John Igbogo Ebeth, “Thomas Aquinas’ Thought on Natural Law: A New Look at an Old Issue” 
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Moore Publishing, 1997) at 367-71. 
 
76 
 
the justifications for the acceptance of the legality of humanitarian intervention later in 
this chapter.  
The early modern age (16th – 18th centuries), equally left an impact in post-
Medieval Europe. In fact, developments during this time set the stage for the expansion 
of the just war doctrine throughout the Enlightenment period.348 Although these 
developments did not occur solely as a result of the work of Enlightenment-era scholars, 
historical, religious and territorial developments in Europe also contributed to the 
changing nature of how warfare was perceived in the early modern age:  
During the first half of the 16th century, the context in which the old jus ad 
bellum operated radically changed. The Reformation caused the collapse of 
the religious unity of the Latin West and struck a mortal blow to the main 
pillars of authority—canon law and ecclesiastical jurisdiction—upon which 
the bridge between the doctrine and reality of just war rested. The 
discoveries and conquests in the New World necessitated a frame of 
reference for the laws of war other than those of Christian theology, canon 
and Roman law. The rise of great dynastic power complexes such as 
Habsburg Spain, Valois France, and Tudor England, out of which the 
modern sovereign states grew as well as the Military Revolution and the 
massification of armies, navies, and warfare it brought, denied the notion of 
war as a limited law enforcement action. All this brought important changes 
in the jus ad bellum, without however signaling the utter demise of the just 
war doctrine.349 
These changes, coupled with a more humanistic vision of Europe allowed for important 
amendments to be made to the notion of what constitutes a ‘just war’. For example, 
Francisco de Vitoria, a theologian and scholar at the infamous School of Salamanca,350 
                                                
348 Randall Lesaffer, “Too Much History: From War as Sanction to the Sanctioning of War” in Marc 
Weller, ed, The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015) at 39 [Lessafer, “Sanctioning of War”].  
349 Ibid at 39. 
350 The School of Salamanca was infamous for its contribution to classical international law and its 
subsequent modernization and secularization. Some of its most famous scholars included Francisco 
de Vitoria, Francisco Suarez and Giovanni Botero. See Geoff Gordon, “Natural Law in International 
Legal Theory” in Anne Orford & Florian Hoffman, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) at 279-305. See also, A H Snow, “The Law 
of Nations” (1912) 6 AJIL 890 at 890–2; Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral, “Francisco de Vitoria’s 
Unexpected Transformations and Reinterpretations for International Law” (2013) 15:3 International 
Community L Rev 287 at 287-310; Martti Koskenniemi, “Empire and International Law: The Real 
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“introduced the concept of bellum justum ex utraque parte (war just on both sides) at the 
subjective level.”351 This allowed for a more inclusionary vision of war that did not 
discriminate against a just or unjust side in a conflict, a significant development from the 
early theoretical tenets of Aquinas who suggested the opposite.352 
Aquinas’ work was further developed on the subject of war by Hugo Grotius 
(1583-1645), who claimed individuals to have the same natural rights as states. As 
explained by Patrick Capps: 
It is by this analogy that [Grotius was] able to claim that war is a form of 
punishment for those states which violate natural rights. To explain, in the 
same way as for natural human agents, natural law establishes a set of 
narrow natural rights which govern the conduct of states. The content of 
these natural rights are identical to those held by human agents. So, states 
have rights to their continued existence, their territory and property, to 
freedom from impediment on the high seas, and a right to have promises 
kept. From this final natural right, the agreements which states enter into 
through their direct and indirect consent are binding as a matter of natural 
law.353  
In underlining the importance of natural law in state interaction, Grotius saw war as a 
form of punishment for the violation of that natural law – a method of restraint in an 
international system without a physical enforcement mechanism.354 Additionally, Grotius 
identified the recto intentio in war, which “implied that the war needed to be waged with 
the intention of doing justice, and ultimately, to attain a just peace.”355 This synthesized 
the theological-canonist vision of just war, with the more humanistic vision of war as a 
legal concept.356 Lastly, a crucial finding by Grotius enabled the identification of the 
concept of war as being related to the concept of statehood, otherwise known as the 
                                                
351 Lesaffer, “Sanctioning of War”, supra note 348 at 40. 
352 Francisco de Vitoria, De Indis et de jure belli relectiones translated by Ernest Inst, ed, (Washington: 
Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1917) at S 2.4-5.  
353 Capps, supra note 332 at 77.  
354 Ibid. 
355 Lesaffer, “Sanctioning of War”, supra note 348 at 37.  
356 Ibid (“[i]n De jure belli ac pacis, Grotius sustained both conceptions of war, just war and legal war 
(bellum solemne). He relayed the question of the justice of war to the domain of natural law, which 
applied in conscience (in foro interno), while the question of the legality of war fell within the domain 
of the positive, human law of nations, which was externally enforceable (in foro externo)” at 41). See 
also Scott ed, “Grotius, DJBP”, supra note 15 at S 1.3.4.1, 3.3.4–5, 3.3.12–13. 
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‘doctrine of state of affairs’.357 More precisely, “[w]hereas under the medieval just war 
doctrine, war had been conceived of as a limited law enforcement action by a prince and 
his adherents against the perpetrator of the injury which had caused the war, in Early 
Modern Europe, war became clashes between sovereign states in their entirety.”358 Such a 
development allowed for the rise of the sovereign order of states, a phenomenon that was 
well-noticed within Early Modern Europe. Overall, in undertaking a more secularized 
interpretation of classical international law, Grotius was able to extensively contribute to 
the development of the jus ad bellum.359 
Alberico Gentilli (1587-1608) was another Enlightenment-era scholar who 
contributed to the notion of just war by stressing the primacy of a more humanistic, 
secular and organized approach to analyzing warfare. For example, he suggested the 
importance of diplomacy and arbitration as a first rule of settling disputes before 
engaging in armed conflict.360  Additionally, he solidified the idea first proposed by 
Francisco de Vitoria; that both sides in a war have a right to wage war, and “as such, the 
laws of war were to be applied indiscriminately to both sides.”361 This new vision of 
warfare, which was built on the concepts of Roman Law (an approach initiated by 
                                                
357 Randall Lesaffer, “Alberico Gentili’s ius post bellum and Early Modern Peace Treaties” in Benedict 
Kingsbury & Benjamin Straumann, eds., The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili 
and the Justice of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 210-4 [Lesafer, “Gentili’s ius post 
bellum”].   
358 Lesaffer, “Sanctioning of War”, supra note 348 at 41. See also Scott ed, “Grotius, DJBP”, supra note 
15 at S 1.2.1.1. 
359  See Kaius Tuori, “The Reception of Ancient Legal Thought in Early Modern International Law” in 
Bardo Fessenber & Anne Peters, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) (“Grotius utilized Roman law to develop a denominationally 
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conviction of the superiority of Roman legal science and its use as an example for contemporary 
jurisprudence” at 1015). See also Benjamin Straumman, “"Ancient Caesarian Lawyers" in a State of 
Nature: Roman Tradition and Natural Rights in Hugo Grotius's "De iure praedae"” (2006) 34:3 
Political Theory 328; Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the 
International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Benedict 
Kingsbury, Hedley Bull & Adam Roberts, Hugo Grotius and International Relations (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990). 
360 Alberico Gentili, De Jure Belli, translated by Sir Thomas Erskine Holland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1877) at 18.  
361 Lesaffer, “Sanctioning of War”, supra note 348 at 40. 
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Grotius),362 “…articulated the concept of legal war, or war in due form.”363 This was a 
significant addition to the development of jus ad bellum as a humanistic concept with a 
certain degree of legal objectivity. As explained by Randall Lesaffer, Gentili’s 
contribution tried to drastically change the way the notion of ‘war’ was interpreted during 
that time: 
Gentili brought this new conception of war to its full complement in his just 
post bellum. Since one could not be certain about the justice of war and 
since victory did not indicate justice, the outcome of war itself—or in the 
absence of clear victory, of the peace negotiations—determined the 
attribution of the claims over which the war was waged. This radically 
changed the conception of war from a law enforcement action (executio 
juris) into a substitute for a legal trial: a form of dispute settlement. 
Whereas under the just war doctrine, the attribution of property and all 
kinds of claim had to be vested in the justice of a cause preceding the war, 
under the doctrine of legal war it was vested in the outcome of war itself. 
The jus post bellum became a jus victoriae.364 
By analyzing the conception of war from an outcome-based perspective, Gentili sought to 
underline the importance of moving away from attempting to justify war, while equally 
focusing on the success of the final outcome of the conflict. In turn, this demonstrated 
how armed conflict, regardless of which entity or state was the aggressor, could rely more 
on the jus post bellum or the jus victoriae, rather than simply the notion of iustum bellum 
on its own.   
Irrespective of the scholarly developments on the jus ad bellum produced by 
Vitoria, Grotius or Gentilli, the just war doctrine, in the classical sense, was still very 
popular among the rulers of Early Modern Europe. In fact, “…princes and republics of 
Early Modern Europe went to a lot of trouble to justify their decision to resort to war. 
Formal declarations of war were often substantial texts in which the reasons for the war 
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363 Lesaffer, “Sanctioning of War”, supra note 348 at 40. For more on the effects of Roman Law in 
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were explained in detail; these, as well as the less formal manifestos of war, were widely 
distributed. In these declarations and manifestos, the discourse of just war was 
utilized.”365 Furthermore, the 17th-18th centuries became popular with the expansion of 
‘defensive wars’, meaning that states were becoming more adept to wage war for 
defensive, rather than offensive reasons. Of course, the just war doctrine eventually 
evolved to reflect this interpretation. Under this development, “…all just wars were 
defensive sensu lato to the extent that they constituted a reaction against prior injury by 
the enemy—armed or otherwise. But they were only defensive sensu stricto if they were 
fought in reaction to a prior or threatening armed attack by the enemy, however big or 
small it might have been.”366 Although it is logical to assume that some of these 
developments may have occurred as a result of the doctrine’s development, it can be 
suggested that most likely, the development was a reaction by states to the growing 
reliance on regional treaties and alliances which became popularized during this period of 
history.367 Overall, the strength of the just war doctrine as a norm of classical 
international law began to fade, with less and less states paying consideration to its moral 
and just considerations of warfare.368 Conclusively, although the practice of states and 
rulers in Early Modern Age Europe still mirrored a theological interpretation of the just 
war doctrine, with the decline of religious influence and the rise of humanism throughout 
the 18th century, “the language [of warfare] changed to the extent that the protection of 
the security and interests of the state came to supplement, and with time, supplant the 
invocation of rights.”369 
 The 19th century brought with it an even more humanistic approach to interpreting 
                                                
365 Ibid at 41.  
366 Ibid at 45. 
367 Ibid at 45. See also, Neff, supra note 341 at 126-30.  
368 Lesaffer, “Sanctioning of War”, supra note 348 at 43. See also Partel Piirimäe, “Just War in Theory 
and Practice. The Legitimation of Swedish Intervention in the Thirty Years War” (2002) 45:3 
Historical J 499.  
369 Ibid at 45. Certain specific aspects of the law of warfare were not mentioned here as they would 
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description of the contributions of the Early Modern Age to both the ius ad bellum and the ius in bello, 
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international law. In general, although the ‘law of nations’ was described in the early 
Enlightenment period to be a dualist system separated between natural and positive law, 
“[t]he legal positivism of the 19th century brought this dualism to an end, as natural law 
was cast out of the world of law and reduced to a code of morality. Thus, modern 
international law shrunk to what had been the secondary, voluntary or positive law of 
nations…[and] the just war doctrine was therefore ousted from the field of international 
law.”370 Indeed, the interpretation of warfare continued to change from a proactive 
mechanism to largely a reactive one. Although the notion of a more defensive tone being 
used to justify warfare occurred in the two centuries prior as well, this was the first time 
that states had collectively adopted the concept as a ‘general guideline’ prima facie. 
Lessafer explains the reasons behind this occurrence in the following manner: 
Over the course of the 19th century, states continued to offer express 
justifications to their subjects and allies when they resorted to war or force. 
Certainly, states more often than before neglected to make a formal 
declaration of war to the enemy, the forms in which justifications were made 
became more diverse, and explanations became less extensive. The 
language shifted further away from war as a means of legal self-help to that 
of war as a means of self-help altogether—or war as ‘a pursuit of policy by 
other means’ to use the famous phrase of Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) 
— as wars became justified in terms of the safeguarding of security, 
territorial integrity, ‘vital interests’, or honour of states rather than 
legitimate rights. But wars were by and large justified as reactions to prior 
unwarranted action, preferably armed action, by the enemy. They were 
justified for being defensive. By the late 19th and the early 20th centuries, 
this focus on defensive war found its correlation in an increasingly general 
rejection of aggression by the international community.371 
In addition to a general disagreement of the concepts of state aggression and the general 
use of force, the French and American Revolutions provided a further emphasis on the 
protection of fundamental rights of citizens to which warfare applied strictly as a manner 
of self-defense. In other words, as previously mentioned in Chapter 2 on the history of 
self-determination, “[h]umanitarian and political interventions were justified as actions to 
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safeguard or restore other people’s fundamental rights or actions for the sake of 
international order and stability.”372 Moreover, the rise in strength of civil society in 19th 
century Europe through such mechanisms as peace associations and civil movements, 
equally contributed to the discernment of warfare by denouncing the notion of warfare in 
toto.373 As part of this radical change, it became evident that the belief of warfare as 
being inherent and natural to humanity (as claimed by the just war doctrine), was no 
longer acceptable as a norm. In turn, this led to calls for the international codification of a 
normative approach which seeks to prevent and avoid warfare between states, as well as 
protects fundamental human rights. Consequently, in the late 19th and early 20th century, 
the first codified attempts were made to limit and eliminate the offensive use of military 
force by states in Europe.374 Nico Shrivjer explains the details behind this codification as 
central to the promulgation of the notion of ‘peace’ in a continent ravaged by centuries of 
bloodshed: 
In fact, during the Westphalian order, only The Hague Peace Conferences 
of 1899 and 1907 introduced the first serious interstate diplomatic attempts 
to restrict the recourse to war. The Hague Convention (I) was aimed at the 
peaceful adjustment of international differences, ‘before an appeal to arms’. 
Contracting parties were ‘animated by a strong desire to concert for the 
maintenance of the general peace’ and ‘resolved to second by their best 
efforts the friendly settlement of international disputes.’ In Convention (III) 
relative to the Opening of Hostilities, contracting parties agree not to 
commence hostilities between them without previous and explicit warning, 
in the form of either a declaration of war containing reasons for the 
commencement of hostilities, or an ultimatum with a conditional 
declaration of war.375 
Through the Hague Peace Conferences, the impetus for the prohibition on the use of 
force began to slowly resonate with the international community in the early 20th 
century.376 Although from a practical standpoint, inter-state armed conflict continued 
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well-into the 20th century (especially with the breakout of the First and Second World 
Wars), the idea of engendering an international law that understood the concept of 
warfare as an ultimum remedium did not. At the First World War’s conclusion, several 
international documents commenced the dialogue around the codification for first the 
restriction, then the overall prohibition on the use of force in international law. These 
documents must be briefly summarized in order to define the scope of the ever-changing 
nature of the use of force as a restrictive concept.  
 The League of Nations Covenant was the first international treaty document to 
undertake a comprehensive effort to restrict military conflict.377 As explained by Oliver 
Dorr, Articles 11 and 12 of the Covenant 
…prohibited nations resorting to war before a dispute had been submitted 
to peaceful settlement and for three months after an arbitral award or a 
judicial decision had been given, thus providing, in essence, merely for a 
moratorium on war. It was only in very special cases that the League 
members were definitely deprived of their freedom to go to war, namely 
against another member that complied with an arbitral award or a decision 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) (Art. 13 (4) League 
Covenant) (Art. 15 (6) League Covenant). In case the Council failed to 
adopt a report by unanimous vote, the League members reserved to 
themselves ‘the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for 
the maintenance of right and justice’ (Art. 15 (7) League Covenant). Those 
provisions were remarkable in their time as the first efforts of something 
like the international community to outlaw war, but they did not have much 
practical effect in the end.378 
Further to the League Covenant, another international treaty signed in 1924, the Geneva 
Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, made a similar attempt to 
avoid inter-state armed conflict by imposing compulsory dispute settlement on warring 
states.379 Although this idea generated interest, it ultimately failed with opposition from 
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colonial states who saw the treaty as an affront on their sovereign rights to control and 
defend their colonial territories.380  
Finally, the Kellogg-Briand Pact381 (also known as the 1928 General Treaty for 
the Renunciation of War) was signed on August 27, 1928. This treaty significantly 
changed the purview of the prohibition on the use of force from an idea that once seemed 
impossible, into a realistic concept. In fact, this treaty represents the first instance where a 
collective group of states attempted to delineate into an agreement over a general 
prohibition on the use of force. As further explained by Anderson, this agreement meant, 
among other things, a certain withdrawal of sovereignty when it came to the unilateral 
use of force by a state: 
Article 1 of the Pact provide[d] that parties "condemn recourse to war for 
the solution of international controversies and renounce it as an instrument 
of national policy in their relationship with one another." This provision 
effectively eliminated the eighteenth and nineteenth century notions of 
ultimate positivistic sovereignty, whereby no state had any restrictions upon 
its "right" to wage war as an instrument of policy. Although the Pact made 
no specific mention of the right to self-defence, the travaux preparatoires, 
or preparatory works, indicate that such an exception was overwhelmingly 
accepted. The Kellogg-Briand Pact thus enunciated two key propositions: 
first, that war was not to be pursued as a matter of policy and second, that 
states had an inherent right to resist any warfare undertaken by other states 
against them.382 
Unfortunately, several issues on the use of force by states became apparent shortly after 
the Pact was signed. An absence of sanctions for breaches of the Pact, as well as its 
insistence on outlawing war and not specifically the use of force by states, allowed for an 
effortless circumvention of this new norm. Incidents such as the Japanese invasion of 
Chinese Manchuria in 1931, as well as the military invasions by the Axis powers at the 
outbreak of the Second World War in the mid-late 1930s ultimately condemned the idea 
of an overall prohibition on the use of force.383 Thus, it was only at the conclusion of the 
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Second World War that a congregation of states decided to include the prohibition on the 
use of force as a corollary norm of international law in the United Nations Charter (UN 
Charter). The next sub-section will list the many factors that outline an overall 
prohibition on the use of force in contemporary international law, as well as establish its 
applicability vis-a-vis the UN Charter and state practice since the Second World War. 
Ultimately, this will lead to a consideration of the use of force in colonial and non-
colonial contexts, setting the stage for a discussion on the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention and its status under international law.  
3.1.2. Jus ad bellum and the ‘Exceptions’ to the prohibition on the use of force   
 The UN Charter is the international treaty which contains the primary codified 
international law on the use of force. Even through the previous treaties attempted to 
delimitate the use of force and aggression by states, they ultimately failed due to a 
number of factors, including the absence of a strict codified prohibition on the use of 
force, as well as the absence of sanctionary and enforcement mechanisms which failed to 
prevent the outbreak of two World Wars.384  
A good place to start when analyzing the international law on the use of force 
through the UN Charter is Article 1 (1) which states that the purposes of the United 
Nations are: 
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to 
the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches 
of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with 
the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the 
peace.385 
Equally, Article 2(4), which as previously mentioned is arguably the most relevant article 
with regards to the prohibition on the use of force, states that: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from any threat or 
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use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.386  
Finally, an enforcement mechanism through Chapter VII provides an extra layer of 
protection for Member States through the right to the use of force as a measure of self-
defence (Article 51) or via military action only through the direct authorization of the 
UNSC (Articles 42 and 43).387 
 In short, the aforementioned Articles decry the extent of the use of force in 
international law as can be interpreted in the UN Charter. Nevertheless, as with any legal 
interpretation, the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force, and its subsequent 
enforcement and sanctionary mechanisms via the UNSC, have not resulted in an 
aggregate cessation of armed conflict between states. In fact, rather than attempt to 
develop the prohibition on the use of force, states have alluded to ‘exceptions’ as existing 
through its a contrario reading.388 Therefore, prior to establishing how the law on the use 
of force applies to the creation of states via UNC secessions, it is necessary to produce a 
brief summary which explains these ‘exceptions’, and establishes the present state of the 
law on the use of force since its codification in the UN Charter.  
The prohibition on the use of force in international law, as was demonstrated 
through the history of the iustum bellum concept, has become a pillar of the international 
legal system. Outside of its mention in the UN Charter, it has been alluded to in 
                                                
386 Ibid, arts 2 (4), 42,43,51.  
387 Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter dictates the actions available to UN members in 
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numerous UN Declarations,389 as well as several ICJ cases,390 thereby solidifying its 
status as both a conventional norm and a rule of customary law. However, this view is not 
universally accepted. The argument for humanitarian intervention evidently opposes this 
view, as does the argument for pre-emptive self-defence.391 For example, with regards to 
the former, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention clearly identifies an exception to the 
prohibition on the use of force in situations of humanitarian crises.392 On the other hand, 
the latter refers to an established doctrine of pre-emptive self defense which allows for 
the pre-emptive use of force by states provided certain criteria of necessity and 
proportionality are met.393 In any case, both ‘exceptions’ will be discussed at large later 
on this chapter; however, prior to doing so, it is necessary to point out the crux of the 
debate which surrounds the extent of the prohibition on the use of force. This must be 
done in order to identify the obscure areas of the UN Charter with regards to the 
prohibition, out of which the ‘exceptions’ to the concept have evolved.  
Largely, the debate around the extent of the prohibition on the use of force 
interpretation of Article 2(4) rests on the second part of the article: “should the words 
‘against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’ be construed as a strict 
prohibition on all use of force against another state, or did they allow the use of force 
provided that the aim was not to overthrow the government or seize the territory of the 
state and provided that the action was consistent with the purposes of the UN?”394 As can 
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be inferred from this question, the prohibition on the use of force was not clearly defined 
in the UN Charter, leaving the door open for its interpretation by member states. For 
example, it was a well-known fact that throughout the Cold War, a conglomerate of 
American scholars argued that the legal interpretation of Article 2(4) should depend on 
the effectiveness of the UNSC as a whole and the collective security system it purports to 
represent through the UN Charter.395  Although this argument may seem partisan due to 
the United States’ role in the Cold War, the veritable reality of a situation where the 
UNSC can become ‘paralyzed’ and unable to act through one of its permanent members 
imposing a veto has proven to be a major obstacle of the debate on the prohibition of the 
use of force. In fact, this situation has played a major role in the inaction of the UNSC in 
response to some of the world’s most egregious atrocities.396 In addition to this barrier, 
the effectiveness of the UNSC was also questioned during the Cold War in response to a 
string of bi-proxy armed conflicts397 supported by the two world superpowers during the 
Cold War (the United States and the Soviet Union). Moreover, as a result of the Cold 
War, the UNSC had its political influence split ideologically between the West and the 
East, paralyzing it further when the prohibition on the use of force was violated by one 
side or the other. Nevertheless, the most difficult challenge to the prohibition occurred 
towards the end of the Cold War, when the ideological split narrowed and the ‘West’ 
began to emerge as the winning side.398 
While the dissolution of the Soviet Union preoccupied most of the world, it 
emerged that the prohibition on the use of force was challenged once again outside of 
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UNSC approval. However, this time it was no longer as part of an armed conflict, but as 
part of a mission to halt a systemic and egregious armed attack against civilians. Indeed, 
the first Gulf War proved to be much more than an armed conflict between states. The 
US, UK and France’s military intervention in Iraq opened a new era of post-Cold War 
armed conflicts which questioned the strength and the scope of the prohibition on the use 
of force in its entirety.399  
As the world moved towards globalization and away from an ideological east and 
west split, the question of how does the international law on the use of force apply in 
humanitarian crises, cases of self-determination denial and territorial conflicts, took 
center-stage now that the possibility of nuclear armed conflict and Mutual Assured 
Destruction (MAD) had curtailed.400 For the purposes of this thesis, the focus of the 
proceeding sub-sections in this Chapter will be to sketch out the applicability of the 
international law on the use of force in cases of self-determination and territorial 
conflicts, specifically as the end of the Cold War brought with it multiple cases of such 
conflicts. These conflicts reverberated in the debate on the legality of sponsorship and 
support of oppressed peoples’ within the context of self-determination, but outside of the 
general decolonization context.401 Thus, before moving forward, it is necessary to 
evaluate the law on the use of force as it pertains to such conflicts, using the history of 
the jus ad bellum as a background to analyze the legitimacy of the emerging ‘exceptions’ 
to the prohibition on the use of force due to the rise in such conflicts in the contemporary 
world.  
                                                
399 For more on the UK and US positions on the First Gulf War in Iraq see “UK Materials on 
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The UN Charter includes three codified exceptions to the general prohibition on 
the use of force. The first exception can be found in Articles 53(1) and 107.402 Needless 
to say, these Articles, which were created to allow for military action against former 
enemy states from the Second World War, have no contemporary legal relevance.403 The 
second exception, as mentioned above, exists through the powers vested in the UNSC 
under Article 24 which allows it to recommend and execute military action under its 
discretion through Articles 39 and 42.404 The last exception, as evinced by the UN 
Charter, can be found in Article 51 which allows for a state to use force only in self-
defence.405 Outside of the ambit of these three exceptions, no other codified legal rules 
permit the use of force by states in international law. Yet, it is no secret that states have 
systematically violated, at least prima facie, the prohibition on the use of force since its 
inception in 1945.406 Therefore, the question can be asked, under what legal precedent do 
such states operate?  
The absence of any further exceptions (apart from those mentioned above) has led 
to the emergence of two schools of thought that interpret the scope of the prohibition on 
the use of force. The permissive and restrictive schools of thought emerged as a result of 
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a growing dichotomy between the interpretations of the true meaning of Article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter.407 Anderson defines each school’s viewpoints in the following manner:   
According to the [permissive school], Article 2(4) only prohibits the use of 
force "against the territorial integrity or political independence" of any state 
or "in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes" of the UN. A priori, 
the use of force in contexts that do not specifically threaten "the territorial 
integrity or political independence" of any state, or are commensurate with 
the purposes of the UN, are not proscribed by Article 2(4)."… The 
restrictive school, by way of contrast, asserts that Article 2(4) prohibits in 
toto a state's right to use force, unless some explicit exception is grounded 
within the Charter itself. According to this view, force may only be used 
when compliant with Article 51, or the now defunct Article 107, which 
allows action against former enemy states.408 
In other words, the permissive school looks to define certain exceptions in international 
law for the use of force, while the restrictive school commits to holding states 
accountable for any use of force outside of the legal parameters outlined in the UN 
Charter. 409 Overwhelmingly, the restrictive school’s approach has been supported by 
scholarly opinion and state practice.410 This has been evidenced by numerous states using 
an interpretation of Article 51 as a justification for the use of force (which permits 
defensive military action), rather than a restrictive reading of Article 2 (4).411 The 
controversy surrounding such interpretations can be analyzed through a close reading of 
Article 51 of the UN Charter which permits the use of force in cases of self-defence:  
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in 
the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to 
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the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at 
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.412 
As can be deduced from the wording of Article 51, the exception to the prohibition on the 
use of force exhibits that “self-defence is permissible in response to an "instant [and] 
overwhelming" threat that leaves ‘no choice of means and no moment for 
deliberation’.”413 This interpretation of self-defence is reiterated in several ICJ cases, 
such as Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,414Oil 
Platforms415 and Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo,416 which also support 
the notion that “…necessity and proportionality are limits on all self-defence, individual 
and collective.” 417  Therefore, it can be confirmed that a necessary and proportionate 
military response by a state acting in self-defence can be conceived as a lawful use of 
force under contemporary international law and customary international law.418 Yet, 
                                                
412 See UN Charter, supra note 21, art 51.  
413 Anderson, “The Use of Force”, supra note 9 at 210. 
414 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 68 at para 141.   
415 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), [2003] ICJ Rep 
161 at para 43 [Oil Platforms]. 
416 Territory of Congo Case, supra note 338 at para 147. 
417 Gray, supra note 337 at 149-50.  
418 The extent of the principle of self-defence through Article 51 is not universally accepted as 
applying only to the definition outlined in the famous 1837 Caroline incident. For example, the United 
States, Australia, Israel and the United Kingdom are examples of states that justify their attacks on 
non-state and state-armed groups as stemming from a right to self-defence under Article 51. For 
more on the academic debate on the extent of the principle of self-defence see ibid at 117-19 (“[a]s 
part of the basic core of self-defence all states agree that self-defence must be necessary and 
proportionate. The requirements of necessity and proportionality are often traced back to the 
1837 Caroline incident, involving a pre-emptive attack by the British forces in Canada on a ship 
manned by Canadian rebels, planning an attack from the USA. This episode has attained a mythical 
authority. States and writers still refer to it, generally to support their own wide claims to self-
defence, but also to support the necessity and proportionality limitation. They invoke the famous 
formula that there must be a ‘necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of 
means and no moment of deliberation’. Others challenge the authority of this episode for the modern 
doctrine of self-defence, seeing it rather as an episode of self-help pre-dating the modern law on the 
use of force and as a one-off episode of pre-emptive action not of relevance to the conduct of wider-
scale conflict. But, irrespective of the status of the Caroline incident as a precedent, necessity and 
proportionality have played a crucial role in state justification of the use of force in self-defence and 
in international response…” at 117-8). See also, Brownlie, “IL and Use of Force by States”, supra note 
371; Stanimir Alexandrov, Self-Defense Against the Use of Force in International Law (Hague: Brill & 
Nijhoff, 1996). 
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outside of the protection of Article 51, another perceived exception to the prohibition on 
the use of force has recently taken center stage. Although this purported ‘exception’ will 
be examined in detail later in this Chapter, it is important to reiterate that, outside of the 
‘exceptions’ listed above, no others have been generally accepted as forming a 
crystallized and well-accepted legal rule in international law.  
Although, in theory, the general prohibition on the use of force should have 
restricted and discouraged blatant violations of inter-state use of force; nearly 73 years 
after the codification of the UN Charter, multiple instances of states using force both 
individually and collectively,419 has reignited the debate on whether their use of force is 
indeed justifiable under any of the acknowledged ‘exceptions’ to the prohibition on the 
use of force. One of the most controversial exceptions to the prohibition, which is 
relevant to this thesis, is the notion of an obligation to undertake a military intervention in 
order to halt a humanitarian crisis, better known contemporarily as the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention.420 However, prior to delving into a legal analysis of the 
doctrine, it is necessary to define one final issue that is relevant to the main objective of 
this thesis: the applicability of the international law on the use of force in the creation of 
states. As unilateral secessions can also be seen as forms of state creation, it is imperative 
to define the ambit of the use of force in such instances, especially within both the 
colonial and non-colonial contexts.  The legal parameters identified in the next sub-
section will then be used to defend the objective of this thesis in providing an exception 
to the prohibition on the use of force in special cases related to UNC secessions, while 
denying the legitimacy of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.421  
                                                
419 A very recent example of a breach or an alleged breach of the prohibition is the attack by the 
United States against a Syrian military air base on April 6, 2017.  See Michael R Gordon, Helene 
Cooper & Michael D Shear, “Dozens of U.S. Missiles Hit Air Base in Syria” (6 April 2017), online < 
wwww.nytimes.com>.  Other examples include the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the 
United States invasion of Iraq in 2003.     
420 Ian Brownlie, “Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen” in Richard B Lillich, ed, 
Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Print, 1973) 
at 139–48.  
421 It is important to reiterate that for the purposes of this thesis, the terms ‘military intervention’ 
and ‘humanitarian intervention’ will be used intermittently. The breadth, legality and threshold of 
this statement will be examined in detail throughout the next two chapters.  See supra note 11.  
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3.1.3. State Creation and the Use of Force  
It is well established that, under international law, state creation can occur as a 
result of unilateral colonial (UC) secession pursuant to the law of self-determination. 
More precisely, a breadth of evidence affirms the right of colonized peoples to a 
unilateral colonial (UC) secession under both codified and customary international law. 
This evidence includes a long history of acceptance of unilateral colonial secessions and 
their subsequent claims to statehood, as well as numerous reaffirmations of this right 
through well-accepted opinio juris. One such example enlists the support of Resolution 
1541 which stipulates that “territories defined as colonial by Resolution 1541 are entitled 
to pursue their sovereign independence from metropolitan powers.”422 More 
contemporarily, the ICJ in the Kosovo Advisory Case has equally upheld the right of UC 
secessions by ruling quod hoc, that: 
During the second half of the twentieth century, the international law of 
self-determination developed in such a way as to create a right to 
independence for the peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples 
subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation (cf. Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 
276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, pp. 31-32, paras. 52-
53; East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 
102, para. 29; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004 (I), 
pp. 171-172, para. 88). A great many new States have come into existence 
as a result of the exercise of this right.423 
As can be deduced from the ICJ’s advisory opinion, the right to a UC secession, although 
largely a product of the 20th century, can be confirmed as existent in international law. 
Nevertheless, the question can be asked, what is its applicability of the use of force with 
regards to UC secessions? More precisely, it is necessary to inquire into whether any 
exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force exist outside of the current legal 
parameters with respect to colonized peoples.  
                                                
422 Anderson, “The Use of Force”, supra note 9 at 216-7.  
423 Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, supra note 145 at para 79.   
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UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolutions 2105424 and 2787425 are considered 
to be two of the primary non-binding international documents calling for the acceptance 
of a right for the use of force by colonized peoples seeking to secure their 
independence.426 Although these resolutions are non-binding in nature, declaratory 
resolutions equally reaffirm the right of colonized peoples to the use of force mutatis 
mutandis. For example, the Friendly Relations Declaration,427as well as the Definition of 
Aggression and Inadmissibility Declaration,428 build on the wording found in Resolutions 
2105 and 2787 to reiterate that “[n]othing…shall prejudice in any manner the right to 
self-determination, freedom and independence of peoples under colonial domination, 
foreign occupation or racist regimes, and the right to seek and receive support in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.”429  This view has similarly 
been supported by a number of legal scholars430 who have concluded correspondingly, 
that the “…right of colonial peoples to forcibly resist an oppressive metropolitan power is 
firmly grounded within customary international law.”431 However, the debate around the 
threshold for third-state support becomes less clear once the aspect of direct and indirect 
support is considered. After-all, what constitutes material support by a third-state? 
Anderson equally observes in assessing this question that the meaning of direct and 
indirect support by third-states has remained largely unclear:  
Unlike the non-declaratory resolutions, however, the Friendly Relations 
Declaration, Definition of Aggression and Inadmissibility Declaration 
explicitly provide that colonial peoples forcibly resisting an oppressive 
metropolitan power may only seek and receive third state "support in 
                                                
424 Declaration of the Granting of Independence, supra note 5.  
425 Importance of the Universal Realization of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination and of the 
Speedy Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples for the Effective Guarantee and 
Observance of Human Rights, GA Res 2787 (XXVI), UNGAOR, 26th Sess, Supp 49, UN Doc A/RES/2787 
(1971) [Resolution on Universal Right to Self-Determination].  
426 John Norton Moore, “The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict” (1969) 9 VA J Intl L 
209 at 267. 
427 Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 144, Principle 5 (5).   
428 Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, supra note 322. 
429 Ibid, art 4.  
430 See Crawford, “The Creation of States”, supra note 22 at 139; Cassese, “Self-Determination of 
Peoples”, supra note 6 at 153-55.  For an extensive list of scholars who support this view, see 
Anderson, “The Use of Force”, supra note 9 at 220, n 91.  
431 Ibid. 
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accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter." This raises the 
controversial question: what exactly does the word "support" and the phrase 
"in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter" actually 
mean? Do they together denote indirect third state assistance, or instead, 
direct third state intervention? 432 
The answer to the question of what is meant by direct or indirect support is complex. In 
large part, this is due to the fact that the threshold for third-state support can induce some 
of the more negative consequences of secession, such as regional destabilization, anarchy 
and civil conflict.433  Undoubtedly, strong support exists within international legal 
scholarship with regards to the right of a colonized population to seek and receive 
indirect third state assistance.434 For example, both Resolutions 2105 and 2787 support 
the use of force by a colonized peoples against a metropolitan power, while equally 
advocating and inviting third states to “…to render aid by way of ‘political, moral and 
material assistance.’”435 Additionally, most scholars point to Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of 
Resolution 3070436 as evidencing that right: 
Recognizing the imperative need to put an early end to colonial rule, 
foreign domination and alien subjugation, 
 
1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of all people under colonial and foreign 
domination and alien subjugation to self-determination, freedom and 
independence in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 1514 
(XV) of 14 December 1960, 2649 (XXV) of 30 November 1970 and 2787 
(XXVI) of 6 December 1971; 
 
2. Also reaffirms the legitimacy of the peoples' struggle for liberation from 
colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation by all available 
means, including armed struggle; 
 
3. Calls upon all States, in conformity with the Charter of the United 
                                                
432 Ibid at 221.  
433 de Villiers, supra note 103 at 81.  
434 See generally, Crawford, “The Creation of States”, supra note 22 at 139; Albrecht Randelzhofer & 
Oliver Dörr, “Article 2(4)” in Bruno Simma et al, eds., 3rd ed, The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary, vol I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 200, 228–9. See also Rosalyn Higgins, 
“International Law and Civil Conflict” in Evan Luard, ed, International Regulation of Civil Wars (New 
York: New York University Press, 1972) at 183 [R Higgins, “IL and Civil Conflict”]; Cassese, “Self-
Determination of Peoples”, supra note 6 at 150-4; Anderson, “The Use of Force”, supra note 9 at 221. 
435 Anderson, “The Use of Force”, supra note 9 at 218.  
436 Resolution on Universal Right to Self-Determination, supra note 425. 
 
97 
 
Nations and with relevant resolutions of the United Nations, to recognize 
the right of all peoples to self-determination and independence and to offer 
moral, material and any other assistance to all peoples struggling for the 
full exercise of their inalienable right to self-determination and 
independence.437 
Moreover, multiple scholars have argued that the combination of General Assembly 
Resolutions and Declarations that consistently encourage states to provide indirect 
support and assistance to colonial peoples, coupled with the evidence of state practice 
that provides it, confirms the legality of such practice intra legem.438 Most importantly, 
evidence points towards the fact that “…in situations where indirect assistance has been 
rendered by third states to colonial insurgent groups, the latter have not been prohibited 
from attaining independence.”439 Therefore, it can be confirmed that international law 
permits the indirect support of colonial insurgent groups fighting for independence on the 
basis of their right to external self-determination.440 
 In contrast, support for direct third state assistance has remained largely an illegal 
act. Simply put, direct third state assistance can be considered a form of military 
intervention, violating not only the prohibition on the use of force, but the peremptory 
norms of territorial inviolability and non-interference into the internal affairs of a 
sovereign state (otherwise known as the principle of non-intervention). As summarized 
by Anderson, the international legal parameters on such assistance is fairly evident: 
An examination of the UN Charter…particularly Articles 2(1), 2(4) and 
2(7), implicitly suggests that such direct third state intervention to colonial 
insurgent groups is categorically illegal. Assuming that the word "state" 
encompasses a metropolitan power's entire territory, this finding is 
supported by the contents of the Friendly Relations Declaration [Principle 
1, paragraphs 4, 8 and 9, Principle 3, paragraphs 1 and 2], Definition of 
Aggression and Inadmissibility Declaration [Articles 3,6].441 
                                                
437 Ibid at paras 1-3 [emphasis added]. 
438 See Rosalyn Higgins, “IL and Civil Conflict”, supra note 434 at 183; Cassese, “Self-Determination of 
Peoples”, supra note 6 at 153; M Rafiqul Islam, “Use of Force in Self-Determination Claims” (1985) 
25:3 Indian J Intl L 424 at 442-3; Moore, supra note 426 at 267.   
439 Anderson, “The Use of Force”, supra note 9 at 223.  
440 Ibid at 222-3. 
441 Ibid at 223.  
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Additionally, the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case pronounced on the importance of the 
effectiveness of the principle of non-intervention, underlining the impracticability of 
raising or lowering the legal threshold on direct third-state support under any 
circumstance: 
The principle of non-intervention derives from customary international law- 
It would certainly lose its effectiveness as a principle of law if intervention 
were to be justified by a mere request for assistance made by an opposition 
group in another State - supposing such a request to have actually been made 
by an opposition to the regime in Nicaragua in this instance. Indeed, it is 
difficult to see what would remain of the principle of non-intervention in 
international law if intervention, which is already allowable at the request 
of the government of a State, were also to be allowed at the request of the 
opposition. This would permit any State to intervene at any moment in the 
internal affairs of another State, whether at the request of the government 
or at the request of its opposition. Such a situation does not in the Court's 
view correspond to the present state of international law.442 
As can be deduced from the ICJ’s reasoning, the inevitable anarchy that will follow 
should the principle of non-intervention lose its effectiveness, dissipates any opportunity 
to legalize the right of third states to directly support a colonized peoples in their struggle 
for independence.443 Hence, the overarching international law on third state intervention 
in the context of colonialism can be confirmed as illegal. In large part, a strong legal 
precedent for (currently, less than 1% of the world’s population can be considered as 
living in colonial territories) international law that advocates for overall decolonization 
can and has been used to ensure that former colonies earn independence from their 
metropolitan powers.444 Yet, how does international law interpret third state assistance in 
                                                
442 Nicaragua ICJ Judgment, supra note 68 at paras 126, 246 cited in Anderson, “The Use of Force”, 
supra note 9 at 225.   
443 Buchheit, supra note 54 at 36. Of note, is the fact that despite the illegality of direct third state 
assistance, one formerly-colonized state, Angola, earned its independence specifically in this manner 
(although this case can be considered sui generis, as well as the only one of its kind.) Angola is a 
former Portuguese colony. In 1975, Cuba sent 15,000 military troops to assist Angola as part of its 
communist-backed liberation movement. At the same time, South Africa backed the opposing US-
backed liberation movement. Despite the violation of the principle of non-intervention, Angola was 
admitted to the UN in 1976. See also Wolf Grabendorff, “Cuba's Involvement in Africa” (1980) 22 J 
Inter-American Stud & World Affairs, 1 at 3-15. 
444 See Khan, supra note 180 (“[d]ecolonization has thus been an impressive achievement of the post-
World War II world community. But the less than 1% that still live in colonial territories, combined 
with their economic and strategic (in)significance, might lull into sanguinity” at para 2). See also 
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the non-colonial context? After-all, could an absence or lack of jurisprudential support 
for unilateral non-colonial secessions eliminate the opportunity for direct or indirect 
third-state support?  Prior to delving into the intricacies of third-state military 
intervention, it is necessary to briefly examine this point.  
 As previously mentioned in the Introduction and Chapter 1, the existence of a 
right to UNC secession exists in extreme situations of gross human rights abuses pursuant 
to the right of self-determination under customary international law. If one is to defend 
the right of a UNC secession as defined through an a contrario reading of Principle 5 (7) 
of the Friendly Relations Declaration, the question can be asked: does a right to a UNC 
secession encompass direct or indirect third state assistance? Anderson recommends 
turning to Principle 5(5) of the same Declaration to find the response: 
Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives 
peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the present principle of their 
right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In their actions 
against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of 
their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to 
receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the 
Charter.445 
Similar to the case of UC secessions, the Declaration reveals a right of indirect support 
by a third state provided the assistance is pursuant to Articles 2(1), 2(4) and 2(7) of the 
UN Charter. Although the Declaration is non-binding in nature, multiple scholars have 
concluded that the right of peoples to indirect third state assistance should exist in both 
the colonial and the non-colonial context.446 The primary reason for this conclusion is 
that a systematic denial of a peoples’ right to self-determination can be said to equate to 
the denial of a right of a colonized peoples to independence. Indeed, both concepts 
                                                
Anne-Hélène Béranger « Décolonisation et droit des peuples selon le droit international » (2005) 44 
Le Genre Humain 143 at 143-5; M Thomas, B Moore & LJ Butler, Crises of Empire: Decolonization and 
Europe’s Imperial States, 1918–1975 (London : Hodder Education, 2008).  
445 See Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 144, Principle 5 (5). 
446 Some examples of other prominent scholars who have come to this conclusion are: Cassese, “Self-
Determination of Peoples”, supra note 6 at 153-5; Georg Nolte, “Secession and External Intervention” 
in Marcelo G Kohen, ed, Secession: International Law Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006) at 77, 95-7; Crawford, “The Creation of States”, supra note 22 at 139-41; Anderson, “The 
Use of Force”, supra note 9 at 234-6.  
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demonstrate a struggle against an oppressor state, with little difference between the more 
refined definition of a colonized state, and a peoples within a state being systematically 
denied their right of self-determination. Cassese, writing before the advent of the 
Friendly Relations Declaration in 1995, stated: 
Turning to internal self-determination, one cannot speak of an oppressed 
racial group's right to use arms against the central authorities. Nor, however, 
can the group's resort to violence be better thought of as a mere fact of life, 
a reality. Here again [as with the UC context], the contention can be made 
that the group has been granted a legal licence to resort to armed force, 
subject to the strict conditions set out above [short of sending military troops 
as assistance].447 
Indeed, the endemic character of self-determination appears to apply to cases outside of 
the decolonization context as well, in which case, similar to UC secessions, a right of 
indirect third-state support will be permitted in cases of UNC secessions as well.448 In 
other words, on the basis of the evidence presented in support of an indirect right to third-
state support, it can hardly be disregarded that a peoples’ inside a particular state “…do 
not breach international law if they engage in armed action against a State that forcibly 
denies their right to self-determination."449 Hence, it can be suggested that indirect third 
state assistance in the context of a UNC secession is permissible under international law. 
Coincidentally, direct third state assistance outside of the colonial context is the 
most controversial concept not only in the context of UNC secessions, but also in the 
context of its direct contention with the general prohibition on the use of force. Indeed, 
the precision of when direct third state assistance is permissible under international law, 
if permissible at all, is the primary question that this thesis intends to answer. 
Accordingly, a detailed study of the notion of third-state military interventions (not just 
‘humanitarian interventions’) is required in order to firmly establish that the only legal 
exception to the prohibition of the use of force outside of the current international law, is 
found within the context of a UNC secession claim and under very particular 
                                                
447 Cassese, “Self-Determination of Peoples”, supra note 6 at 153-5 cited in Anderson, “The Use of 
Force”, supra note 9 at 234-6. 
448 Islam, supra note 438 at 429.  
449 Cassese, “Self-Determination of Peoples”, supra note 6.   
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circumstances.    
3.2. Third-State Military Intervention, Humanitarian Intervention & 
R2P 
The legality of humanitarian intervention is a controversial subject in international 
law.450 In large part, this is due to the fact that finding the balance between the “evolving 
conceptions of human rights and ethical state behavior,” 451 is a daunting task considering 
that international law limits the use of force by states to self-defence or through 
authorization by the UNSC.452 The first use of the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ can 
be attributed to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,453 in a book titled Self-
Determination in the New World Order,454 which invented the term as part of an 
explanation for the rise of “collective military intervention to accomplish strictly 
humanitarian objectives.”455 Nevertheless, the origins of the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention, that is, a foreign power’s military intervention on behalf of a population 
experiencing mass oppression - can be traced as far back as the 19th Century. During this 
time, a perceived necessity of military action to rescue Christians undergoing persecution 
in the Ottoman Empire is said to have given birth to the concept.456 This necessity of 
military action, purported to be executed on grounds of morality and justice, strongly 
resembles the iustum bellum concept, which in turn, relates to the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention. This section will define this relationship in detail, putting 
                                                
450 Aidan Hehir, “NATO's ‘Humanitarian Intervention’ in Kosovo: Legal Precedent or Aberration?” 
(2009) 8:3 J of Human Rights 245 at 246. 
451 Ibid. 
452 On the prohibition on the use of force in international law, see UN Charter, supra note 21, arts 29, 
33, 36, 37, 38, 52. 
453 Cohn, supra note 392 at 138. 
454 Morton Halperin & David Sheffer, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992). 
455 Cohn, supra note 392 at 160. 
456 For more on this see Gray, supra note 337 at 30–59. See also Nigel Rodley, “Humanitarian 
Intervention” in Dinah Shelton, ed, Human Rights and General International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013) (“England, France, and Russia intervened in Greece in 1827 to stop 
massacres by Turkey, and France intervened again in Syria in 1860, to stop the killings of Maronite 
Christians. Various European powers also intervened in defence of Christians in Crete (1866–68), the 
Balkans (1875–78), and Macedonia (1903–08)” at 819).  
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forward an analysis of the doctrine that will connect it with the notion of just war, while 
providing evidence that the moral obligation for the use of force by states in international 
law is nonexistent.  
In contemporary terms, humanitarian intervention can be defined as an “…armed 
intervention [that] is permissible to enforce standards of civilized conduct when rulers 
violate those standards, and finds expression today in the widely held opinion that states, 
acting unilaterally or collectively, are justified in enforcing respect for human rights.”457 
While many believe that the post-UN Charter concept of military intervention for the 
purposes of halting mass abuses of human rights began with the Balkan wars of the 
1990s,458 its genesis can actually be traced as early as the 1970s “in connection with 
several armed attacks at that time (i.e. especially in Eastern Pakistan/Bangladesh).”459 At 
that time, India’s militarily intervened to halt mass atrocities and human rights abuses 
being suffered by the Bengal peoples in East Pakistan.460 In the opinion of Jerzy Zajadlo, 
the concept has evolved in the following manner ever-since: 
In the 1960s and 1970s cases of intervention in internal conflicts took place 
and they can be recognised as humanitarian interventions from today's 
perspective and standpoint, even if interveners referred to self-defence 
aspect rather than to humanitarian reasons (i.e. India's intervention in East 
Pakistan, or to some extent Tanzania's intervention in Uganda and 
Vietnam's in Cambodia).461 
According to another prominent scholar, in looking at the codified international law on 
the use of force, an interesting observation can be made in that, perhaps, the unilateral 
and indiscriminate use of force by states after the Second World War was simply 
unimaginable, yet became a reality once peace was restored. Nigel Rodley explains this 
line of thinking by stating that  
Contextually, it must surely have been unthinkable that the drafters of the 
                                                
457 Nardin, supra note 17 at 57.  
458 The ‘Balkan Wars’ refers to the conflict in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia between 1990 – 
1999. See András J Riedlmayer, “Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace: Destruction of Libraries during and 
after the Balkan Wars of the 1990s” (2007) 56:1 Library Trends 107 at 111.   
459 Jerzy Zajadlo, “Humanitarian Intervention: Threat to International Order, Moral Imperative, or 
Customary Norm in statu nascendi?” (2004) 27 Polish Y B Intl L 33 at 35.  
460 A detailed analysis of this conflict will be presented as part of a separate case study in Chapter 4.  
461 Zajadlo, supra note 459 at 36. 
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UN Charter could have expected that, after the Nazi-perpetrated genocides, 
the world would again have to stand by if widespread atrocities were being 
committed behind the veil of national sovereignty. The world could not 
have unlearned the lesson so soon. In any event, if it was not the case at 
first, since it has come to be accepted that there is now not only a right, but 
a responsibility to protect against the major atrocities that scarred the 
conscience of the world, it is unconscionable to leave the fate of populations 
to the will of the Security Council, especially when that will is determined 
by a veto that may be cast for reasons having nothing to do with the clarity 
of the call and the need for rescue of those in danger.462 
In that respect, it is important to briefly summarize the arguments for and against the 
existence of an obligation for a humanitarian intervention, starting with its theoretical 
conception and ending with its contemporary applicability through the Responsibility to 
Protect principle.    
3.2.1. Iustum Bellum & Ius Naturale  
As mentioned in section 3.1.1., one of the major arguments which favours 
humanitarian intervention traces its roots back to the concept of just war. Be that as it 
may, it should be noted that the concept of iustum bellum must not be conflated with the 
international legal principle on the prohibition on the use of force. Although the former 
can be said to have contributed to the idea of a just reason to wage war, its inherent 
nature, which was built on ideals of warfare often developed through a natural law theory 
lens, prevents its use as part of a legal analysis in this thesis. Hence, it can be firmly 
stated that “neither the UN Charter system nor the classic just war theory provides an 
adequate analysis of jus ad bellum for the twenty first century.”463 Additionally, a 
primary reason that a just war doctrinal analysis will not be completed in this thesis, is 
that unfortunately, its theoretical underpinnings cannot be effectively incorporated into a 
contemporary international legal examination of the subject at hand. More precisely, it is 
suggested that the classical just war theory fails to conceptualize the legal, moral and 
political factors that are seen to govern the international law on the use of force 
(specifically in relation to military intervention). This view has found support in the legal 
                                                
462 See Rodley, supra note 456 at 779.  
463 Robert J Delahunty & John Yoo, “From Just War to False Peace” (202) 13:1 Chicago J Intl L 1 at 44. 
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scholarly community. For example, Delahunty and Yoo echo this position, specifying 
that there are multiple challenges related to using the classical just war theory as an 
assessment mechanism of military interventions: 
While it [classical just war theory] permits humanitarian interventions, it 
forbids preventive war: war is only "just" when, like the criminal law, it 
serves punitive justice. The injuries that war can properly redress, on the 
classic just war theory, are past ones; the threat of future injury, no matter 
how grave, cannot justify war except when the injury is actually impending. 
In an age when rogue states can credibly threaten millions of innocent 
civilians with instantaneous destruction, that consequence is simply not 
acceptable.464 
Indeed, solely from a legal perspective, the religious tenets of morality, which find their 
basis in the theory, prevent it from being used as part of the legal analysis. As colorfully 
defined by Nussbaum while writing during the Second World War: 
It appears that the traditional doctrine of just war is essentially religious 
where its religious spirit evaporates, only a shallow and stale residue 
remains. Certainly, the issue of just war deserves discussion in any course 
or textbook on international law, but only as a matter of analysis and 
historical information. This view will eliminate a prolific source of doubts 
and obscurities. The just-war-on-both-sides problem is illustrative. It is 
there that insoluble troubles befell the writers who tried to elaborate the just-
war concept in a legal or semi-legal way.465 
Nonetheless, it must be reiterated that the importance of iustum bellum in influencing the 
contemporary doctrine of humanitarian intervention cannot be ignored. Although aspects 
of the classical just war theory border on the theoretical, and at-times canonical teachings 
that are no longer fully applicable to modern warfare or international law, certain ideals 
                                                
464 Ibid. See also Stephen Lee, “The Who and the Why of Humanitarian Intervention” (2011) 30:3 
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465 Arthur Nussbaum, "Just War--A Legal Concept" (1943) 42:3 Mich L Rev 453 at 478.  
 
105 
 
of the theory have surpassed its criticism and have influenced important aspects of the 
contemporary doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Such ideals include “the common 
idea that war must be waged as a last resort…or Vitoria’s idea that a balance should 
always exist between war and the utility which is sought by using such force.”466 
Therefore, one way to see classical just war theory is to acknowledge its influence in 
resurrecting similar moral principles when applied to the notion of warfare through an 
advocacy for the existence of an overall obligation for humanitarian intervention.467 In 
other words, the basis of the theory has been found to make up the crux of the argument 
for the existence of a morality-derived legal parameter for humanitarian intervention, 
which finds that an international responsibility exists amongst states, as a matter of last 
resort, to use military force in an effort to halt mass and systematic humanitarian 
atrocities. Hence, although the theory itself will not be used as part of this thesis’ legal 
analysis of the issue at-hand, the connection between the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention, iustum bellum and natural law must be made abundantly clear. The next 
sub-section will briefly do so in order to introduce the theoretical foundation of the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention, whose status under international law can then be 
established accordingly.  
The philosophical relationship between natural law theory and military 
intervention (specifically humanitarian intervention) traces its roots as far back as ancient 
Greece and Rome.468 A suggested definition of humanitarian intervention holds that 
“…armed intervention is permissible to enforce standards of civilized conduct when 
rulers violate those standards, and finds expression today in the widely held opinion that 
states, acting unilaterally or collectively, are justified in enforcing respect for human 
rights.”469 Fundamentally, the moral aspect of adhering to a ‘civilized conduct” in 
respecting human rights, points to the use of classical natural law principles in the 
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aforementioned definition. This dictates a return to the roots of morality within the 
contemporary international legal system, a task that revives the abandoned philosophical 
approach to morality using natural law.470 
The early philosophical stages of natural law can be better defined as ‘classical 
natural law’ emphasizing the natural law maxim of “…what naturally is, ought to be.”471 
The commencement of classical natural law theory can be principally attributed to the 
literary works of Plato and Aristotle.472 Notwithstanding these contributions, the 
contemporary approach of analyzing pre-modern legal theory typically falls silent on 
natural law; preferring to refer to legal positivism as a more tangible alternative to natural 
law’s ‘outdated’ philosophy.473 In spite of these statements, natural lawyers believe that 
international law “entails some elementary normative propositions and consequently, as 
per Aquinas – is supposed to [serve] the common good.”474  In light of this view, it can be 
suggested that classical natural law perceives certain processes to be predetermined, and 
thus inherent to humanity. If this statement is applied to the primacy of human rights in 
the international law on the use of force, it becomes evident that they can be considered 
as inherent to humanity and hence, should be considered as forming the basis of the that 
law, while providing legitimacy for the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.475 Yet, this 
argument begs an important question with regards to the legal status of the doctrine: how 
can such a primacy be enforceable in international law? Herein lies the most challenging 
issue with regards to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. More precisely, the same 
criticism leveled against the use of classical just war theory to defend the development of 
the international law on the use of force, can also be applied, ipso facto, to the doctrine of 
                                                
470 David Kennedy, “International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion” (1997) 
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humanitarian intervention. Moreover, their general absence in international treaties or 
opinio juris supports this argument.476 Therefore, although the iustum bellum concept 
may have contributed to the development of the jus ad bellum through its implication of 
the right of self-defence for example,477 the current status of international law prevents 
the existence of a law solely on the basis of ‘morality’ or ‘justice’, especially without 
evidence of adherence to such a law in treaties or customs through state practice. 
Similarly, the absence of a ‘tribunal’ or any type of assessment or enforcement 
mechanism to evaluate the notion of justice or morality as it pertains to the act of 
humanitarian intervention seemingly prevents its invocation as a legal right under 
international law. This is applicable to both customary and treaty sources of international 
law as they pertain to the international law on the use of force. 
In conclusion, it can be suggested that the connection between classical just war 
theory and the doctrine of humanitarian intervention weakens the overall argument of the 
latter. This leads this thesis to recommend that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
should be put through a legal evaluation under the positivist understanding of 
international law. In other words, the doctrine should be put through an examination 
using the understanding of international law as deriving from treaty or custom, and not 
simply on the basis of its morality and justice towards humanity. The next subsection will 
                                                
476 Nussbaum, supra note 465 at 474.  
477 See e.g. Dino Kritsiotis, “Theorizing in International Law on Force and Intervention” in Anne 
Orford & Florian Hoffmann eds, Regimes and Doctrines, Part III (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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‘more general disappearance’ that has been observed of the concept of punishment ‘from the theories 
and vocabulary of contemporary legal theorists writing about war’, although complications attend 
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accomplish this in order to firmly establish that an overall right or obligation for 
humanitarian intervention does not exist in contemporary international law.  
3.2.2. Contemporary Arguments for Humanitarian Intervention in the 20th & 21st 
Centuries  
 Throughout post-UN Charter history, atrocities committed by states and their 
respective governments have kept alive the debate surrounding the existence of an overall 
right of collective or unilateral military intervention. Specifically, whether that right 
encompasses an absolute right to the use of force or not centered precisely on the attempt 
to halt them and consequently, prevent them from reoccurring in the future.478 Indeed, it 
is difficult to argue against the fact that the principle of state sovereignty, which remains 
corollary to the international legal system, can be left unfettered in the face of mass 
atrocities committed in Rwanda (1994) or Srebrenica (1995), for example.479 
Additionally, the fact that such atrocities have not been limited to certain states or regions 
of the world begs the question of: at what point does a state lose its sovereignty in the 
face of such atrocities being committed on its territory? Conversely, it can be asked, 
should a state lose its sovereignty at all? Would that not open up a ‘Pandora’s Box’ in an 
international legal system without an effective enforcement mechanism? Such valid 
questions remain a part of an ongoing debate promulgated through extensive scholarship 
that has attempted to argue their respective interpretations of the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention. As the past chapters have demonstrated, with the international legal system 
being reluctant to support laws solely by reason of morality or justice, it is necessary to 
assess the strength of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention by appraising its legal 
status and foundation. Once completed, it will be easier to understand the strongest 
argument of this thesis, which denies the legality of humanitarian intervention, rather 
arguing that an exception to the prohibition on the use of force exists solely under 
customary international law and under the condition of a systematic denial of a right to 
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self-determination, coupled with human rights abuses deemed as in extremis. 
The advocacy for the existence of a right to humanitarian intervention as a norm 
evolved principally throughout the Cold War period.480 In large part, two central 
arguments promulgated the concept: either as a justification for the use of force outside of 
the ambit of the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force, or as a responsibility to 
uphold a moral standard for an intervention in an oppressed state undergoing massive and 
systematic abuses of human rights.481 In response to the latter, the UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office stated in 1984 that “the best case that can be made in support of 
humanitarian intervention is that it cannot be said to be unambiguously illegal.”482 With 
regards to the former, as previously mentioned, an ongoing debate persists over the extent 
of the prohibition on the use of force in international law. In any case, it should be 
mentioned that attempts were made to develop the doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
into an enforceable legal norm through the introduction of the Responsibility to Protect 
principle, otherwise known as R2P.483 Before moving on, it is necessary to briefly 
summarize R2P’s development and contemporary status under international law, as the 
current doctrine on humanitarian intervention has embraced the concept as part of its 
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attempts to be codified into international law.484 
In response to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, and the claims of inaction by UN 
peacekeeping forces ‘paralyzed’ by bureaucratic and nebulous guidelines on the 
prohibition on the use of force,485 a discussion began to be had around the question of 
“…whether there is now a ‘responsibility to protect’, that is a duty on states to intervene 
in certain cases of humanitarian crisis.”486 In 2004, the High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change set up by the UN Secretary-General released a report titled: A 
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.487 Its contents reiterated the 
responsibility of states to collectively protect and work towards eliminating mass 
humanitarian atrocities. As further summarized by Gray, the Report advocated for a 
collective security mechanism against mass atrocities: 
[The Report] endorsed the emerging norm that there is such a collective 
responsibility to protect in cases of genocide and other large scale killing, 
ethnic cleansing or serious violation of international humanitarian law. The 
primary duty to protect lies with the state, but when a state fails to act to 
protect its own citizens the international community has a responsibility to 
act, by force if necessary, though only as a last resort. The responsibility to 
protect was exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military 
intervention.488 
One year later, the contents of the report were transferred into the World Summit 
Outcome Document during the World Summit in 2005. Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 
document distinctively pointed out the responsibilities of states from the perspective of 
both international law and the international community. With regards to the R2P 
principle in particular, Paragraph 139 clearly demonstrated the intent of establishing a 
collective security mechanism for the purposes of a military intervention:  
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The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to 
help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective 
action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in 
accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case 
basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as 
appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities 
are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need 
for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the 
Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as 
necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and 
conflicts break out.489 
Although this paragraph, and its wording, was hailed as a monumental achievement by 
the UN Secretary General at the time,490 the debate over the implication of creating a 
legal obligation for states to act began to slowly fragment the R2P principle and 
consequently, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention in general. In large part, a group 
of states calling themselves the ‘non-aligned movement’ saw R2P as simply a pretext for 
powerful states to invade smaller states under the auspices of that doctrine, while also 
imposing their political and economic will in the intervened state ex post facto.491 
Generally, proponents of R2P point to numerous examples where the ‘principle’ was 
invoked and used successfully. However, although such proponents point to Resolutions 
1674 (2006)492 and 1973 (2011)493  as acknowledging the use of the ‘responsibility to 
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protect’ doctrine with regards to the humanitarian crises in Sudan and Libya for example, 
the underlying debate over the meaning of R2P has interrupted any idea of the concept 
emerging into a customary norm in international law.494 In other words, even those who 
still claim that R2P has the potential to crystallize into a customary international law 
norm in the future, have acknowledged the challenge of invoking the doctrine outside of 
UNSC approval, reaffirming the original challenge with the prohibition on the use of 
force in the first place.495 Generally speaking, it can be suggested that R2P’s legal status 
can be measured as being at best an instrument of soft law, encouraging states to limit 
and avoid committing atrocities.496 In order to reaffirm this statement, it is necessary to 
assess first, which states, if any, have  openly supported the doctrine, and second, has 
state practice adequately supported it, as well?   
As previously mentioned, until very recently, states were reluctant to recognize a 
legal right or obligation for a humanitarian intervention in their domestic or foreign 
policies. This has contributed to probably the largest criticism of humanitarian 
intervention: the absence of any direct legal justification for its existence, as well as a 
reluctance of lawyers and legal scholars to adamantly confirm its existence, instead 
opting to state that it could or should exist.497 Still, consider this extract from a speech 
delivered on January 11, 2017 by the Right Honourable Jeremy Wright, the United 
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Kingdom’s Attorney General on the modern law of self-defence whereby the right to 
humanitarian intervention is clearly mentioned:  
To be clear, today I address only the law relevant to the resort to the use of 
armed force (jus ad bellum), and not the law which applies to the conduct 
of military operations (jus in bello). As you know, the starting point is that 
the use of force is prohibited under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. That is 
such a fundamental tenet of the post 1945 world order that it is considered 
by many to be a peremptory norm from which no derogation is permissible. 
Even so, there are clear exceptions to that prohibition, both in the UN 
Charter itself and, in the United Kingdom’s view, in customary international 
law. Under the UN Charter, armed force may be used both pursuant to a 
Chapter VII authorisation by the UN Security Council and in individual or 
collective self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The UK also 
recognises humanitarian intervention as a potential legal basis for the use 
of force in certain exceptional circumstances.498 
As can be deduced from the Attorney-General’s speech, the United Kingdom recognizes 
the right for a humanitarian intervention in ‘certain exceptional circumstances’. This 
declaration is significant in that it denotes one the first times in the last decade that a 
government’s policy has openly supported a legal justification for humanitarian 
intervention outside of the current prohibition on the use of force. Unfortunately, it also 
one of the only times a government has openly acknowledged its existence. Nonetheless, 
it is important to note that proponents of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention have 
not ignored the criticism of unenforceability with regards to its evaluation. Generally, it is 
argued that a threshold or a test must be developed to assess the gravity of the situation 
and the necessity of the intervention.499 Rodley, for example, summarizes the generic test 
for humanitarian intervention requiring an assessment through six separate criteria: 
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1. Gravity of the situation (i.e are human rights abuses in moderato vs. in 
extremis?) 
2. Political neutrality (i.e is there national self-interest on behalf of the 
intervening state or states?) 
3. UNSC paralysis (i.e has the UNSC been paralyzed in its ability to 
invoke the use of force through its Chapter VII mandate?) 
4. Necessity (i.e is the necessity of the intervention similar to the threshold 
invoked for self-defence: ‘instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of 
means, and no moment for deliberation’) 
5. Proportionality (i.e what is a proportional military response to the 
situation? This consideration would avoid the occurrence of senseless 
destruction of civilian infrastructure and collateral damage such as the 
ones in perpetrated in NATO’s bombing campaign of Kosovo in 
1999)500 
6. Accountability (i.e what is the threshold for the accountability of the 
intervening party? What governmental body would have the authority 
to hold the intervening state or states accountable on the basis of the 
validity of the intervention?).501  
Such tests, although important if one is to consider the legitimacy of an intervention, pose 
a number of different issues. For example, who will administer these tests on the 
international level? Can an independent arbiter truly assess the nature, necessity, or 
political neutrality of an intervention? Further, what type of sanctions, if any, can be 
imposed on those that violate their responsibilities under this test? In many ways, these 
types of questions cannot be answered in the face of the contemporary status of the 
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doctrine from a legal perspective. Overall, Nodley equates the rendition of humanitarian 
intervention as a legal doctrine to the introduction of assisted suicide into a domestic 
legal system. In other words, Nodley sees a troubling trend emerging should a 
humanitarian intervention doctrine be officially introduced into international law. In 
particular, he sees states abusing the exception to the prohibition on the use of force, 
seeing as no sanctionary mechanism can prevent them from acting unilaterally on that 
basis, similar to the legal ramifications of implementing an overall right to deregulated 
assisted suicide in a domestic legal system.502 Nodley’s arguments are salient in that they 
identify a seemingly insurmountable argument against the concept of humanitarian 
intervention: the building of legal threshold for an obligation of humanitarian 
intervention, that can be independently assessed and enforced if a blatant violation were 
to occur. From a legal perspective, as noted by Mindia Vashakmadze, the R2P principle 
has not attained the necessary strength of a rule in international law: 
The enthusiasm for a possible legal nature of R2P may increase in the years 
to come and it is to be expected that the debate on the normative significance 
of R2P will continue. However, it must not be overlooked that the success 
of the concept as such cannot be measured by its suitability to be translated 
into a binding legal principle. At this stage, the R2P may be a more powerful 
and effective mechanism if it is used as a tool for a slow normative change 
and not as an established (or emerging) principle of international law.503 
Simply put, it is impossible at this juncture to argue for the existence of an overall right to 
humanitarian intervention as evinced by the R2P principle. Nonetheless, it should be 
noted that the main argument of this thesis does not defend an overall obligation for 
humanitarian intervention. Additionally, it must be reiterated that this thesis defends the 
right, and not a responsibility or obligation, for a third state military intervention in the 
case of human rights abuses deemed as in extremis, and only if a claim of self-
determination has been invoked and has been systematically denied to the peoples in 
question. Hence, a thorough analysis of three case studies will be presented in the next 
Chapter in order to better understand the implications of a situation whereby an attempted 
UNC secession is followed by the commission of human rights abuses deemable as in 
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extremis. The case studies will focus on three relatively recent examples of military 
interventions with the objective of demonstrating the legal requirements necessary to 
justify a third-state military intervention. Namely, the three examples will consist of 
interventions by India in Bangladesh in 1971, NATO in Kosovo in 1999 and Russia in 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008. Once a thorough analysis of each case is completed, 
a concluding sub-section will present a legal framework through which an exception to 
the prohibition on the use of force under customary international law can be established.  
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Chapter 4 
Chapter 4: Case Studies – Bangladesh, Kosovo & South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia 
 The history of third-state military interventions in the pre-UN Charter period is 
controversial in relation to the nature, the reason and the end result of the interventions on 
the state in question. As mentioned in Chapter 3 with respect to the history of the iustum 
bellum concept, until the mid-19th century, states had been reluctant to call interventions 
‘humanitarian’, rather opting for other justifications as part of their recourse to the use of 
force. Overall, “history casts a heavy shadow over any intervention claimed to be 
‘humanitarian,’”504 in large part due to the conflation of humanitarian intervention with 
neo-imperialism.505 For example, the military intervention in Cuba by the United States 
in 1898 was claimed by the United States as justified on the basis of protecting United 
States citizens and interests, while also freeing the Cuban citizens from Spanish colonial 
rule. Ultimately, this led Cuba to become a US protectorate until the Cuban Revolution in 
1959, which, on many accounts, occurred either on moral and hence justifiable grounds, 
or due to the willingness of the United States to impose its hegemony in Cuba, which 
ultimately led to the exploitation of Cuban resources by American companies.506 As can 
be seen through this example, finding instances of state practice with regards to a true 
‘humanitarian intervention’ is extremely challenging.507 As explained by Rodley, the 
criteria for what constitutes a justifiable military intervention are generally vexing to 
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identify: 
Again it will only be the more evident that candidacies for the title of 
example of humanitarian intervention are hard to come by. It is not intended 
to consider rescues of the intervening state’s national (or other foreign 
nationals) abroad. To the (questionable) extent that such interventions may 
be lawful, they are rarely if ever justified as being undertaken pursuant to a 
general right of humanitarian intervention, that would protect all those in 
the territory of the state in question, but only for the more limited right to 
protect foreign nationals; sometimes self-defence is advanced as an 
underlying justification. Certainly, such a defence is the only one consistent 
with the original notion that the only exceptions to the prohibition on the 
use of force were self-defence and Security Council-authorized action under 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter…Any inhibition on the use of force, short 
of resort to outright war, must inevitably have had more than a trace of 
flimsiness about it, thus creating space for the possibility of armed action 
for many politically convenient purposes. It is after the advent of the 
universal prohibition on the use of force that state practice becomes 
especially important. 508 
Without going further into the ‘flimsiness’ of military interventions executed on 
‘humanitarian’ grounds, it should be noted that the intent of this thesis is to identify state 
practice with regards to third-state interventions only in cases related to external self-
determination combined with human rights abuses deemed as in extremis. Therefore, the 
case studies which will be explored in this chapter will be analyzed with the 
understanding that strategic and ulterior motives can exist within the ambit of third-state 
military interventions (whether or not they are perceived or conceived to be of a 
humanitarian nature). In turn, the threshold of whether such strategic or ulterior motives 
constitute a violation of non-derogable peremptory norms of international law will also 
be considered. Conclusively, the factors that will be established as legitimizing the 
military intervention under international law, will provide the necessary burden of proof 
that the intent, proportionality and final execution of the intervention outweigh any 
notion of the interventions’ ulterior or strategic motives. 
The case studies analyzed in this Chapter have been selected on the basis of the 
following three variables as generally applying to three separate conflicts: a) the 
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territorial conflict in question includes a peoples that have been systematically denied 
their right to internal self-determination and thus have invoked their right to external self-
determination, b) the systematic denial of self-determination has been followed-up with 
human rights abuses deemed as in extremis and c) a third-state or a collective of third-
states has(ve) militarily intervened in the conflict. Additionally, the three case studies will 
be considered separately to demonstrate the scope of legal and illegal third-state military 
interventions. More precisely, the military interventions in Bangladesh and Kosovo will 
demonstrate how systematic denials of a peoples’ self-determination, combined with 
human rights abuses deemed as in extremis, have validated or justified the interventions 
in those conflicts. Alternatively, the cases of South Ossetia and Abkhazia will 
demonstrate how, even as both entities can claim to meet the international legal 
requirements for statehood, the absence of systematic denials of internal and external 
self-determination do not justify or validate the Russian military intervention and 
subsequent occupation of the Georgian territories. Overall, the case comparison will 
establish the legal requirements necessary for a third-state intervention in violation of the 
prohibition on the use of force, but justified as part of customary international law. 
4.1. Bangladesh  
 As one of the few successful secessionist movements in the 20th century, 
Bangladesh is the first case whereby a serious systematic violation of self-determination 
rights was met with direct military intervention perpetrated by a third state (India).509 
Additionally, the case has been considered as one of the first instances of ‘legitimate’ 
interventions, leading to the subsequent creation of a sovereign state post-1945.510 The 
rapidity of its acceptance into the international community, coupled with over 28  de jure 
state recognitions in 1972, and earning full de jure recognition once conceded by 
Pakistan in 1974, speaks to the importance of the factors which led to and subsequently 
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completed its path to independence.511 Prior to delving into the developments of the 
Bengali independence movement, it is necessary to briefly summarize the history of the 
region. This will establish a firm understanding of the ethno-religious plight of its 
multinational history, made more complex by multiple waves of invasions and colonial 
rule over the last two millennia.   
4.1.1. Bangladesh – a brief chronological history 
 The history of the contemporary state of Bangladesh is complex as it “is 
intertwined with that of India, Pakistan and other countries in the area.”512 Moreover, the 
impact of religion as introduced by the numerous colonial conquests of the territory, 
provide an added opportunity to understand the complexity of its ethno-diverse 
population. From the onset, Buddhism dominated the region during the Mauryan Empire 
from around the 3rd Century BCE, followed by a re-establishment of Hinduism between 
4-6 BCE by the Gupta kings.513 The two religions were able to coexist fairly peacefully 
until an overthrow of the Senas by Muslim invaders in 1200 AD. After the invasion, the 
religion of the majority of the population changed to Islam. Nevertheless, as explained by 
this extract from Britannica Encyclopedia, the multiconfessional makeup of Bangladesh 
after 1200 AD was not an immediate cause for the ethnic conflict that would follow in the 
centuries to come: 
Muslim rule in Bengal promoted a society that was not only pluralistic but 
also syncretic to some degree. The rulers largely remained uninterested in 
preaching religion; rather, they concentrated on incorporating local 
communities into the state system. In their administration, high office 
holders, influential traders, eminent literati, and musicians came from 
diverse religious traditions. Nevertheless, practitioners of Sufism (mystical 
Islam) and Muslim saints did indeed preach Islam, and Muslim settlers 
received patronage. Although high-caste Hindus received land grants under 
early Muslim rule, under the Mughals most grants were awarded to Muslim 
settlers. These settlers developed an agrarian economy in Bengal that 
ultimately helped the spread of Islam. Meanwhile, the extensive interaction 
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between Islam and Hinduism was reflected in social behaviour and the 
flourishing of various cults, notably that of the Hindu saint Caitanya (1486–
1533). In contrast to more orthodox forms of Hinduism, the Caitanya sect—
like Islam—was open to all members of society, regardless of caste or social 
rank. Under the Mughals the political boundaries of Bengal expanded to 
become Suba Bangalah (the Province of Bengal), and economic activity 
increased.514 
Once the English East India Company was granted the right to establish its headquarters 
in Calcutta (known as Kolkata) in the early 18th century, the British were able to exploit 
the weaknesses of the Mughal empire through their military dominance and monopoly in  
operating international trade routes.515 In 1757, the East India Company with the backing 
of British troops fought a war against the weakened Mughal empire, ultimately defeating 
them and establishing the ‘Bengal Presidency’, a permanent settlement which 
implemented a feudal-type colonial system through a policy known as the bhandralok. 
The policy created a new middle-class, which unbeknownst to the British, would 
advocate for eventual independence and Indian self-government.516  
The difficulties of governing such a large territory were demonstrated early in the 
20th century when the British decided, for geopolitical and geostrategic reasons, to 
separate the Bengal Presidency into Western and Eastern Bengal. Western Bengal at that 
time had a Hindu majority, while Eastern Bengal was primarily inhabited by a Muslim 
population.517 As expected, the partition did not go well with the local minority 
populations in each territory. This led to the eventual annulment of the partition in 1912 
(due to opposition from the Indian and Hindu-dominated National Congress); however, 
the seeds of religious and ethno-based separatism had already been planted.518 Over the 
next twenty years, the Hindu-dominated National Congress party and the Muslim-
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dominated Muslim League party fought over control of a reunited Bengal (albeit 
amicably). Yet, despite British efforts to dissipate ethno-religious tensions, “…in August 
of [1946] an intense Muslim-Hindu communal conflict erupted in Calcutta, and it 
eventually spread well beyond the borders of Bengal.”519 As Britain began to lose control 
over India, its partition followed by civil conflict became inevitable.520 Finally, in August 
1947, India and Pakistan emerged as independent countries, with their territorial 
boundaries sketched and separated by the British, with West Bengal going to India and 
East Bengal going to Pakistan.521 Evidently, the partition of East and West Bengal was 
not well received by the local populations. The reasons for this disenchantment are 
described by Li-ann Thio as revolving around several factors:  
The geographically non-contiguous eastern wing of Pakistan, where 56 per 
cent of the total population lived, was separated from the western wing by 
1200 miles of Indian territory. Islam was the sole unifying factor, given the 
cultural and linguistic differences of West and East Pakistanis. Rather than 
implementing a proposed federal system, military rule was imposed; 
further, Pakistani nationalism shaped the central policies that were designed 
to keep East Pakistan under-developed, negating the Bengali cultural 
identity. This unjust socio-economic and political order bred Bengali armed 
resistance and the desire to establish a Bengalese nation-State as a curative 
to the repressive West Pakistani rule.522 
As can be deduced from Thio’s explanation, the boundaries that were drawn up by the 
British to separate East and West Bengal did not entirely represent the religious and 
linguistic demographic of the regions.523 Additionally, “…since the Partition of British 
India in 1947, India and Pakistan had been fierce enemies, strategic and ideological rivals 
with clashing claims on Kashmir. The newly independent states fought a war in 1947-48, 
and then again in 1965 over Kashmir.”524 Indeed, by the early 1960s, civil armed conflict 
became inevitable, as the developments that followed the partition, would lead to the rise 
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of a secessionist movement that would eventually bring independence to Bangladesh. The 
next sub-section will provide greater detail on the legitimacy of the Bangladesh 
independence movement, as well as the historical developments which led to India’s 
support and subsequent military intervention in 1971.  
4.1.2. Legality of India’s intervention in Bangladesh  
 The conflict in Bangladesh arose in the region known formerly as East Bengal, 
which was partitioned from West Bengal and given to the newly-independent state of 
Pakistan in 1947. As the emergence of the Pakistani state was largely a product of Islamic 
nationalism,525 the ethno-religious tensions flared in the region once nationalist 
movements in Pakistan began to infringe on the rights of the more Hindu-dominated 
ethnic populations of East Bengal. Consequently, by 1948, “Bengalis had begun to resent 
the nonacceptance of Bengali as an official language, the domination of the bureaucracy 
by non-Bengalis, and the appropriation of provincial functions and revenue by the central 
government.”526 Further, in 1955, East Bengal was renamed East Pakistan to represent its 
status as an eastern province of the Pakistani Union (a more federative-modeled state). 
Nevertheless, after the Awami league, a leading Bengali political party, backed a 1956-
proposed constitution that purported to provide equal representation and rights to each 
ethno-religious group in East Pakistan; a proposition was made for Eastern Pakistan 
autonomous rule  as early as 1962.527 The Awami league argued that this is “the only way 
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of resolving the disparity between Pakistan’s two parts [East and West Bengal and the 
Pakistani Union].”528 Subsequently, the Awami League won the national elections in 
1970-1 with an overwhelming majority in East Bengal, “…which would have given it a 
majority in the National Parliament and most probably would have led to the 
federalisation of Pakistan.”529 Naturally, this news was not met with enthusiasm by the 
Pakistani Union, with the military pronouncing an ultimate rejection of the democratic 
election results while equally proclaiming that the results were marred with ‘civil 
disobedience’.530 Pakistan then launched a large-scale military operation on March 25, 
1971, sending thousands of troops into the region. Consequently, the leaders of the 
Awami league, as well as several other Bengali and pro-Bengali politicians were jailed 
for their opposition to Pakistan’s response.531 As a result, on March 26, East Pakistan 
proclaimed its unilateral independence from the Pakistani Union; however, the atrocities 
committed against civilians had started the day before. It is well documented that, during 
the Pakistani military operations, multiple atrocities were committed, with “over one 
million Bengalis…killed[,] some 10 million driven into exile in India [as refugees], 
nearly 40 million displaced from their homes and tens of thousands of Bengali women 
raped.”532 Many states and state representatives decried the Pakistani military operation 
as ‘genocidal’.533 In response to such actions, India attacked Pakistan ‘pre-emptively’ on 
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December 3, 1971534 and on December 6 officially recognized Bangladesh as an 
independent state. Nearly fourteen days later, “Pakistani troops were routed in the 
east…with Indian forces deep inside Bangladesh, Pakistan offered its surrender in Dhaka 
on December 16, 1971.”535 By May 1972, Bangladesh’s independence was recognized by 
nearly 70 states, with nearly 100 states recognizing its de jure status by September 
1973.536 At first, Pakistan, attempted to break off diplomatic relations with every state 
which recognized Bangladesh, but ultimately, they were forced to rescind this action 
when “the major powers such as the the Soviet Union and the United States, and the 
European Council countries granted recognition”537 as well. Accordingly, after several 
delays caused by China’s use of the veto in the UNSC due to its close relationship with 
Pakistan,538 on September 17, 1974, Bangladesh was officially admitted into the United 
Nations.539 
Pakistan’s argument for respecting its territorial sovereignty largely included 
pointing to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter as the reason for denouncing India’s actions as 
illegal under international law.540 Additionally, Pakistani diplomats pointed to Article 
2(7) as another reason for which India and outside states had no business in meddling 
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into the internal affairs of their country.541 Interestingly, this view was supported by a 
number of democratic states including the United States, Britain, France, West Germany 
and Japan.542 It was alleged at the time that regardless of the atrocities being committed 
by Pakistan in East Bengal, the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention in 
international law must be respected to the highest degree and without derogation.543 This 
leads to the question: on what grounds did India justify its military intervention?  
 India’s argument for military intervention has been questioned on the grounds of 
its military training and support for the Bengali nationalist movements prior to the 
intervention, as well as “seizing [on the] opportunity to dismember Pakistan.”544 In 
addition to this argument, India’s internal cabinet saw military intervention as the only 
feasible policy left, especially in an era where other democratic governments were 
equally, if not more involved in executing similar actions around the world: 
This kind of abnegation of international law was prominently suggested by 
the strategist Subrahmanyam in an influential secret report sent to the senior 
ranks of the government, including Haksar, Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, 
Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram, the army chief of staff, and others. 
Subrahmanyam noted that India had gotten away with its 1961 seizure of 
Goa from Portuguese colonial rule, despite international condemnation. 
"Over a period of time in international community all actions tend to be 
overlooked," he argued candidly. “U.S. intervention in Guatemala, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and Hungary 
and French intervention in Chad are all now vague memories.” None of 
these nations had as much justification to intervene as India now has in 
Bangla-Desh.545 
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In other words, India looked to comply with international law, yet draw a fine line with 
regards to the nature of its military operation in East Bengal. It is important to consider 
that India’s violation of the prohibition on the use of force should not detract from its 
commitment and support of international law. In fact, India prided itself on its record of 
supporting and complying with international law since the ratification of the UN 
Charter.546 At the end, “Indian officials and legal authorities advanced four interlocked 
claims for intervention in East Pakistan: arguments from human rights, genocide, self-
determination, and India's own sovereignty.”547 In order to confirm the legitimacy of 
these arguments, it is necessary to look at several interpretations of the intervention by 
legal scholars.  
 Inevitably, the most challenging factor in India’s intervention was the violation of 
the principle of territorial inviolability. With respect to the importance of the principle, 
even in contemporary times, consider this opinion by Roth:  
To be sure, the traditional insistence on territorial inviolability of existing 
states has an element of arbitrariness at its core. On occasion, this 
arbitrariness places intolerable stress on the putative rule, justifying the 
emergence of a narrow exception in keeping with the traditional 
framework's basic logic; a normative order that cannot bend will likely 
break. But an overall approach more favorable to external encouragement 
of secession would ultimately serve neither the moral principle of self-
determination nor the practical project of inter-state peace.548 
Simply put, the principle of territorial inviolability clashes with the right of self-
determination, specifically when that right is exercised externally through an attempted 
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separation of territory, which as explained earlier, could lead to a withdrawal of 
sovereignty as well. Furthermore, the separation of territory is typically either completed 
through military support of the entity wishing to separate by a third-state, or through a 
third-state military intervention in cases where the entity’s resistance is met with 
systematic human rights abuses deemed as in extremis. Therefore, in looking at the 
legality of India’s actions, it is important to consider its record of compliance with 
international law (as mentioned above), as well as its considerations of the status of the 
Bengali people as a peoples under international law.   
The ramifications of the military intervention on India’s part, and the recognition 
of Bangladesh on the other, make for a very interesting case with regards to its evaluation 
under international law. Consider this opinion of the ‘remedial right to secede’ for 
Bangladesh by John Dugard and David Raic: 
Supporters of the qualified right of secession agree that Bangladesh met all 
the suggested criteria for the exercise of a unilateral right to secede. There 
is no doubt that the Bengalis constituted a people, in an ethnic sense, which 
formed a majority within East Pakistan. It is also clear that the people of 
East Pakistan were exposed to serious harm in the form of a denial of 
internal self-determination and widespread violations of fundamental 
human rights. Moreover, all realistic options for the realisation of internal 
self-determination were exhausted.549  
Equally, consider this opinion on the same matter by Crawford: 
Genocide is the clearest case of abuse of sovereignty, and this factor, 
together with the territorial and political coherence of East Bengal in 1971, 
qualified East Bengal as a self-determination unit within the third, 
exceptional, category discussed above, even if it was not treated as a non-
self-governing territory. The view that East Bengal had, in March 1971, a 
right to self-determination has received juristic support.167 Moreover, the 
particular, indeed the extraordinary, circumstances of East Bengal in 1971 
to 1972 were undoubtedly important factors in the decisions of other 
governments to recognize, rather than oppose, the secession: by its conduct 
the Pakistan army had disqualified itself, and the State, from any further 
role in East Bengal.550 
Additionally, with respect to the illegal use of force by India, Anderson suggests that, 
                                                
549 Dugard & Raic, supra note 528 at 122-3.  
550 Crawford, “The Creation of States”, supra note 22 at 140-1. 
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given the circumstances, the strength of the principle of self-determination was solidified 
through India’s careful consideration of its military actions: 
The principal factor which prevented Bangladesh from breaching the 
peremptory norm prohibiting the illegal use of force was the scale and 
severity of the human rights abuses suffered by East Pakistanis at the hands 
of the Pakistani military prior to Indian intervention. In effect, these abuses 
- which have been generally characterized as genocidal - functioned as an 
antidote to the corresponding illegal use of force by Indian troops. Thus, 
although Indian intervention was illegal, this did not result in Bangladesh's 
statehood being called into question…A further factor which assisted 
Bangladesh in not breaching the peremptory norm prohibiting the illegal 
use of force is that India did not, in the judgment of the international 
community, directly intervene in order to secure sovereignty or de facto 
authority throughout East Pakistani territory. Rather, India's direct 
intervention was a response to the estimated nine million East Pakistani 
refugees that entered India and established makeshift camps.551 
If all three opinions’ primary arguments are analyzed collectively, it can be determined 
that several factors support the notion that, although India’s actions violated the 
prohibition on the use of force, India’s intent for the intervention, as well as the 
proportionality of its response, provide an exception to the prohibition on the use of force 
which was justifiably accepted by the international legal community. In fact, this 
exception can be summarized  through five primary factors that form the basis for the 
‘exception’ to the prohibition on the use of force in international law: a) the Bengalis 
were systematically denied their right of international self-determination since the 
partition of India and Pakistan, b) the Bengalis had their right of external self-
determination supressed by the Pakistani military, c)  the Bengalis had become the 
subject of human rights abuses designated as in extremis (ethnic cleansing and possibly 
even genocide) while the nearly 9 million refugees encroached on India’s sovereignty,552 
                                                
551 Anderson, “The Use of Force”, supra note 9 at 235-6.  
552 India had claimed that the influx of refugees strained resources in its country, as well as provided 
an opportunity for a potential domestic humanitarian catastrophe. By threatening the peace and 
stability of India’s domestic situation, the refugee influx was used as another element that supported 
India’s argument for the necessity of the military intervention. See Bass, supra note 524 at 269. 
Additionally, on the topic of India’s claim of mass refugee flow as a factor for military intervention 
see M K Nawaz, “Bangladesh and International Law” 11 Indian J Intl L 251 at 263-5. This would not 
be the last time that a state claims that a massive influx of refugees from a territorial conflict 
encroaches on the peace and stability of the receiving state. The United States’ support of ousting the 
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d) India’s military intervention became justified in response to factor c, and finally, d) 
India’s military intervention into Pakistan ended as soon as the fear of human rights 
abuses had dissipated, with no subsequent imposition of Indian sovereignty, culture or 
language on the Bengali peoples.   
 In sum, it can be concluded that, although India’s military intervention in 
Bangladesh was a violation of the prohibition on the use of force, its proportionality, 
along with its intent and its execution effectively legitimized it. Next, it is necessary to 
analyze another case of a military intervention which occurred more recently, and hence, 
can provide a more contemporary assessment of the argument which supports the right of 
third-state military interventions in cases of external self-determination. Although it will 
be demonstrated that certain aspects of NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo were 
different from those in Bangladesh, the underlying similarities between the two will 
reaffirm the factors which support and justify the ‘violation of the prohibition on the use 
of force in the case of Kosovo as well. In turn, this will solidify the argument that third-
state military interventions can be justified provided they are executed within the context 
of UNC secessions as supported by the principle of self-determination in international 
law.  
4.2. Kosovo  
The NATO intervention in Kosovo tested the limits of ‘humanitarian intervention’ 
from the perspective of international legitimacy and state sovereignty. As expanded on by 
Zajadlo, this type of collective and unilateral action, against the clearly-defined 
parameters of the prohibition on the use of force, was of extreme concern for the 
international community: 
From this point of view, NATO's intervention in Kosovo was a turning point 
                                                
Haitian military junta in 1994 (authorized under Chapter VII of the UN charter) and NATO’s 
arguments with regards to the influx of refugees from Kosovo and Yugoslavia into neighbouring 
states are also examples of this. See also Anthea Roberts, “Legality vs. Legitimacy: Can Uses of Force 
be Illegal but Justified?” in Philip Alston & Euan MacDonald, eds., Human Rights, Intervention and the 
Use of Force (Oxford: Oxford University Press) at 178-85; Thomas Franck, Recourse to Force: State 
Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 134-40.  
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- both legality and legitimation of this action [intervening militarily without 
United Nations Security Council approval] have been the subject of debates 
until the present day. The conclusion to the report of the International 
Commission on Kosovo is the best example for that. It reads: ‘The 
Commission acknowledges that the NATO's military intervention was 
illegal, though legitimate’. And further it goes on to state: ‘The lesson from 
NATO's intervention in Kosovo shows that there is a need to bridge a gap 
between legality and legitimation’.553 
More succinctly, it became unclear whether the territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
states - both considered to be non-derogable and well-accepted norms of international law 
– had changed on the basis of the legitimization of the intervention arguments  posited by 
NATO.554 Hence, it is important to examine both sides of the legality vs. legitimization 
debate with respect to the NATO intervention in Kosovo, as well as provide a 
background to the conflict itself; however, prior to doing so, it is necessary to summarize 
the historical development of the Kosovo region. This will, similar to the historical 
summary of Bangladesh, allow for a more comprehensive study of the complex and 
distinctive makeup of the future state of Kosovo. 
4.2.1. Kosovo – a brief chronological history 
 The first use of the name ‘Kosovo’ can be attributed to the Battle of Kosovo (June 
25, 1389), a major battle between the “Serbian prince Lazar and the Turkish forces of the 
Ottoman Sultan Murad I (reigned 1360–89). The battle ended in a Turkish victory, the 
collapse of Serbia, and the complete encirclement of the crumbling Byzantine Empire by 
Turkish armies.”555 It is from this battle, named ‘Kosovo Polje’ or ‘field of blackbirds,’ 
that Kosovo derives its name. Prior to 1389, the region was home to a majority ethnic 
                                                
553 Zajadlo, supra note 459 at 36.  
554 Former UN Secretary General Boutros Gali, in Agenda for Peace stated that: “The foundation-stone 
of this work is and must remain the State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are 
crucial to any common international progress. The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, 
however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of States today 
to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the 
requirements of an ever more interdependent world.” See Report of the Secretary General, An 
Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, UNGAOR, 47th Sess, UN Doc 
A/47/277-S/24111 (1992) at para 17. 
555 “Battle of Kosovo, 1389” in Britannica Academic, Encyclopedia Britannica, online: 
<www.academic.eb.com>.  
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Serb Christian Orthodox population.556 However, following this battle, the majority 
Serbian Christian Orthodox population fled north to Serbia proper, leaving the region to 
be populated by an Albanian-speaking and predominantly Muslim population that was 
part of the Ottoman Empire.557 In 1698, an attempt by the Austro-Hungarian Empire to 
retake Kosovo failed, leading to an even larger exodus of 40-50,000 ethnic Serbs settling 
outside of the territorial bounds of Kosovo.558 The abolishment of the Serbian 
Patriarchate in 1766 further diminished the  ethnic Serb population (including its 
influence in the region).559 The ethno-centric challenges continued well into in the 18th 
and 19th centuries; however,  Kosovo remained a multiethnic and multiconfessional 
region of the Balkans. As summarized by Thomas, the role of the Albanian-speaking 
population in Kosovo is typically misunderstood: 
It was the Ottoman Empire, though, and not the Albanian population, that 
was responsible for the emigration of ethnic Serbs from Kosovo. When the 
Serbian principality was founded in 1830, Kosovo was not included in the 
territory. Not until the founding of the Albanian State in 1912/13 was 
Kosovo, by that time predominantly populated by Albanians, incorporated, 
not into Albania, but into the Serbian principality…The remaining territory, 
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – to be renamed Yugoslavia in 
1929 included Kosovo and its 400,000 Albanians.560 
Nevertheless, when Serbia regained control over Kosovo for brief periods of time in the 
early 19th and 20th centuries, thousands of Kosovar Albanians fled neighboring countries 
in fear of persecution. Attempts by the Kosovar Albanians to integrate Kosovo with 
Albania failed in 1921 and again after the Second World War.561 The attempts for 
rapprochement between Kosovar Albanians and Albania were further exacerbated by the 
                                                
556 Ibid.  
557 Julianne Kokott, Human Rights Situation in Kosovo 1989-1999 in Christian Tomuschat, ed, Kosovo 
and the International Community: A Legal Assessment (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003) at 23. 
558 See Carole Rogel, The Breakup of Yugoslavia and its Aftermath: Revised Edition (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 2004) at 39.  
559 “Kosovo” in Britannica Academic, Encyclopedia Britannica, online: 
<www.academic.eb.com>[Britannica, “Kosovo”]. 
560 Ronald Thomas, “The Distinct Cases of South Ossetia and Kosovo” (2008) 32:6 Fordham Intl L J 
1990 at 2015 [R Thomas].  
561 In 1944, a revolt by Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo who wanted Kosovo to join Albania was crushed 
by the Yugoslav Communist Army. See Martins, supra note 401 at 1020. 
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ideological split of Yugoslavia from the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and 
subsequently Enver Hoxha’s communist Albania in the 1950s, leading to an overall 
alienation of Kosovo from Albania and other communist-friendly states.562  
After the Second World War, Kosovo was incorporated into the Federative 
structure of Yugoslavia by Josip Broz Tito. In light of the temporary halt to ethnic 
conflict, the internal federative structure of Yugoslavia attempted to integrate the 
multinational makeup of the state. The post-Second World War period saw Kosovo gain 
autonomous provincial status; however, ethnic discriminations continued to be 
perpetrated by Yugoslav authorities dominated by an ethnic-Serb majority (who did not 
forget the role that Kosovar Albanians played during the Nazi occupation of the 
Balkans).563 Nevertheless, Tito’s rise to power aimed to quell the ethno-influenced 
tensions in the region. In the mid-1960s, Yugoslavia began adopting policies to 
acknowledge and integrate the ethnic Kosovar Albanian identity into provincial and 
federal administrations.564 Consequently,  “[b]eginning in 1963, the status of Kosovo 
within Yugoslavia improved, becoming a province and, with the 1974 Constitution, equal 
to that of the other seven units of the Yugoslav federation.”565 Towards the final years of 
Tito’s rule, ethnic tension between the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo began to flare up,  
followed by a series of events which would set the foundations for their respective 
independence movements. This period of time is summarized by Krueger as 
demonstrating a time of civil unrest in Kosovo: 
The Kosovo Albanians continued to demand their independence more 
vehemently. This led to an increase in tensions between the Albanian 
majority and the Serbian minority, as well as early trouble at the beginning 
of the 1980s. The migration of tens of thousands of Serbians and 
Montenegrins over the following period unleashed Serbian fears, which the 
future Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic used to his advantage in 1986. 
This subsequently led to a restriction of Kosovo's autonomy and reprisals, 
                                                
562 R Thomas, supra note 560 at 2016. 
563 Ibid. 
564 Martins, supra note 401 at 1020-5. On the ideological split between Yugoslavia and the USSR, see 
Ivo Banac, With Stalin Against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism (Pittsburgh: Cornell 
University Press, 1988) at 215.  
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breeding further tensions. In 1989 the autonomy of Kosovo was completely 
suspended.566 
In the early 1990s, the question of Kosovo’s status was regarded as a domestic 
Yugoslavian matter, and consequently, little attention was devoted to it by the 
international community.567 However, it should be noted that “…the Kosovo Albanians 
lobbied heavily for the question to be considered as part of the Dayton peace process,568 
which led to the resolution of the conflict in Bosnia.”569 In response to the reluctance of 
the international community to address the ‘independence of Kosovo’ question, under the 
leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA/UÇK) began to 
execute radical forms of guerilla warfare on the Serbian-led Yugoslavian army, as well as 
on the ethnic Serb population in 1996.570 Then, “[b]eginning in January 1997, the KLA 
                                                
566 Heiko Kreuger, “Implications of Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia for International Law: The 
Conduct of the Community of States in Current Secession Conflicts” (2009) 3:2 Caucasian Rev of Intl 
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567 James Ker-Lindsay, “Preventing the Emergence of Self-Determination as a Norm of Secession: An 
Assessment of the Kosovo ‘Unique Case’ Argument” (2013) 65:5 Europe-Asia Studies J 837 at 843 
[Ker-Lindsay, “Preventing Self-Determination”]. 
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Herzegovina, as well as provide regional peace and stability. For more on the Dayton Agreement see 
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contentious. For one opinion, see John R Fulton, “Global Security Studies” (2010) 1:3 Global Security 
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States initially recognized the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) as a terrorist organization, they 
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Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2008) 
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stepped up its bombing campaign and, during the summer of 1998, it grew stronger. 
Originally, the group's numbers were small, but by July 1998, the KLA enjoyed wide 
popular support across Kosovo and controlled roughly one third of the territory."571 By 
1998, United States-mediated peace talks were failing to put an end to the armed 
conflict.572 After mass atrocities against Kosovar civilians were documented and 
attributed to the Milosevic regime,573 NATO began a bombing campaign on March 24, 
1999 as part of Operation Allied Force.574  
All in all, the reaction to NATO’s bombing campaign requires further assessment. 
What legal rule gave NATO the right to execute a military operation on the sovereign 
territory of another state? The following sub-section will explore this question in greater 
detail, pronouncing on the UNSC Resolutions prior to, during and after the conflict. A 
fortiori, this analysis will look to draw similarities between NATO’s actions in Kosovo 
and the military intervention in Bangladesh, demonstrating that their actions can be 
considered as legitimate in accordance with the law of self-determination.  
4.2.2. United Nations, Kosovo and UNSC Resolution 1244  
While the situation of ethnic cleansing and discrimination in Kosovo deteriorated 
throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, the international community did not formally 
react to the atrocities being committed in Kosovo until 1998.575 As part of the 
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international community’s response, several important UN resolutions were presented 
leading up to the 1999 NATO bombing campaign, which put an end to the conflict and 
led to a transition of power.576 This subsection will explore the legal aspects of these 
resolutions as part of the Kosovo conflict between 1998–1999. Additionally, a brief 
literature review will present several viewpoints of the actions perpetrated by NATO and 
Yugoslavia, as part of the Kosovo conflict. This will be done in order to objectively 
analyze the emergence of the state of Kosovo.  
In the Spring of 1998, the situation on the ground in Kosovo continued to 
worsen.577 This prompted the UNSC to pass Resolution 1160,578 which condemned acts 
of violence by both militarized Serb and Kosovar Albanian factions.579 At the same time, 
“…Resolution [1160] stressed that any solution to the Kosovo question would be based 
on the territorial integrity of former Yugoslavia and would take into account the 
[Kosovar] Albanians' position under international law. [Additionally,] [t]he preamble to 
the resolution emphasized the continuing sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Yugoslavia in even clearer terms.”580 This is noteworthy, as the pattern of reaffirming the 
territorial integrity of Yugoslavia would continue in each UNSC resolution passed 
afterwards until the cessation of hostilities.581 Nevertheless, after numerous 
condemnations of atrocities committed against civilians, hostilities did not cease, rather, 
                                                
576 See Security Council resolution 1160, SC Res 1160, UNSCOR, 53rd Sess, UN Doc S/Res/1160 (1998) 
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reports indicated that Yugoslav-led Serb security forces “[intensified] the policy of ethnic 
cleansing against Albanians.”582 These actions prompted the UNSC to adopt Resolution 
1199.583 This resolution demanded an immediate cessation of hostilities and an 
implementation of an immediate ceasefire in Kosovo.584 Additionally, and most 
importantly, the UNSC called on both sides to “take immediate steps to improve the 
humanitarian situation and to avert the impending humanitarian catastrophe.”585 Labeling 
the conflict as an ‘impending humanitarian catastrophe’ prompted, according to some 
scholars, the United States and NATO to act in a ‘moral capacity’ as part of a 
humanitarian intervention mission.586 Yet, no concerted military action took place during 
the time. Notwithstanding the international pressure, and believing that no military 
intervention would take place, the Yugoslav-led military forces continued their campaign 
of ethnic cleansing, with a mass grave discovered in September 1998,587 prompting an 
intense outcry from the international community.588 
Recognizing a policy that was failing the Kosovar civilians, activation orders 
“were issued by NATO to allow it to carry out air strikes, if the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia continued to fail to comply with the demands of Security Council Resolution 
1199.”589 NATO’s implicit threat of action prompted Milosevic to agree to a last-minute 
compromise with “United States envoy, Richard Holbrooke, under which the Federal 
Republic would allow NATO reconnaissance planes to overfly the region, and the 
Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) to deploy a 2,000 strong 
Kosovo Verification Mission' to monitor a cease-fire, agreed between the Yugoslav 
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authorities and the Kosovo Liberation Army.”590 Nonetheless, the situation on the ground 
continued to deteriorate,591 forcing the UNSC to adopt UNSC Resolution 1203592 “which 
sought to protect unarmed monitors who were overseeing the cease-fire from the 
ground.”593 As explained by Klinton Alexander, this Resolution was also interpreted by 
certain NATO member states as acknowledging the right to the use of force: 
Specifically, the resolution affirmed that ‘in the event of an emergency, 
action may be needed to ensure [the monitor's] safety and freedom of 
movement ...’[594] It also provided for "relevant equipment for the sole use 
of the Verification Missions." which NATO countries interpreted to mean 
weapons.595 
In retrospect, NATO would later point to UNSC Resolution 1203 as a legal justification 
for the military intervention; however, this did not take away from the controversy of 
NATO’s action.596 The Resolution’s instructions to cease hostilities against civilians 
would not be followed by Yugoslavia, and a subsequent meeting in Rambouillet, 
France597 failed to secure a signature from Yugoslav officials. In response, NATO began 
its aerial bombardment on March 24, 1999, prompting a lukewarm reception by the 
international community.598  
On one hand, NATO acted unilaterally and outside of the legal parameters of the 
UN Charter. On the other, there was a clear indication that hostilities were being 
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perpetrated against a peoples who had invoked their right to self-determination. Needless 
to say, the dilemma surrounding the legality of NATO’s military intervention was left 
unsolved. After a 72-day bombing campaign, Milosevic and the Yugoslav army agreed to 
a cessation of hostilities599 through a peace plan that was subsequently adopted through 
the passing of UNSC Resolution 1244.600 Accordingly, it became the pivotal document in 
determining the legitimacy of Kosovo’s bid for independence and statehood.601 However, 
the Resolution posed several logistical and legal challenges in Kosovo’s succession as an 
autonomous entity, still within the territorial sovereignty of Serbia.602 These challenges 
require a brief mention, as they will underline the complexity of rebuilding an ethnically-
divided Kosovo post-conflict, and answer the question of why the idea of Kosovar 
independence resonated with the majority of the international community.  
The primary challenge posed by UNSC Resolution 1244 was the question of its 
effects on the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, specifically whether its operative 
language implied an autonomous or independent status for Kosovo. Borgen summarizes 
the dichotomy of the arguments put forward in the document by pointing to drastically 
different interpretations by the warring parties in the conflict: 
Serbia and Russia, referring to Resolution 1244’s preambular language 
‘[r]eaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia…’, have argued 
that Resolution 1244 does not allow the secession of Kosovo without the 
agreement of Serbia. By contrast, the EU has taken the position that 
Resolution 1244 is not a bar to Kosovo’s independence as, in its view, the 
resolution does not define the outcome of final status talks.603  
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Thus, the ‘end status of Kosovo’ question became a pressing issue for the United States, 
NATO and the EU, which only increased in contention throughout the implementation of 
the UNMIK plan.604 In large part, this contention existed through the challenge of finding 
the balance between respecting the territorial integrity of Serbia and the granting of 
independence to the Kosovar peoples, which ultimately rested on the implementation of 
the eight standards [fixed by UNMIK]. The eight standards included democratic 
governance, the rule of law, freedom of movement, the rights of ethnic minorities, 
property rights, the economy, the field of cultural heritage, and dialogues that were to be 
met by the provisional local authorities elected under the control of UNMIK. Only as far 
as these standards of democratic governance would be met by the elected local authorities 
of Kosovo – which was initially the guiding concept of UNMIK – would it be possible to 
negotiate on the definitive political and legal status of Kosovo (i.e. autonomy in Serbia or 
independence).605 
 In February 2007, a report submitted by Martti Ahtisaari (also known as the 
Ahtisaari plan)606 summarized the frustrations of nearly “…17 rounds of direct talks and 
26 expert missions to Belgrade and Prishtina that [he] had carried out.”607 The core of the 
proposal insisted on independence as the only realistic solution. As summarized by Oeter: 
The proposal [was] built on the finding that the standards policy pursued by 
UNMIK had not yielded the expected results and that Kosovo’s unclear 
political status is a cause of economic backwardness and political 
instability. Ahtisaari’s conclusion was that a continued international 
administration is not sustainable and that independence is the only viable 
option. Such independence should be conditioned, and there should be an 
international supervision of the newly formed sovereign State, exercised by 
                                                
demilitarizing the UCK, establishing a secure environment for the return of refugees, the 
establishment of a transitional administration, and the delivery of humanitarian aid, as well as 
ensuring public safety and order” at para 78). See also Resolution 1244, supra note 102 at para 33. 
604 Robert Muharremi, “The European Union Rule of Law in Kosovo (EULEX) from the Perspective of 
Kosovo Constitutional Law” (2010) 70 Heidelberg J Intl L 358 at 371.  
605 Oeter, “Dissolution of Yugoslavia”, supra note 50 at para 82. 
606 Henry H Perritt, The Road to Independence for Kosovo: A Chronicle of the Ahtisaari Plan (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 24. 
607 See Oeter, “Dissolution of Yugoslavia”, supra note 50 at para 83. 
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regional organizations (in particular the EU).608  
Therefore, although a closer review of the Resolution concludes that it neither prohibits 
nor advances Kosovo’s secession,609 it can be suggested that the operative language on 
the future status of Kosovo was left deliberately vague, a potential precursor of things to 
come and a reaffirmation of the gray area in international law surrounding the act of 
unilateral non-colonial secession when coupled with human rights abuses perpetrated by 
the metropolitan state that are deemed as in extremis.610 Moreover, this point of 
contention has, to-date, not been resolved even as the alliance of states recognizing 
Kosovo’s independence has grown exponentially611 since the Kosovo Advisory Opinion 
ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).612 Therefore, although the question of 
Kosovo’s independence continues to be challenged by multiple states, its status under 
international law remains unchanged. To support this supposition, it is necessary to assess 
the legality of NATO’s intervention as part of the international law on the use of force, as 
well as determine whether the peoples of Kosovo, can be considered as such, leading to 
the confirmation of the factors necessary to legitimize the intervention de lege lada. 
                                                
608 See ibid at para 84. But, see Gianluca Serra, “The International Civil Administration in Kosovo: A 
commentary on some major legal issues” (2008) 18 Italian Y B Intl L 63 (“UNSC Resolution 1244 
(1999) is the legal basis for the establishment and deployment of UNMIK. It is supplemented by the 
formal consent given by the host State, namely FRY of which Kosovo was thereby reaffirmed to be 
part. At least two main theoretical issues need to be scrutinized when assessing such legal bases from 
the international law point of view: i) where is Resolution 1244 drawing its force from? ii) was the 
FRY's consent validly given? In connection to the first one, a third question is to be raised: iii) what is 
the legal ground for the acts adopted by UNMIK?” at 67). 
609 Borgen, “Is Kosovo a Precedent?”, supra note 46 (“[o]n balance, it appears that Resolution 1244 
neither promotes nor prevents Kosovo’s secession. Although operative paragraph 1 of Resolution 
1244 states that a political solution shall be based on the principles of the annexes, those annexes are 
silent as to the governmental form of the final status of Kosovo. The annexes only state that, pending 
a final settlement, an “interim political framework” shall afford substantial self-governance for 
Kosovo and take into account the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
Moreover, the references to the territorial integrity of Serbia are only in the preambular language 
and not in the operational language. The document is therefore silent as to what form the final status 
of Kosovo takes. Much of the debate thus grapples with the broader issues of self-determination and 
secession under international law” at 3). 
610 See Oeter, “Dissolution of Yugoslavia”, supra note 50 at para 82. 
611 See Azemi v Serbia, No 11209/09 at para 22, [2013] EHCR 1314. 
612 Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, supra note 145.  
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4.2.3. Legality of NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo 
The legality of NATO’s intervention has remained a discordant issue of debate in 
legal, political and academic circles.613 The debate can be summarized through the 
following two questions: (1) whether NATO’s intervention was legal under international 
law, and subsequently, (2) whether the ‘human catastrophe’ in Kosovo permitted the 
violation of the ‘inviolable’ principle of territorial sovereignty, and consequently, 
affirmed the independence of Kosovo as a sovereign state in 1999. The objective of this 
section will be to answer these questions by assessing whether a) Kosovo possessed the 
right to a UNC secession, and b) whether the human rights abuses experienced in Kosovo 
reached the level of in extremis, which prompted NATO’s military intervention. Through 
this analysis, it will be shown that, through a historico-legal analysis, a case exists for 
supporting Kosovo’s right to a UNC secession and consequently, NATO’s intervention as 
well.  
After the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999, the late Cassese famously wrote 
that, although the use of force by NATO was in clear violation of contemporary 
international law, the missing parameters for the use of force in the case of a 
humanitarian catastrophe (coupled with the invocation of the right to self-determination) 
were factors that could have potentially legitimized its actions.614 In other words, had 
there been an effort to legitimize the use of force outside of the auspices of the UNSC, 
the NATO intervention could have been considered legitimate. Nearly twenty years later, 
this effort has not yielded such a result, with Cassese’s words continuing to prove to be 
correct. Nevertheless, in answering the first question of whether the NATO intervention 
was legal under international law, it can be concluded that the answer is in the negative. 
An explanation is provided below. 
Several authors have pronounced themselves on the illegality of NATO’s 
                                                
613 Dovile Morkyte, “International Law as a Legal Basis for Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention” 
(2011) 24:7 Hague YB Intl L 121 at 131. 
614 Cassese, “ex iniura ius oritur”, supra note 501 at 25. 
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intervention. In some cases, scholars have accused NATO of not only violating the 
international law on the use of force, but also violating international humanitarian law 
given the civilian casualties and infrastructure damage caused by the disproportionate 
aerial bombardments.615 Additionally, opponents of the intervention have argued that the 
situation in Kosovo was a domestic matter as affirmed and reaffirmed in subsequent 
UNSC Resolutions, which the NATO military intervention seemingly ignored.616 
Furthermore, it has been claimed that NATO violated its own founding treaty617 in 
bypassing the UNSC and by authorizing the aerial bombardments.618 The last claim has 
cause for merit given that, admittedly, certain NATO states have acknowledged the 
illegality of their actions under international law.619 Moreover, NATO’s actions could 
have violated several other international treaties, including the 1976 Convention on the 
Prohibition of Military or Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques,620 the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions,621 the 1985 
                                                
615 See Cohn, supra note 392 (“NATO’s humanitarian bombs killed between 500 and 1800 civilians 
and wounded thousands more. They hit not only military forces and facilities, but also destroyed 
Yugoslavia’s entire public infrastructure, inflicting an estimated $ 4 Billion of damage on bridges, 
highways, railroads, civilian airports, oil refineries, factories, construction equipment, media centers, 
hospitals, schools, apartment buildings, houses, buses, electrical plants, and hundreds of acres of 
forest” at 137). See also Wheatley, supra note 586 at 478-81; Rosaline Higgins, “International Law in 
a Changing International System” (1999) 58 Cambridge L J 78 at 95. 
616 See Security Council resolution 1160, supra note 576 at preamble; Security Council resolution 1199, 
supra note 576 at preamble. 
617 The North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949, 34 UNTS 241 [NATO Treaty].  
618 See ibid (“[t]he Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any 
international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations” at art 1). See also ibid (“This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting 
in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the 
United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of 
international peace and security” at art 7). As the use of force was inconsistent with the UN Charter 
given the violation of arts 2(4)-(7), 33, 37, 39, 51, 103, there is little justification for the legitimacy of 
NATO’s actions.   
619 Julie Hyland, “British parliamentary committee admits NATO bombing of Yugoslavia was illegal”, 
World Socialist Web Site (14 June 2000), online: <www.wsws.org>. 
620 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques, 18 May 1977, 1108 UNTS 152 (entered into force 5 October 1978). 
621 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 
1978). 
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Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer,622 the 1987 Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 623 and the 1992 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change 624.625 As can be deduced from some of these accusations, 
the illegality of NATO’s intervention is clear due to the violation of several treaties, 
including the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force. This brings this sub-section to 
consider the other side of the debate: whether the intervention, albeit illegal, was 
legitimate under the guise of a UNC secession experiencing human rights abuses deemed 
as in extremis.  
A large number of scholars have pronounced their support for NATO’s 
intervention, prompting a consideration of whether the debate on the existence, vel non, 
on the use of force outside of the current parameters. In general, several categories of 
justifications for NATO’s intervention can be identified. This is explained by Tesón as 
relating to the large spectrum of scholars who believed in the growing need to establish a 
right to humanitarian intervention in international law: 
Reactions from legal scholars [on NATO’s intervention] varied. Of those 
who believed the intervention had been unlawful, many also expressed the 
belief that the intervention was morally or politically wrong. Others thought 
the intervention was unlawful, but that institutional structures should be 
reformed to be more responsive to humanitarian crises. Another group 
believed that the intervention had been illegal in a technical sense, but so 
morally appropriate as to be otherwise justified. Yet others saw Kosovo as 
an instance of legitimate humanitarian intervention. Finally, some opined 
that the Kosovo incident itself marked a move toward the formation of a 
customary rule of humanitarian intervention. It was, for them, a case that 
expanded, rather than breached, the law, similar to the Truman 
proclamation about the continental shelf. Scholars other than legal 
academics, however, by and large found the intervention justified.626 
                                                
622 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 22 March 1985, 1513 UNTS 293 (entered 
into force 22 September 1988). 
623 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 September 1987, 1522 UNTS 3 
(entered into force 1 January 1989). 
624 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 4 June 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 (entered 
into force 21 March 1992). 
625 See G Thomas, supra note 498. 
626 Fernando R Tesón, “Kosovo: A Powerful Precedent for the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention” 
(2009) 1:2 Amsterdam L Forum 42 at 43, online: <www.amsterdamlawforum.org> [Teson, 
“Kosovo”]. 
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Tesón’s analysis demonstrates that legal, political and philosophical scholarship varies on 
the legality of the intervention; however, a point can be made that NATO’s actions 
derived their legality from existing international law. For example, certain scholars627 
have attempted to put forward a validation with strong legal elements in an attempt to 
justify the intervention through customary international law. In general, they point to 
three major explanations.628 First, it is argued that humanitarian intervention is an 
acceptable concept in accordance with the general purposes and principles of the United 
Nations.629 Next, humanitarian intervention finds support in the following international 
legal instruments: the Genocide Convention of 1948,630 the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights of 1948,631 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949.632 Lastly, the argument 
is made that human rights transcend domestic matters, and become international issues 
                                                
627 See generally, Leslie A Burton, “To bomb or not to bomb? The legality of the question” (2001) 7:1 
Ann Surv Intl & Comp L 49; Julie Mertus, “Reconsidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention: 
Lessons from Kosovo” (2000) 41:5 Wm & Mary L Rev 1743; Laura Geissler, “The Law of 
Humanitarian Intervention and the Kosovo Crisis” (2000) 23 Hamline L Rev 323; Ian Brownlie, 
“Kosovo Crisis Inquiry: Memorandum on the International Law Aspects” (2000) 49:4 ICLQ 878; 
Jordan J Paust, “NATO's Use of Force in Yugoslavia” (1999) 33:9 UN L Rep 114. 
628 Burton, supra note 627 at 54.   
629 Ibid ([g]eneral purposes and principles of the United Nations under “Article 1 of the United 
Nations Charter which include the preservation of peace, security, self-determination of peoples, and 
respect for and observance of human rights…under Articles 55 and 56 because all member states are 
required to take joint and separate action for the universal respect for and observance of human 
rights... [including to] prevent and punish... [genocide]” at 55). 
630 Ibid (“[t]he Genocide Convention in particular calls upon the United Nations to take such action as 
appropriate for "the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide. 'Acts of genocide include killing, 
or inflicting serious harm, on members of an ethnic group with an intent to destroy that group. The 
crime of genocide transcends the inviolability of states, and using force to prevent it is legal. The 
crime of genocide was occurring in Kosovo. Because NATO intervened to prevent it, NATO's action 
was legal” at 56). See also Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 
December 1948, 78 UNTS 277 (entered into force 12 January 1951) [Genocide Convention]. 
631 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights condemns the unlawful taking of life, and the Geneva 
Conventions prohibits the murder of civilians. These agreements encourage signatories to take action 
when a state violates the agreements' provisions. See e.g. Burton, supra note 627 at 57. See also 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Resolution 217 (III), 1948 [UNDHR].  
632 See generally Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into force 20 October 1950) [Geneva 
Convention I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into force 20 October 
1950)[Geneva Convention II]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 
August1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 20 October 1950) [Geneva Convention III]; Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered 
into force 20 October 1950) [Geneva Convention IV] [hereinafter 1949 Geneva Conventions]. 
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when they become subject to in extremis abuse.633 These arguments point to a dilemma 
between the influence of human rights in public international law, a debate that tends to 
use legal theory when explaining its legal status.634 
 Through this debate, one inevitably faces the challenge of explaining public 
international law beyond the codified law and clearly-established norms and practices. As 
the Kosovo example has demonstrated, certain scholars vehemently continue to defend 
NATO’s intervention as an appropriate action given the fact that the international legal 
system would have otherwise been unable to act due to a paralyzed UNSC and the overall 
prohibition on the use of force. 635 For example, Smith claims that the only negative 
aspect to the intervention was the fact that NATO member states refused to clarify their 
recto intentio to the rest of the world: 
NATO's justification for intervention in Kosovo was tortured and 
disingenuous. Instead of dancing on the head of a pin about whether 
Resolution 1199 authorized the use of force, the Alliance should have 
argued from the beginning that intervention as justified because: 
Yugoslavia illegally withdrew Kosovo's autonomy, it denied the Albanian 
majority in Kosovo its fundamental right to self-determination; and it 
continued to trample on numerous other basic human rights guaranteed 
under the UN Charter. In so doing, Yugoslavia forfeited its right to Kosovo. 
These egregious Yugoslav violations of international law gave NATO 
sufficient legal grounds for using force to assist the KLA in its fight for an 
independent Kosovo.636  
Indeed, a reliance on self-determination could have justified the intervention and 
consequently, created a precedent for an emerging international law norm. Such an 
approach is suggested as part of this thesis’ legal analysis of the Kosovo case study. 
Through the lens of self-determination, it becomes evident that NATO’s intervention, 
                                                
633 Burton, supra note 627 (“[a]s human rights have gained acceptance, the notion of state 
sovereignty has lost ground” at 60).  
634 Fernando R Tesón, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 3rd ed 
(Netherlands: Brill, 2005) at 122. 
635 Teson, “Kosovo”, supra note 626 (‘Positivist international law’ is further expanded on by Tesón: 
“Most critics of humanitarian intervention are positivists. For them, state practice, and only state 
practice, is the touchstone of international law. Their opposition to humanitarian intervention 
results, in part, from their hostility to philosophy or any other technique that introduces values into 
the ascertainment of international law” at 4).  
636 Smith, supra note 571 at 21. 
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although illegal due to its violation of the prohibition on the use of force, was justified 
through the fact that Kosovars had a right to a UNC secession, and that the human rights 
abuses being perpetrated on Kosovo’s territory reached levels of in extremis. With 
respect to the first point, it remains to confirm how it became established that Kosovo 
possessed that right. This will be done below through a brief analysis of the 
contemporary status of the Kosovar peoples, as well as of the territory of Kosovo.  
4.2.4. Kosovo’s right to UNC Secession 
Over the last three decades, the concept of humanitarian intervention has been 
examined mostly using the principle of non-intervention637 in international law; however, 
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo reopened an opportunity to analyze the concept under 
the strengthening role of the principle of self-determination.638 Consequently, it is 
necessary to determine whether Kosovars constituted a ‘peoples’ to invoke their right to 
self-determination, and subsequently, whether the territory of Kosovo fulfills the criteria 
for statehood. As a result, it will become evident whether the situation in Kosovo in 1999 
should be treated as a case of self-determination denial coupled with human rights abuses 
deemed as in extremis. Should the threshold for this condition be met, Kosovo’s status as 
an entity possessing the right to a UNC secession will become justified.  
The first question to consider is whether the Kosovars constituted a “peoples” 
under international law. According to Borgen, “…the Kosovars are a people, inasmuch as 
they are of the same ethnicity, perceive of themselves as a group, and have inhabited 
Kosovo for centuries.”639 This claim has also been reaffirmed by a number of scholars 
                                                
637 For more on the influence of the principle of non-intervention see Jasmeet Gulati & Ivan Khosa, 
“Humanitarian Intervention: To Protect State Sovereignty” (2013) 41:3 Denv J Intl L & Poly 397 at 
400-3.   
638 Ibid at 398.  
639 Borgen, “Is Kosovo a Precedent?”, supra note 46 at 5; For similar views see generally Gerd Seidel, 
A New Dimension of the Right of Self-Determination in Kosovo, in Christian Tomuschat, ed., Kosovo and 
the International Community : A Legal Assessment (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003) at 205; 
Kokott supra note 557 at 6; Stanislav V Chernichenko & Vladimir S Kodiar, Ongoing Global Legal 
Debate on Self-determination and Secession: Main Trends, in Julie Dahlitz ed., Secession and 
International Law: Conflict Avoidance – Regional Appraisals (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2003) at 75. 
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including Gerd Siedel and former European Court of Justice Advocate General Julianne 
Kokott.640 In other words, it can be presumed that the Kosovars constituted a peoples 
under international law and possessed the right to a UNC secession long before such a 
concept became part of the legal framework for self-determination. 641  
With respect to whether Kosovo fulfilled the Montevideo criteria for statehood, it 
had a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and a limited capacity to 
enter into relations with other states. Although the population was separated politically 
through ethnic alliances to Albania, Croatia and Serbia proper, regardless of the Kosovar 
Albanian and Serb displacements throughout the 20th century, a permanent population 
continued to reside on the territory of Kosovo consistently between 1980 and 2008,642 
satisfying the first criterion for statehood. Further, the 1974 Yugoslavian Constitution 
allowed Kosovo to “have its own identity and territory and [have acknowledgment] in the 
field of international relations.”643 Thus, it can be suggested that as well as having a 
permanent population, Kosovo had a defined territory and even a limited capacity to enter 
into relations with other states as an ‘autonomous province’ as part of the Yugoslavian 
Federative model.644 Although Kosovo’s capacity to enter into relations with other states 
was limited, as interpreted by Crawford, the effectiveness of this criterion depends 
largely on an entity’s independence and ability to enter into relations with other states.645 
Therefore, although Kosovo’ capacity to enter into relations with other states was limited 
due to its status under the Yugoslav constitution, its ability to do so post-1999 allows for 
it to meet the requirements of this criterion. Finally, apart from the time of NATO’s 
                                                
640 See generally, Kokott, supra note 557 at 6-7; Seidel, supra note 639 at 205-6. 
641 For a more detailed illustration of the multiethnic makeup of Kosovo, see Britannica, “Kosovo”, 
supra note 559 (“[Kosovar] Serbs are concentrated in northern Kosovo, particularly in Mitrovicë 
(Mitrovica), as well as around Shtërpcë (Štrpce), on the Macedonian border.” The ethnic composition 
of Kosovo in 2011 was the following: 92.9% Albanian, 1.5%, Serb and 5.9% Other (Turkic, Croat, 
Roma etc…) respectively”). 
642 Seidel, supra note 639 at 205. 
643 Hajredin Kuci, “The Legal and Political Grounds for, and the Influence of the Actual Situation on 
the demand of the Albanians of Kosovo for independence” (2005) 80:1 Chi Kent L Rev 331 at 341; 
See also, Constitution of Socialist Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia at preamble & arts 1, 5 
224,225,226, online: <http://mojustav.rs/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Ustav-SFRJ-iz-1974.pdf>.  
644 Ibid at 342. 
645 Crawford, “The Creation of States”, supra note 22 at 62. 
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military intervention,  Kosovo had a functioning government.646 After the intervention, 
government functions were taken over as part of UNMIK in accordance with UNSC 
Resolution 1244.647 On the basis of these facts, it is necessary to briefly explain how 
UNSC Resolution 1244 further granted independence to Kosovo.648  Resolution 1244 
“…codified a number of principles which were to guide the allocation of sovereignty 
among the FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), Kosovo and the international 
community.”649 As per Williams, the Resolution remains an integral piece of 
jurisprudence with regards to the independent status of Kosovo: 
The substance of Resolution 1244 focused on: 1) displacing FRY 
sovereignty from Kosovo; 2) replacing it with interim U.N. and NATO 
sovereign responsibilities; 3) establishing substantial autonomy and 
democratic self governance; 4) ‘facilitating a political process designed to 
determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet 
accords," and 5) preparing in the final stage to oversee "the transfer of 
authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established 
under a political settlement.’650 
In essence, the Resolution “…altered sovereign control over Kosovo...by displacing 
Yugoslav sovereign control and replacing it with an interim U.N. administration 
mandated to build independent Kosovar institutions capable of providing for democratic 
self-government.”651 Although much contention exists with regards to the question of 
                                                
646 Kuci, supra note 643 at 342.  
647 See Security Council resolution 1244 [on the deployment of international civil and security presences 
in Kosovo], SC Res 1244, UNSCOR, 54th Sess, UN Doc S/Res/1244 (1999) at para 10 [Resolution 1244].   
648 It should be noted that alternative viewpoints exist that claim Kosovo as not having fulfilled the 
criteria for statehood. In most cases, this is based on an interpretation of historical and political 
events that occurred in Kosovo over the past three decades. See e.g. Milena Sterio, “Creating and 
Building A “State”: International Law and Kosovo” (2010) 104 Am Socy Intl L Proc 361 (“First, 
Kosovo's territory is heavily disputed by Serbia, which claims that Kosovo is part of Serbia and that 
historically, Kosovo has always been Serbian land. Second, Kosovo does not have a permanent 
population, because of the heavy flows of both Serbian and Albanian refugees that have moved in and 
out of Kosovo. Third, Kosovo does have a government, but its stability depends on protection 
ensured first by the United Nations, and now by the European Union. Finally, Kosovo can only enter 
into international relations because of the international community's involvement with it. In other 
words, Kosovo has been administered by the United Nations and its internal security has been 
secured by international forces, which ensure that Kosovo has access to the outside world, that it can 
trade, import and export goods, and that its political leaders can travel abroad” at 364).   
649 Williams, supra note 216 at 406.  
650 Ibid at 406. See also Resolution 1244, supra note 647 at paras 3-4, 9, 5-11, 17.  
651 Williams, supra note 216 at 407. 
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whether Resolution 1244 granted Kosovo territorial independence from Serbia,652 it 
should be noted that much of that contentiousness stems from different interpretations of 
Kosovar history, and consequently, the political decisions that led to the breakout of the 
ethnic conflict. 653 Examples include such factors as the competing territorial claims for 
Kosovo as part of a ‘Greater Serbia’ or a ‘Greater Albania,654 as well as the nature of 
NATO’s intentions in Kosovo as originating from wanting to impose the ‘American 
world order’ in Eastern Europe.655 Nevertheless, the determining factor can be suggested 
as being stated in Resolution 1244, which granted Kosovo the right to an inclusive 
autonomous government, a right that was denied to them by the Serb-led Yugoslav 
authorities before 1999. It should be noted here that, as mentioned in Chapter 2, an 
effective government as part of a justified UNC secession must only demonstrate the 
ability and not the capacity to enter into relations with other states as part of its ‘actual 
independence’. Additionally, in the case of a UNC secession experiencing human rights 
abuses deemed as in extremis, the formal part of independence can occur post-
intervention, as was the case in Kosovo.  Conclusively, it can be determined that - 
regardless of political decisions made by Kosovo, the EU, the United States and Serbia ex 
post facto; Kosovo’s status as an independent state must be acknowledged as having 
derived from Resolution 1244. 656   
                                                
652 See e.g. Alexander Orakhelashvili, “Kosovo: The Post-Advisory Opinion Stage” (2015) 22 Intl J on 
minority and group rights 486 [Orakhelashvili, “Kosovo”] (“the Admissibility Decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Ali Azemi v. Serbia (2013) dealing with the claims as to the 
compliance with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights in the context of the 
enforcement of decisions of courts operating under the Kosovo Albanian authority. The Court 
acknowledged that 89 States had recognised Kosovo’s independence, including 22 out of 27 
European Union Member-States, as well as steps taken by the Kosovo government and International 
Steering Group to end Kosovo’s “supervised independence” Yet the Court frames its own reasoning in 
terms of Serbia’s continuing territorial sovereignty over Kosovo that, due to various circumstances, 
cannot be factually exercised on the ground” at 491). See also, Azemi v Serbia, supra note 611.  
653 Sterio, supra note 647 at 364. 
654 Orakhelashvili, “Kosovo”, supra note 652 at 487. 
655 Cohn, supra note 392 at 138. 
656 The evidence of human rights abuses committed against the Kosovars was presented in detail as 
part of the previous sub-section. It should be noted that the actions of Yugoslav forces in general 
towards non-Serb and non-Orthodox Christian minorities in the former Yugoslavia can be used as an 
additional factor of analyzing the reasons for which a military intervention was required in Kosovo. 
Although the deaths of Kosovars at the hands of Yugoslav-supported military in Kosovo may not 
meet the threshold of a genocide, similar actions by Yugoslav and Serb-supported factions in Bosnia 
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 Now that the cases of military interventions in Bangladesh and Kosovo have been 
summarized, it is necessary to look at a third military intervention which will demonstrate 
the drastic difference between a justified and a non-justified violation of the prohibition 
on the use of force. The next section of this Chapter will analyze Russia’s military 
intervention in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Republic of Georgia in 2008, 
establishing the tenets around the illegal intervention, as well as the false claims of a 
justified right to external self-determination by the two entities, which consequently 
prompts a denial of their claims to independence.  
4.3. South Ossetia & Abkhazia  
Long-time Caucasus’ scholar Donald Rayfield recently wrote that “[t]he origins 
of the Georgian peoples, their ethno-genesis, like that of most nations, precedes 
documentary evidence.”657 In fact, geographically, Georgia’s diverse and rich ethno-
history allowed its historical boundaries to reach “far into today’s Turkey, Azerbaijan and 
Armenia,”658 although the contemporary Republic of Georgia659 is much smaller than the 
original federative state of a once flourishing Georgian Empire. Inside its contemporary 
international boundaries, two de facto republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which 
represent approximately 18-20% of the internationally-recognized Georgian land mass, 
remain under foreign occupation since 2008.660  
This sub-section will consist of a short historical summary of both entities’ 
histories in order to establish the ethno-historic tensions that resulted in their emergence. 
Subsequently, an analysis of Russia’s military intervention to secure the entities’ 
                                                
(Srebrenica) for example provide additional evidence of a systematic persecution of minorities that 
ended with NATO’s military intervention in 1999. For more on the intricacies of the ethno-inspired 
persecutions in Yugoslavia, see Rogel, supra note 558.  
657 Donald Rayfield, Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia (London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2012) at 11.  
658 Ibid at 7.  
659 Georgians do not refer to their country as the ‘Georgia’, rather, they use the term Sakartvelo which 
stands for the ‘land of the kartvelians.’ The Kartvelians ethnos’ are generally said to be made up of 
Georgians, Mingrelians, Laz and Svans. 
660 See Robert E Hamilton, “NATO In the South Caucasus: Present for Duty or Missing in Action? – 
Analysis” The Eurasia Review (23 June 2017) online: < www.eurasiareview.com/23062017-nato-in-
the-south-caucasus-present-for-duty-or-missing-in-action-analysis/>.  
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independence will be completed in order to demonstrate its staunch differences with the 
military interventions in Kosovo and Bangladesh. The self-determination cases of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, although representing two distinct and separate regions within the 
internationally-recognized borders of the Republic of Georgia, will be analyzed 
collectively as they secured their de facto independence in a similar manner and at 
approximately the same time.661 However, before delving into their chronological 
histories, it is necessary to indicate two important factors with respect to their relationship 
with Russia. First, from a geopolitical perspective, it is necessary to note that 
…Russia's recent approach to geopolitical strategy capitalizes on the 
challenging ambiguity surrounding the right of self-determination and its 
enforcement in international law. This ambiguity is allowing Russia to take 
advantage of uncertainties and move forward with its own geopolitical 
objectives in Transnistria, Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, Abkhazia, and South 
Ossetia.662 
Second, it is important to acknowledge the multi-ethnic and multi-religious makeup of 
the Caucasus region, to which both breakaway ‘republics’663 belong. Although the 
heterogenous makeup of the region has been the cause of other regional and territorial 
conflicts in the past,664 the South-Ossetian and Abkhaz conflicts, which were primarily 
rooted in the breakup of the Soviet Union, “followed years of simmering tensions and 
                                                
661 Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by presidential decree on 
August 26, 2008. See Clifford J Levy, “Russia Backs Independence of Georgian Enclaves”, The New 
York Times (26 August 2008) online:<www.nytimes.com>.  
662 Adam Sorenson, “South Ossetia and Russia: The Treaty, the Takeover, the Future” (2016) 42 NCJ 
Intl L 223 at 224. For a more succinct legal analysis of Russia’s interpretation of international law, 
see Milena Sterio, “Self-Determination and Secession Under International Law: The New Framework” 
(2015) 21 ILSA J Intl & Comp L 293.  
663 For the purposes of avoiding any confusion, the term ‘republics’ may identify South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia in this Chapter. This will be done in order to dispel any confusion between using the term 
‘region’ to define each republic and the geographic Caucasus region to which they belong to. The use 
of the term ‘republic’ does not take away from their status under international law as de facto 
breakaway regions.   
664 Territorial conflicts around the borders of the Russian Federation are plentiful. Some examples 
include Nagorno-Karabakh, a de facto republic and a point of armed conflict between Azerbaijan and 
Armenia. Another example is Chechnya, an autonomous republic within the Russian Federation, 
whose independence movement caused a number of bloody armed conflicts in the 1990’s. For more 
on the conflict in Chechnya, see Jonathan Charney, “Self-Determination: Chechnya, Kosovo, and East 
Timor, 34 Vand J Transnat’l L 455. For more on the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh see Tim Potier, 
Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, A Legal Appraisal (Boston: Kluwer Law 
Publications, 2001). 
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sporadic hostilities in the region.”665 To summarize, outside of the legal ambit of analysis 
for this case study, it is important to keep in mind that Russia’s involvement in the 
Caucasus region certainly possesses historical and political influences, which cannot be 
ignored when attempting to understand its actions sine 1992.  
4.3.1. Abkhazia – a brief chronological history666 
 The history of Abkhazia is complex in that, similar to other territorial disputes, it 
had been the subject of conquests, invasions and multiple waves of imperialism over the 
past three millennia. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the Abkhaz culture and 
language had existed in Georgia since its inception as a functioning society,667 and other 
Georgian ethnos’ such as the Svans, Laz and Mingrelians have lived side by side with 
Abkhaz peoples since Georgia became a federative state in the 10th century AD. 668 In any 
case, as was written by ecclesiastical lawyer Giorgi Merchule over one thousand years 
ago, in the 10th century, “…Georgia was defined as anywhere where the Mass was said in 
                                                
665 Philip Leach, “South Ossetia” in Elizabeth Wilmhurst ed, International Law and the Classification of 
Conflicts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 317.  
666 It is important to note that a large part of this sub-section will cite the following publication: 
Dugard & Raic, supra note 528. This publication’s excerpt on the history of Abkhazia is a combination 
of multiple original historical sources. See generally, Potier, supra note 664; A Khachikian, 
“Multilateral Mediation in Intrastate Conflicts: Russia, the United Nations, and the War in Abkhazia” 
in M C Greenberg, J H Barton & M E McGuinness, eds., Words Over War, Mediation and Arbitration to 
Prevent Deadly Conflict (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000) at 15; S N MacFarlane, 
“Conflict Resolution in Georgia” in H G Ehrhart & A Schnabel, eds., The Southeast European Challenge: 
Ethnic Conflict and the International Response (Hamburg: Nomos Verlagsgeselleschaft, 1999) at 117; 
Raic, supra note 13 at 379–86. 
667 See Rayfield, supra note 657 (London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2012) (“[w]hen Georgia emerged from 
legend into history, it did so as two possible three, distinct entities. One is the core of the future 
unified state, Iberia (today’s Kartli and Kakhetia).  The second is Colchis, the Black Sea coast region 
that at its greatest stretched from east of Trebizond to north of today’s Sukhumi [modern-day capital 
of Abkhazia]…The third is Svanetia, ancient Suania, which two or three thousand years ago was more 
extensive than today’s landlocked highlands…Colchis is mentioned as a kingdom long before Iberia…” 
at 12). 
668 See George Hewitt, “Abkhazia and Georgia: Time for a Reassessment” (2008) 15 Brown J World 
Aff 183 (“Passing through the Caucasus in 1404, the cleric Johannes de Galonifontibus has left a 
brilliantly succinct description of the sequence of countries he visited. His text translates: "Beyond 
these [Circassians] is Abkhazia, a small hilly country...They have their own language...To the east of 
them, in the direction of Georgia, lies the country called Mingrelia...They have their own language... 
Georgia is to the east of this country. Georgia is not an integral whole...They have their own 
language"” at 184).     
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Georgian”669 – Abkhazia included.  
Abkhazia’s early history as a functioning society can be traced back to the 9th 
century BC, where until the 6th Century BC, its territory belonged to the ancient kingdom 
of Colchis (Kolkha).670 Subsequently, an influx of Milesian Greeks established 
themselves on the territory in around the 5th Century BC and in 1 AD, the region was 
invaded and conquered by the Byzantine Roman Empire. In the centuries that followed, 
the Kingdom would be the subject of multiple conquests; however, the strength of the 
Georgian, and predominantly Christian-Orthodox population, allowed for its culture and 
language to survive nonetheless. 671 In 978 AD, Abkhazeti (Abkhazia in Georgian) was 
absorbed into a feudal Georgian state ruled by King Bagrat III. Upon its absorption into 
the Georgian state, the Abkhaz lived in proximity and married into other Georgian 
ethnos’, with many important figures of the Georgian monarchy having direct Abkhaz 
lineage or ancestry.672 
Through countless invasions by first the Sassanids, the Mongols, the Timurs, and 
finally the Ottoman Turks, the Georgian state ultimately fragmented into smaller 
principalities under the yoke of foreign conquest. Eventually, Abkhazia broke into its 
own independent principality in the 17th century while under the Ottoman Empire, but 
through Russia’s conquest of the North Caucasus673 became a part of the Russian Empire 
via official annexation in 1864.674 Fearing revolts by the Abkhaz against further imperial 
                                                
669 Rayfield, supra note 657 at 7. 
670 David Braund, Georgia in Antiquity: A History of Colchis and Transcaucasian Iberia (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995) at 359.  
671 Rayfield, supra note 657 at 18-47, 55.  
672 It is important to note Abkhazia’s role as part of the unified Georgian federal state. See Hewitt, 
supra note 668 (“[t]he first king of this unified state, Bagrat' III, in 978 inherited from his Abkhazian 
mother, Gurandukht', the Kingdom of Abkhazia, which included both Abkhazia proper and most of 
today's west Georgian provinces, which Abkhazian prince Leon II had added to his domains in the 
late 8th century. By the time of his death in 1014, Bagrat' had inherited all remaining Georgian-
speaking regions, and, as his 36 -year reign ended, the Georgian chronicler ascribed to him the title 
apxazta da kartvelta mepe: "Sovereign of the Abkhazians and the Georgians. However, this unified 
polity was bound to fragment after the depredations of the Mongols, who first appeared in the 
Caucasus during the reign of Tamar's daughter, Rusudan, in the 1270’s” at 184). 
673 It is also important to note that the Russian Empire annexed and conquered most of Georgia by 
the early 1800’s.   
674 Dugard & Raic, supra note 528 at 113. 
155 
 
rule, the Russian Empire authorities proceeded to deport Muslim Abkhazians to the 
Ottoman Empire. Consider this summary of the historical developments in 18th century 
Abkhazia by George Hewitt, which clearly underline the Russian Empire’s relationship 
with the Caucasus region: 
As Tsarist Russia pushed south in the late eighteenth century following the 
1783 Treaty of Georgievsk between Catherine the Great and Erek'le II, king 
of the central and eastern Georgian kingdoms of Kartli and K'akheti, 
resistance grew across virtually the whole North Caucasus. During the 
nineteenth century Caucasian War, the Abkhazians were the only people 
resident south of the mountains to join it. Abkhazia came under Russian 
"protection" in 1810 but continued to administer its own affairs until 1864. 
This was the year when the Caucasian War ended with the surrender of the 
North-West Caucasian alliance at Krasnaja Poljana, inland from Sochi. 
Following their defeat, all the Ubykhs and most Circassians and Abkhazians 
chose to abandon their ancestral lands to resettle in the Ottoman Empire. As 
a result, most Abkhazians and Circassians today live in the Near East, 
predominantly in Turkey. A further outflow took place after the 1877-1878 
Russo-Turkish War. It was after these migrations, known as maxadzhirstvo, 
"Great Exile," that non-Abkhazians first started to populate the denuded 
areas… With the departure of at least 120,000 Abkhazians, mostly during 
the maxadzhirstvo, and the beginning of an inflow of non-Abkhazians, 
Abkhazian territory was subjected to different administrative divisions and 
arrangements up to the time of the Russian Revolution (1917).675 
Evidently, the Abkhaz peoples underwent a broad range of ethnic discrimination under 
the rule of the Russian Empire. This prompted them to seek more autonomy and freedom, 
especially as communism began to slowly dismember the power of the Russian 
monarchy. After the October Revolution in 1917 and the rise of the Bolsheviks, the 
Abkhaz Socialist Republic was finally given official republican status within the Soviet 
Union in 1921. Nearly one decade later, under pressure from the Soviet Union central 
government, the autonomy originally granted to the Abkhaz began to slowly disappear.676 
Raic and Dugard explain that what happened next set the stage for the isolationism that 
the Abkhaz peoples felt throughout the 20th century:  
On 4 March 1921, the Abkhazian Soviet Republic was formed, which 
possessed full republican status in the Soviet Union. In December 1921, 
under pressure from the central government of the Soviet Union, a special 
                                                
675 Hewitt, supra note 668 at 185. 
676 Dugard & Raic, supra note 528 at 113. 
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‘contract of alliance’ was signed between Abkhazia and Georgia, by which 
Abkhazia became part of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic while it 
retained its status as Union republic. On 1 April 1925, the Abkhazian 
Constitution was adopted which enshrined its republican status with treaty 
ties to Georgia. However, under Stalin, the status of Abkhazia was reduced 
to an autonomous republic within Georgia. In the course of the 1930s, large 
numbers of Georgians were resettled in the region… Under Stalin’s rule, a 
period of ‘Georgianisation’ took place in the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
The Abkhazian language was banned from administration and publication 
and the Abkhazian alphabet was changed to a Georgian base. In 1953, 
following the death of Stalin, this policy changed and the Abkhazians were 
rehabilitated and compensated with over-representation in local offices. In 
1978, the Abkhaz launched a campaign to separate the Autonomous 
Republic of Abkhazia from the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic and to 
incorporate it in the Russian Federative Socialist Republic. Although 
rejected by Russia, this resulted in significant concessions to the Abkhaz, 
including disproportionate representation in the Supreme Soviet of 
Abkhazia.677 
As can be established from this extract, the Abkhaz incurred forms of self-determination 
denial and discrimination in the early 20th century by both the Russians and the 
Georgians; however, this would gradually change as the Soviet Union adopted a more 
balanced activism of self-determination rights on the international stage.678 Ultimately, 
Abkhazia’s exhaustive requests for autonomy from Georgia were met with concessions 
from the Soviet Union’s central government, which granted ethnic Abkhaz supremacy in 
their autonomous parliament; a move that would create discord and significantly impact 
relations with ethnic Georgians living on the territory of Abkhazia in the coming years.  
In the 1980s, a rise in Georgian nationalism led to renewed fears of 
‘Georgianisation’ in Abkhazia, prompting tensions to boil over on August 25, 1990 when 
“…the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet, in the absence of its Georgian deputies, voted in 
favour of independence, and like virtually all autonomous republics of the former Soviet 
Union, declared the state sovereignty of the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Republic 
(ASR).”679 Although the declaration was subsequently disregarded and proclaimed as 
                                                
677 Ibid. 
678 See sub-section on “Leninist Self-Determination” in Chapter 2.   
679 Dugard & Raic, supra note 528 at 114.  
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invalid by Georgia, the Abkhaz authorities made legitimate efforts twice (in 1990 and 
1992) to begin discussions on including Abkhazia into Georgia as part of the federal 
structure of an independent Georgian federative state. Unfortunately, both times the 
proposals were ignored and, following a coup d’état in 1991, “…the Georgian Military 
Council reinstated Georgia’s 1921 constitution which did not recognise Abkhazia’s status 
as a separate entity within Georgia.”680 In response to this, Abkhazia declared its 
independence, naming itself the ‘Republic of Abkhazia’; however not ‘officially’ 
proclaiming its independence as a state from Georgia.681  
Without a consensus in place, a civil war broke out between the Georgian 
National Guard and the Abkhaz militia as early as 1991, with the primary reason for the 
Georgian intervention being the growing Abkhaz secessionist movement in the country. 
By the end of June 1993, Abkhaz militias had overpowered the Georgian military, 
capturing Sukhumi (the capital of Abkhazia) a few months after. Once a cease-fire was 
agreed upon on December 1, 1993, Georgia conceded to previous Abkhaz demands by 
offering proposals for extensive autonomy, which were subsequently rejected by the 
Abkhaz authorities.682 One year later, the UN attempted to hold talks between the two 
sides; however, an insistence on recognising the territorial integrity of Georgia prompted 
the Abkhaz authorities to reject any declarations or propositions by the Georgian side. 
The primary issue for the Abkhaz was that they wanted to return to a confederal structure 
of Georgia (Abkhazia as an autonomous republic with the same rights and status as 
Georgia, but within the Georgian de jure territory); however, the Georgians were 
prepared only to offer autonomy to Abkhazia under a Georgian federative state.683 In any 
case, upon learning of the Abkhazian authorities’ refusals, negotiations ceased and 
                                                
680 Ibid at 115. 
681 Ibid. 
682 Ibid at 116.  
683 It is necessary to note that although Georgia had sought to offer this option to the Abkhaz 
authorities, it was not done with much enthusiasm and was most likely a result of international 
pressure to solve the civil conflict.  
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Abkhazia continued its path to de facto statehood by holding elections in 1996.684  
Indeed, it is the time period after the 1996 elections from which much of the 
opposition to Abkhazia’s de facto independence is derived. The civil conflict in Abkhazia 
had caused nearly 300,000 ethnic Georgians to flee from Abkhazia into Georgia proper. 
Their return, which was fervently advocated by the international community and by 
Georgia, became a point of contention between the Abkhaz and the Georgian authorities. 
In large part, this was due to the fact that the return of Georgian refugees (which slowly 
began in 1997), was claimed by Abkhazia to be a way of destabilizing “the delicate 
politico-military balance in the area.”685 After nearly 30,000 returned refugees were 
forcibly expelled from Abkhazia in 1998, calls about a potential ethnic cleansing by the 
Abkhaz authorities began to shape the nature of the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict.686 
Ignoring the international pressure to solve the refugee situation, Abkhazia held an 
independence referendum in 1999, the results of which overwhelmingly called for an 
independent Republic of Abkhazia. However, by that point, it had become clear that the 
majority of ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia had not participated in the voting due to forced 
exile and intimidation. The international community’s response reflected this fact, with 
the referendum and the subsequent ‘declaration of independence’ later that month being 
declared as illegal.687 As rightly summarized by Raic and Dugard: 
The international (in particular the United Nations) stance towards the 
conflict is characterised by (a) consistent support for the preservation of the 
territorial integrity of Georgia, (b) a rejection of secession by Abkhazia, and 
(c) an insistence on the grant of extensive autonomy to the Abkhazians 
within the Republic of Georgia. 688 
                                                
684 The elections results were rejected by the majority of the international community and 
pronounced as illegal by the UNSC and the European Parliament. See e.g. Security Council Resolution 
1096 on extension of the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), SC Res 1096, 
UNSCOR, 52nd Sess, S/Res/1096, (1997) at para 3 [Security Council Resolution 1096]; Security 
Council Resolution 1065, Resolution on the Situation in Abkhazia, SC Res 1065, UNSCOR, S/Res/1065 
(1996) at paras 3-4. See also Dugard & Raic, supra note 528 at 116. 
685 Ibid at 116-7. 
686 Ibid at 116, n 69.  See specifically, OSCE Istanbul Summit Declaration, OSCE Doc. SUM.Doc/2/99 
(1999) at para 17 (“In 1996, the European Parliament labelled the treatment of the refugees and 
displaced Georgians from Abkhazia as ‘ethnic cleansing”). 
687 Ibid at 117.  
688 Ibid. 
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Indeed, the UNSC, as well as the European Union and Council of Europe, all agreed that 
Abkhazia’s independence infringed on Georgia’s territorial integrity under international 
law.689 Further, the Abkhaz authorities, who initially began negotiations in the early 
1990’s with discussions of Abkhazia as existing under a Georgian federative structure, 
rejected every proposal offered to them either by Georgia, or international mediators once 
some form of governmental stability returned to Georgia in 1996.690   
 Between the years 2000 and 2008, the situation in Abkhazia remained tense but 
stable, characterized as a ‘frozen conflict zone’ with both Russia and Georgia attempting 
to scrounge support in the region. For example, after 2000, Russia began issuing Abkhaz 
citizens with Russian passports as a means of travel and protection.691 Additionally, the 
election of pro-‘West’ President Mikhail Saakashvili as part of the Rose Revolution in 
2004 further strained relations between the separatist republic and Georgia. Specifically, 
this was due to the fact that Saakashvili “made Georgian territorial unity and control of 
the country’s separatist regions—Abkhazia among them—a political priority.”692 
Moreover, a ‘nationalist turn’ related to the election of Saakashvili further provoked the 
severity of the secessionist crisis, rekindling Abkhaz memories of previous 
‘Georginasation’ movements in the past. As explained by Hewitt, the argument that the 
reality of a nationalist government in Georgia was of concern to the Abkhaz authorities 
should be accepted: 
The advent of a new Georgian president might have been the moment to 
manifest a sense of realism vis-a-vis Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, 
                                                
689 See Security Council Resolution 1287, SC Res 1287, UNSCOR, S/Res/1287 (2000) at para 5; Security 
Council Resolution 896, SC Res 896, UNSCOR, S/Res/896 (1994) at para 5; Resolution on the Situation 
in Abkhazia, SC Res 1065, UNSCOR, S/Res/1065 (1996) at paras 2-3; Council of Europe, PA, 1997 
Ordinary Sess (10th Sitting), Resolution 1119 on the conflicts in Transcaucasia, Debates, vol 1 (1997).  
690 The Georgian government was unstable in the years after declaring independence from the Soviet 
Union on May 26, 1992. Mired by civil and ethnic conflicts, as well as a destabilized government 
system, the earlier rejections of Abkhaz proposals in 1990 and 1992 should be disregarded due to 
the instability of the Georgian government at that time. In fact, even the UNSC criticized Abkhazia on 
its ‘uncompromising stance’ towards negotiations with Georgia once negotiations began in 1996. For 
more on this see Security Council Resolution 1096, supra note 684 cited in Dugard & Raic, supra note 
528 at 118, n 75. 
691  See Mark Mackinnon, “Russian passports anger Georgia” The Globe and Mail (2 May 2002), online: 
<www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/russian-passports-anger-georgia/article4137259/>.  
692 “Abkhazia” in Britannica Academic, Encyclopedia Britannica, online: <www.academic.eb.com>. 
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any such opportunity was squandered yet again, as Saak'ashvili set himself 
the nationalist goals of regaining the lost territories, including the Muslim-
Georgian region of Ach'ara in the southwest during his first presidential 
term, offering Abkhazians the same old "maximal autonomy" until early 
2008, when the offer, 19 years too late, became a special federal 
arrangement. After peacefully regaining Ach'ara in May 2004, Saak'ashvili 
turned his attention to South Ossetia. As for Abkhazia, troops, allegedly 
mere policemen that were needed to restore order entered the Upper K'odor 
Valley in the spring of 2006, Abkhazia's only region that Georgia has 
historical claims to still under Tbilisi's control. They were quickly joined by 
the so-called "Abkhazian Government in-exile." This provocation, which 
saw tourist numbers plummet in the expectation of renewed fighting, 
produced no immediate Abkhazian response other than to halt the 
negotiations.693 
Thus, under the pretence of halted negotiations, it was only a matter of time before 
tensions spilled over into an armed conflict in August of 2008.  Prior to delving into the 
developments that caused the Russian military intervention in 2008, it is necessary to 
present a similar historical summary of South Ossetia to identify the comparable 
differences between the two separatist entities, as well as the similarities which equally 
affect their current status’ under international law.  
4.3.2. South Ossetia – A brief chronological history 
South Ossetia can be found within the territorial boundaries of the north-eastern 
region of the Republic of Georgia, separated by the Caucasus mountain range with North 
Ossetia-Alania, an autonomous federal republic within the territorial boundaries of 
Russia.694 The Ossetian peoples are considered to be of “Iranian origin and are viewed by 
Georgians as a non-native group living in its territory.”695 Unlike Abkhazia, which had its 
                                                
693 Hewitt, supra note 668 at 192. 
694 Sorenson, supra note 661 at 228.  
695 Noelle Higgins & Kieran O’Rielly, “The Use of Force, Wars of National Liberation and the Right to 
Self-Determination in the South Ossetian Conflict” (2009) 9 Intl Crim L Rev 567 at 568.  It should be 
noted that finding historical summaries of South Ossetia is fairly challenging as the number of 
publications on the subject either in Russian or in English is limited. The following authors have 
summarized South Ossetia’s complex historiography. Many of the sources used in their publication 
require mentioning as part of this source which will be used extensively in this sub-section: Georgia: 
Avoiding War in South Ossetia, International Crisis Group Report 159, Brussels/Tbilisi, 2004; Charles 
King, “The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia's Unrecognized States” (2001) 53 World 
 
161 
 
origins and language engrained into the etymological history of Georgia, Ossetians, 
believed to have derived from a Sarmatian Iranian tribe known as the Alans, only began 
to migrate into Georgia en masse sometime in the 17th century.696 Hence, the 
historiography of the Ossetian peoples can begin at this juncture of Georgia’s long and 
rich history.  
Once South Ossetia became part of the Russian Empire through the annexation of 
Georgia in 1801, “…the Ossetians retained their identity and did not join other groups in 
the North Caucasus putting up fierce resistance to the expansion of the Russian 
empire.”697 Furthermore, Ossetian migration continued into Georgia throughout the 19th 
century, and while ‘Russification’ was more prevalent in North Ossetia, the ethnic 
tensions between Georgians and Ossetians persisted due to in large part, linguistic and 
cultural differences, as well as a strong support of Russia by the Ossetians.698 Following 
the Russian Revolution, a Menshevik government was elected in what came to be known 
as the “First Georgian Republic” (1918-1921);699 however, as described by Noelle 
Higgins and Kieran O’Rielly, the ethno-historical issues that to-date bordered on 
linguistic and cultural differences, began to take a more ‘separatist’ undertone: 
The First Georgian Republic's Menshevik government faced many 
problems, including war (with Armenia and White Russian forces), 
economic chaos and hyperinflation." The Mensheviks turned to Georgian 
nationalism as they tried to bolster support for the state. This led to 
minorities, including Ossetians, feeling isolated within the state, and 
Georgians began to regard them as a potential fifth column which could 
collaborate with forces outside of Georgia to undermine the Georgian 
government. Following the defeat of the Mensheviks, the incorporation of 
Georgia into the Soviet Union in 1921 was followed by the establishment 
of an autonomous oblast of South Ossetia within the Georgian Soviet 
Socialist Republic.' Unhappy with the division of Ossetia into two units in 
separate Soviet republics, through the 1920s and 1930s North and South 
                                                
Politics 534; Svante E Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the 
Caucasus (London: Curzon Caucasus World, 2001).    
696 Rayfield, supra note 657 at 231. 
697 Sorenson, supra note 661 at 229.   
698 Roland Topchishvili, “Georgian-Ossetian Ethno-Historical Review” (2011) National Library of 
Georgia at 23.  
699 Higgins & O’Rielly, supra note 695 at 569. See Cornell, supra note 695 at 148.  
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Ossetian leaders sought a united Ossetia within the Soviet Union and 
petitioned the Soviet Union leadership for this. However their request was 
denied.700 
After the Second World War, Joseph Stalin (himself an ethnic Georgian), ceded both 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the Georgian Socialist Soviet Republic.701 Throughout the 
post-war Soviet period, ethnic tensions were low, only beginning to rise towards the end 
of the 1980s in response to the multiple South Ossetian requests “…to have its status 
upgraded from that of an autonomous oblast to an autonomous republic.”702 In fact, it was 
only in 1989, where a final request by the South Ossetians for extensive autonomy was 
met with violence, that the Georgian-Ossetian ethnic divide reached similar levels to the 
ongoing conflict in Abkhazia: 
In the summer of 1990 regional parties were banned from Georgian 
elections, effectively prohibiting any South Ossetian party from 
participating. In response, in September, South Ossetia declared full 
sovereignty within the Soviet Union. Georgia in turn abolished South 
Ossetia's autonomous oblast status completely.' The Soviet Union did not 
accept South Ossetia's declaration of sovereignty or Georgia's abolition of 
South Ossetia's autonomous status.' In 1989 “two-thirds of the population 
of South Ossetia was ethnic Ossetian," and the main catalyst for conflict 
was the publication of articles in the Georgian media stating that the 
government was considering making Georgian the only official state 
language, and the subsequent declaration to that effect following Georgia's 
independence in 1991 - when at the time only 14% of South Ossetians could 
function in Georgian.' Cornell states that there was a total lack of will to 
compromise on both sides. Georgians regarded Ossetians as immigrants and 
a tool of Russian attempts to block Georgia's moves toward independence. 
Ossetians and other minorities were reacting against growing Georgian 
nationalism and chauvinism and attempts at Georgianization and 
Christianization of Georgia.703 
                                                
700 Ibid at 569-70.  
701 William R Slomanson, “Legitimacy of the Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia secessions: 
Violations in search of a rule” (2009) 6:2 Miskolc J Intl L 1 at 5.   
702 Higgins & O’Rielly, supra note 695 at 570.  
703 The South Ossetian fears of a potential return of ‘Georgianazation’ were warranted during the rule 
of the first Georgian president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia who publicly declared that Ossetians should 
return to their true home in North Ossetia. For more on this see Higgins & O’Rielly, supra note 695 
(“A 1993 survey illustrated that three of every four Georgians held a negative view of South 
Ossetians, and two-thirds rejected any compromise that would give South Ossetia significant 
autonomy while remaining in Georgia” at 570).  See also, Darrell Slider, “Democratization in Georgia” 
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Following the first breakout of violence, and as the Georgian declaration of independence 
in 1990 recused all former autonomous boundaries, the situation between South Ossetian 
and Georgian authorities deteriorated completely. Inevitably, Georgia’s bid for 
independence left South Ossetia as simply another region within Georgia, losing its 
former status as an autonomous ‘oblast’ and crushing any hope for an autonomous 
republic or an independent state.704 Armed conflict eventually broke out, and although a 
peace agreement (Sochi Agreement) between Russia and Georgia was signed in 1992, by 
then, South Ossetia had become a de facto state controlled by armed militias who were 
supported and trained by the Russian military.705 Additionally, it should be noted that the 
Sochi Agreement “and its provisions did not lead to a settlement of the situation, but 
rather the region entered a 'frozen' conflict phase, similar to others in the former Soviet 
Union (in Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdniester), in that, while violence 
ended, no lasting peace was achieved.”706 As summarized by Higgins and O’Rielly, after 
1992, 
South Ossetia began to operate as a de facto state, outside of the control of 
Georgia despite being a part of Georgian territory. The coming to power of 
Georgian President Saakashvili [in 2004] marked a major change in 
relations between Georgia and the area of South Ossetia. Tensions had been 
low in the region for many years, especially in comparison with other frozen 
conflicts such as Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. However, there were 
attempts by the Saakashvili government to regain control of the region, 
including the closing of local markets that had facilitated cross-border 
trading. From being the most tranquil of the frozen conflicts in the former 
Soviet Union, the South Ossetian became the most volatile. This coincided 
with a general deterioration of relations between Russia and Georgia. In 
2005 North and South Ossetia released an agreement stating their wish for 
unification.707 
After the declaration for Ossetian unification in 2005, tensions began to rise again as it 
became more and more likely that South Ossetian separatism would not accept anything 
                                                
in Kiren Dawisha & Bruce Parrott eds., Cleavage and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) at 173-80. 
704 Cornell, supra note 695 at 164-6 cited in Higgins & O’Rielly, supra note 695 at 571, n 23.  
705 Sorenson, supra note 661 at 229. 
706 Higgins & O’Rielly, supra note 695 at 571. 
707 Ibid at 571. 
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less than full independence from the Georgian state. Additionally, as a major promise of 
Saakashvili’s platform included ‘unifying’ Georgia, a Georgian-proposed referendum for 
autonomy was rejected by South Ossetian and Abkhaz voters in 2006. At this point, 
tensions began to point towards a potential for an all-out armed conflict, with South 
Ossetian militias becoming more organized and better-trained, largely through funding 
and support by the Russian authorities.708 After the 2006 referenda in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, negotiations ceased and relations deteriorated between Georgia on one 
side, and South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Russia on the other. The next sub-section will 
explore the series of events that followed the 2006 referenda in detail, defining the 
illegality of Russia’s military intervention in 2008 and rejecting the claim of external 
self-determination for both South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  
4.3.3. Legality of Russia’s military intervention 
As demonstrated in the previous sub-sections, Russia’s involvement in the 
Caucasus should not be surprising given its historical and geopolitical ties to the region. 
Outside of these ties, Russia’s support for territorial disputes and secessionist conflicts 
around its borders are certainly a cause for concern, although the intervention and 
subsequent invasion of Georgia in 2008 was the first instance of a direct Russian military 
invasion since the end of the Cold War.709 This sub-section will provide a brief 
chronological summary of Russia’s military intervention in Georgia in 2008, and will aim 
to firmly establish how, notwithstanding all other factors, the intervention and subsequent 
invasion of Georgia was executed on false legal precedents that do not conform to the 
                                                
708 See e.g. Nicolas Landru, “Two Referendums and Two “Presidents” in South Ossetia” Caucaz 
Europenews, (20 November 2006) online: 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20061128064202/http://www.caucaz.com/home_eng/breve_conte
nu.php?id=279>; Liz Fuller, “Georgia: South Ossetia Seeks To Contain Opposition Challenge” 
RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty (10 November, 2006), online: < www.rferl.org/a/1072652.html>.  
709 Russia’s numerous alleged violations of international law related to the secessionist movements 
include the support of ‘insurgencies’ in Moldova (Transnistria), Ukraine (Donetsk & Lugansk), South 
Ossetia (Georgia) and Abkhazia (Georgia). For a detailed summary and legal analysis of said 
violations, see Marissa Mastroianni, “Russia Running Rogue? How the Legal Justifications for Russian 
Intervention in Georgia and Ukraine Relate to the U.N Legal Order” (2015) 46 Seton Hall L Rev 599.  
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international legal norms for the use of force in UNC secessionist conflicts.710  
South Ossetia and Abkhazia were subject to multiple civil armed conflicts prior to 
2008, which primarily consisted of the Georgian National Guard facing off against 
Abkhaz or South Ossetian militias. Although the military skirmishes did not permanently 
cease, and both republics’ territorial boundaries became labeled as ‘frozen conflict 
zones’,711 the events which took place in 2008 overshadowed any attempts to find a 
negotiated solution to the territorial conflicts.712 Therefore, prior to investigating the 
legality of the military intervention, it is necessary to briefly summarize the events that 
occurred right before and after the military intervention in 2008. 
 As previously mentioned, the events that led to Russia’s military intervention in 
August of 2008, known as the ‘Russo-Georgian five-day war’, started much earlier in the 
year. As early as April 2008, “Russia moved to formalize its relations with both South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia as President Putin signed a decree instructing the government to 
open political, economic and social relations with the regions.”713 A string of military 
clashes between the South Ossetian and Georgian militaries followed. After a bout of 
Russian military exercises in neighbouring North Ossetia in July of the same year, 
clashes and Georgian shelling of the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali commenced 
sometime during the first week of August. Although the series of events that took place 
                                                
710 It should be noted that it cannot be ignored that independence negotiations between Russia and 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia occurred more frequently following the declaration of independence by 
Kosovo on February 12, 2008. Russia’s political and strategic motivations behind holding these 
negotiations was most likely motivated by the declaration and subsequent recognitions of Kosovo by 
the international community. Multiple authors have supported this conclusion. See e.g. Levan 
Alexidze, “Kosovo and South Ossetia: Similar or Different? Consequences for International Law” 
(2012) 12 Baltic YB. Intl L 75; Sorenson, supra note 661; Borgen, “Is Kosovo a Precedent?”, supra note 
46; R Thomas, supra note 560 at 1991; Kreuger, supra note 566; Adam Sucur, “Observing the 
Question of Secession in the Wake of Recent Events in Kosovo, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea” 
(2015) 3 Zagrebačka Pravna Revija [Zagreb Law Review] 273 at 294-7.   
711 See e.g. Alejandro Sanchez, “The "Frozen" Southeast: How the Moldova-Transnistria Question has 
Become a European Geo-Security Issue” (2009) 22 J Slavic Mil Stud 153 at 155; Christopher Borgen, 
“Imagining Sovereignty, Managing Secession: The Legal Geography of Eurasia's "Frozen Conflicts" 
(2007) 9 Orlando Rev Intl L 477 at 497-9; Leach, supra note 665 at 334. 
711 Anderson, “Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession”, supra note 7 at 82. 
712 Ibid. 
713 Higgins & O’Rielly, supra note 695 at 571. 
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during the first days of August remains unclear, it is well established that the Georgian 
military attacked the capital Tskhinvali on August 7th through an air and ground assault, 
capturing the capital on August 8.714 This prompted Russia to respond with a 
comprehensive military intervention, including 300 combat aircraft, a naval blockade of 
Georgia’s ports and the deployment of nearly 9,000 troops into South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia.715 The military intervention lasted nearly two weeks, with Russian troops 
supporting South Ossetian and Abkhaz militias to repel the Georgian military to outside 
the boundaries of their respective republic boundaries. However, instead of ceasing 
hostilities once the Georgian military retreated, Russia proceeded to send its troops into 
Georgia proper, coming within miles of the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, while undeniably 
attacking Georgian military on “undisputed Georgian territory.”716 Additionally, in 
Abkhazia, Russian and Abkhaz forces attacked the Georgian military stationed in the 
upper Kodori Valley, while forcibly expelling the majority of the ethnic Georgian 
population from Abkhazia proper.717 These developments prove crucial to the 
understanding of why the international reaction to Russia’s military intervention rejected 
the notion that it was executed under the pretences of a pre-emptive ‘humanitarian’ cause 
based on the Abkhaz and South Ossetian peoples’ right to self-determination.  
Russia’s military intervention and subsequent invasion of Georgia ended with a 
brokered ceasefire by French President Nikolas Sarkozy on August 12, 2008. Although 
the Russian military forces withdrew from the areas considered to be Georgia proper, 
they maintained their military presence inside both South Ossetia and Abkhazia.718 In 
                                                
714 Mastroianni, supra note 709 at 631.  
715 Roy Allison, 'Russia resurgent? Moscow's Campaign to "coerce Georgia to peace"” (2008) 84:6 
International Affairs J at 1157 cited in Higgins & O’Rielly, supra note 695 at 572.  
716 Mastroianni, supra note 709 at 631-2. 
717 Ibid. On the specific details of the conflict mentioned in this excerpt, see e.g. Christopher Borgen, 
“The Language of Law and the Practice of Politics: Great Powers and the Rhetoric of Self-
Determination in the Cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia” 10 Chicago J Intl L 1 at 9-13; T Thomas, 
“The Bear Went Through the Mountain: Russia Appraises its Five-Day War in South Ossetia” (2009) 
22 J Slavic Mil Stud at 31-40; “Road to War in Georgia: The Chronicle of a Caucasian Tragedy” Der 
Speigel (25 Aug 2008) online: <www.spiegel.de>; Michael Toomey,  “The August 2008 Battle of South 
Ossetia: Does Russia Have a Legal Argument for Intervention?” (2009) 23 Temp Intl & Comp L J 443 
at 464-74.   
718 Mastroianni, supra note 709 at 632.  
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response to the international community’s condemnation of Russia’s intervention and 
subsequent invasion of Georgia, a number of ‘legal arguments’ were put forward by the 
Russian authorities to justify Russia’s actions under international law. One of those 
points, made by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and reiterated by then-Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin, was that the Russian military intervention was executed 
“…upon the finding that South Ossetians and Abkhazians faced an extreme amount of 
peril at the hands of the Georgian state right before Russia intervened.”719 Additionally, 
Putin made an unsubstantiated claim that a ‘genocide’ had been committed by Georgia in 
South Ossetia, in reference to the figure of 1,500–2,000 dead civilians as part of the 
Georgian military operation.720 Lastly, a comparison was made between the situation in 
Kosovo and the situations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with Russia insisting that both 
peoples were the targets of ethnic cleansing and discrimination, which prompted an 
obligation for pre-emptive and reactive military intervention.721 
 In the context of this thesis, it is necessary to validate only the arguments that 
pertain to whether the Abkhaz and South Ossetian peoples possessed the right of self-
determination, as well as whether the human rights abuses they suffered at the hands of 
the Georgian military could be considered as in extremis. Should these factors not meet 
the threshold set by the two aforementioned case studies for a direct third-state military 
intervention, the actions of the state become that of an aggressor and should be analyzed 
from a perspective of their violations with respect to international law.   
 Concerning the case of Abkhazian peoples, the answer to whether they had a right 
to seek external self-determination lies in assessing two separate claims. First, the lack of 
international recognition for Abkhaz peoples’ right for external self-determination, and 
second, the lack of evidence that atrocities were committed by Georgians against the 
                                                
719 Ibid at 639.  
720 Higgins & O’Rielly, supra note 695 at 573.  
721 It should be noted that Russia also used other excuses to justify its military intervention, such as 
the doctrine of self-defence with regards to the Russian citizens living in Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
that required protection, as well as the ‘privileged interests doctrine’ which seeks to justify the 
military support of friendly states in precarious civil situations. See Mastroianni, supra note 709 at 
633, 635, 639.   
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Abkhazian people. As expanded on by Anderson, both claims have serious legitimacy 
issues: 
[The lack of international] recognition stems from the fact that Abkhazia's 
UNC secession did not conform with the customary law right of peoples to 
external self-determination. In the period prior to the declaration of 
independence, Abkhazian citizens were not subject to deliberate, sustained, 
and systematic human rights abuses in extremis at the hands of Georgia. As 
such, Abkhazia's UNC secession violated the peremptory norm of the right 
of peoples to self-determination, which in turn ensured that Abkhazia's 
statehood failed to crystallize.722 
This claim is echoed by Raic and Dugard who state that 
…There is no doubt that the Abkhazians qualify as a people for the purpose 
of self-determination. This was acknowledged by the Soviet Union when it 
conferred a special status on Abkhazia…This does not, however, seem to 
be the main obstacle in the way of recognition of Abkhazia’s bid for 
independence. Instead the answer is to be found in Abkhazia’s 
intransigence at the negotiating table and the absence of serious violations 
of the Abkhazian people’s human rights by Georgia. The Abkhazians have 
become more and more unwilling to enter into good faith negotiations on 
the future political status of Abkhazia within Georgia, whereas the Georgian 
government has been willing to grant a substantial amount of political 
autonomy since the end of 1993. The consistent rejection by the Abkhazians 
of Georgia’s proposals for political and territorial autonomy within a federal 
arrangement, and of the appeals of the international community for such a 
settlement, suggests that the Abkhazians are not prepared to exhaust 
effective and peaceful remedies before claiming secession. Moreover, there 
is no evidence of widespread and serious violations of the fundamental 
rights of the Abkhazians by Georgia. On the contrary, the Abkhazians are 
themselves accused of violating the fundamental rights of Georgians 
resident in, or previously resident in, Abkhazia. Therefore, the conclusion 
must be that the Abkhazians do not, under the prevailing circumstances, 
possess a right of unilateral secession and, consequently, that the 
proclamation of independence is in violation of the law of self-
determination.723 
Although certain human rights violations were committed as part of the on-going civil 
conflict between the ethnic-Georgian citizens and the ethnic-Abkhaz citizens, no 
evidence points to perpetrated human rights abuses that can be designated as in extremis. 
                                                
722 Anderson, “Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession”, supra note 7 at 81.  
723 Dugard & Raic, supra note 528 at 119 [emphasis added]. For more scholars who support this view, 
see Alexidze, supra note 710 at 82-5; Raic, supra note 13 at 384-5; Slomanson, supra note 701 at 19. 
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Furthermore, the exile of ethnic-Georgian citizens from Abkhazia throughout the late 
1990s, as well as after the war in 2008 (which continues to present day), provides 
evidence of the fact that the Abkhazian peoples’ right to external self-determination 
infringed on the rights of a Georgian ethnic minority which lived on its territory, through 
abusive and discriminatory practices.724 Similarly, with regards to South Ossetia, 
Anderson writes that 
Whilst it is obvious that Georgians and South Ossetians experienced a 
prolonged breakdown of relations and intermittent hostilities during the 
period 1989-2008, it must be asked whether South Ossetia's UNC secession 
conformed with the customary law right of peoples to external self-
determination. More pointedly, it must be asked whether South Ossetians 
experienced sustained and systematic human rights abuses in extremis at the 
hands of Georgians, with no prospect for peaceful resolution of the conflict. 
It would seem most likely that the answer is no, as prospects for a political 
solution stopping short of UNC secession were possible, particularly under 
Shevardnadze's more moderate influence…It would seem then that South 
Ossetia's statehood has failed to crystallize, owing principally to the fact 
that its UNC secession was not in conformity with the peremptory norm of 
the right of peoples to self-determination.725 
Therefore, if the right of self-determination is applied to the cases of South Ossetian and 
Abkhazian peoples prior to Russia’s military intervention in 2008, it becomes evident 
that, factually, a lack of dolus specificus with respect to the purported human rights 
abuses committed against them by the Georgian state prevents the invocation of any right 
of external self-determination. Additionally, the plethora of attempts by the Georgian 
                                                
724 For evidence of the on-going treatment of refugees and internally displaced persons who fled 
Abkhazia, see Status of internally displaced persons and refugees from Abkhazia, Georgia, and the 
Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia, GA Res 71/290, UNGAOR, 71st Sess, UN Doc 11919 (2017) 
and “Human Rights Council hears oral updates on Ukraine and Georgia under its technical assistance 
and capacity building agenda item” (21 June 2017) online: < 
www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21786&LangID=E>.  
725 Anderson, “Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession”, supra note 7 at 84.  This view is echoed by a 
number of other scholars, see e.g.  Alexidze, supra note 710 at 86-7; R Thomas, supra note 560 at 
2042; Higgins & O’Rielly, supra note 695 at 581; Kreuger, supra note 566 at 136;  Leach, supra note 
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state to include Abkhazia and South Ossetia as part of a federative autonomous state 
structure both under a less-nationalist and moderate nationalist government, further 
alienates any justification of that right. Lastly, Russia’s direct military intervention which 
supported the de facto independence of both republics, violated the prohibition on the use 
of force through its invasion of Georgia proper, which cannot be used as a pretense for a 
justification of independence, as it was determined that both peoples’ in question did not 
possess the right to external self-determination.726 
 In sum, this sub-section can be summarized by three conclusions with respect to 
the status of the two breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia: i) one of 
Russia’s primary and official reasons for military intervention into South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia was that it responded to confirmed  acts of ‘genocide’ and ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
(both of which could be considered as fulfilling the criteria of human rights abuses in 
extremis if factually accurate), ii) no evidence of ethnic cleansing or genocide have 
surfaced to date for either entity, iii) at most, South Ossetians and Abkhazians have the 
right to invoke their right of internal self-determination (i.e. request for more autonomy), 
an opportunity which they were presented with numerous times by Georgian and 
international negotiators and systematically rejected. Collectively, these conclusions 
allow for the confirmation that, even if a legal justification existed for Russia’s military 
intervention with regards to Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia due to the death of 
Russian peacekeepers in the initial Georgian military attack on Tskhinvali,727 the 
subsequent military invasion which reached deep into Georgian territory blatantly 
violated peremptory norms of international law and thus invalidate any invocation or 
execution of the right of South Ossetian and Abkhazian peoples to external self-
                                                
726 Scholarly opinion and state practice extensively support the notion that compliance with 
peremptory norms is a primary requirement of a UNC secession. See e.g. Anderson, “Unilateral Non-
Colonial Secession”, supra note 7 at 87-8 n 325; Raic, supra note 13 at 156; Crawford, “The Creation 
of States”, supra note 22 at 107. 
727 There is evidence that Russia’s military response was lawful in response to the death of its 
peacekeepers allegedly by the Georgian Armed Forces. See especially, Heidi Tagliavini, Report of the 
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, (Volume II, 2009) online: < 
http://echr.coe.int/Documents/HUDOC_38263_08_Annexes_ENG.pdf> at 23-5. Additionally, for a 
breakdown of the legal justification for self-defence that can be applied by Russia in this particular 
instance, see Mastroianni, supra note 709 at 641. 
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determination.    
 Now that all three case studies have been presented, it is necessary to conclude 
this Chapter by combining the factors which identified the justifications behind the right 
to both a UNC secession and a military intervention, into a legal framework. This 
framework, which will be presented in the next section, will establish a platform through 
which a third-state military intervention can be analyzed and consequently, determined to 
be justifiable and legitimate.  
4.4. The Analysis Framework of Third-State Military Interventions  
 Although evidence of state practice with regards to a qualified right to a third-
state military intervention under international law has been presented in the preceding 
Chapters, it is necessary to identify the elements which strengthen its legal justification. 
This sub-section will do this by establishing a framework consisting of four requirements 
through which such elements can become more easily identifiable. Once identified, such 
elements can subsequently be applied to situations of military interventions in similar 
circumstances, and consequently, assist in determining their legitimacy under 
international law.  
Prior to delving into the factors that justify the violation of the prohibition on the 
use of force, it is necessary to briefly mention the critical difference between an ‘excuse’ 
and a ‘justification’ in international law. Vidmar presents an excellent definition of the 
two terms, which can be adopted as part of this thesis’ legal analysis: 
Justifications are legally-warranted exceptions to the general prohibition. 
As such, they are a way out of illegality. Excuses, on the other hand, are not 
a way out of illegality, but act as mitigating circumstances that preclude 
responsibility for an otherwise illegal conduct.728   
As can be deduced from Vidmar’s definition, the difference between the two concepts is 
central to understanding the criticism leveled against international law and the use of 
                                                
728 Jure Vidmar, “Excusing Illegal Use of Force: From Illegal but Legitimate to Legal Because it is 
Legitimate?”  (14 April 2017) online: < www.ejiltalk.org/excusing-illegal-use-of-force-from-illegal-
but-legitimate-to-legal-because-it-is-legitimate/> [emphasis added] [“Vidmar, “Excusing Illegal Use 
of Force”]. 
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force in general. For example, the previous sub-sections in this Chapter have 
demonstrated that Russia’s military intervention into Georgia proper in 2008 and 
NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo in 1999, have been ‘justified’ through official 
statements that purport to provide a ‘legal justification’ for the states’ actions. When 
analyzing the veracity of such statements, especially in the legal sense, it is crucial to 
identify and differentiate the ‘excusatory’ statement from the ‘justificatory’ one. In other 
words, as international law relies heavily on states to provide justifications for their 
actions in order to formulate custom729 (this assumes of course that the action is not 
found in codified treaties), the threshold for identifying whether a states’ response to that 
action meets the standard for a legal justification or not must be established.  In the 
context of the use of force, defining the asymmetry of the two concepts is challenging as 
in part “[i]nternational law does recognize defenses for states that breach their 
international obligations, but it does not clarify which defenses are justifications and 
which are excuses.”730 Although the debate on international state responsibility is an 
extensive subject and beyond the scope of this thesis,731 it is nonetheless important to 
consider the juristic difference between an ‘excuse’ and a ‘justification’ in international 
law. Further, Vidmar makes an excellent point of identifying that in providing a threshold 
or a guideline for what constitutes a ‘justification’, a norm prohibiting the act which 
requires justification can be eased or relaxed, thereby ensuring that its violators can 
become easily identifiable. 732 This is an important suggestion, which if applied to the 
case of third-state military interventions, reaffirms the existence of a more ‘relaxed’ 
                                                
729 Curtis A Bradley, International Law in the U.S. Legal System, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015) in at 139. 
730 Arthur Kutoroff, “Emerging Voices: Excuse in International Law” (12 August 2015), Opinio Juris 
(blog), online: < http://opiniojuris.org/2015/08/12/emerging-voices-excuse-in-international-law/>. 
731 The debate over state responsibility and the difference between a justification and an excuse is 
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International Law: Concept and Theory of General Defences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017). See also Roman Boed, "State of Necessity as a Justification for Internationally Wrongful 
Conduct" (2000) 3:1 Yale Human Rights and Dev J 1. 
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interpretation of the prohibition on the use of force as being restrictively qualified and not 
obligatory.  
Now that the difference between an excuse and a justification of a violation of 
international law has been established, it is necessary to present the four requirements 
which makeup the framework through which a third-state military intervention can be 
properly analyzed.  The first requirement which determines whether a right to third-state 
military intervention exists or not, mandates two necessary criteria: i) that a ‘peoples’ 
within an established state are the subject of systematic abuses of human rights deemed 
as in extremis, with no possibility of a negotiated solution between them and the state 
authorities,733 and (ii) that such ‘peoples’ be eligible to invoke a right to a UNC secession 
under international law.734 In this context, the term ‘peoples’ should be construed openly, 
so as to not limit the right of self-determination to certain descriptive or ascriptive 
features that can create discord in multinational states. A good example of considering an 
‘open’ definition of the term ‘peoples’ is presented in the following manner by Anderson:  
Although there is no definitive legal definition of “peoples,” three 
propositions can be reasonably inferred from relevant UN instruments: first, 
that “peoples” are not restricted to the colonial context; second, that more 
than one “people” can inhabit a non-self-governing territory and sovereign 
state; and third, that “peoples” should have what might be loosely termed 
“national overtones,” in the sense that they should have some common 
group identity. The latter point, however, should not be interpreted 
narrowly: “psychological perceptions and not tangible attributes” should 
form the primary basis of peoplehood. The corollary of the foregoing points 
                                                
733 It is important to note that in order to reach the threshold of ‘no possibility of a negotiated 
solution’, numerous attempts at a negotiated solution should be attempted and subsequently fail. 
734 This element can be determined by putting the peoples’ in question through the ‘implied 
requirements test’ as suggested by Anderson. According to him, the four implied requirements of a 
right to a UNC secession are: I) The discrimination against the peoples’ in question must be 
deliberate and sustained, II) The discrimination must be contemporary, meaning that the attempted 
UNC secession must be based on contemporary events which do not surpass 10 years ex post facto, 
III) UNC entity must agree to protect and uphold the rights of other minorities within its territorial 
claim, especially any minorities of the offending state, IV) the entity must abide by all laws of 
statehood in international law, meaning that it will not be granted legitimacy should its UNC 
secession come about as a result of a violation of peremptory norms of international law. For a more 
in-depth analysis of this test, see Anderson, “A Post-Millennial Inquiry”, supra note 13 at 1218-20. 
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is that there are no reasonable grounds to argue that the definition of 
“peoples” in anyway precludes UNC secessionist self-determination.735 
It is therefore suggested that, for the purposes of this framework, the term ‘peoples’ be 
interpreted as such; however, it is also necessary to point out that, in considering the 
applicability of the term, a consideration for the extent of the discrimination they face 
must equally be applied. In other words, it must be determined that, outside of the 
applicability of whether the homogenous group can be attributed the term ‘peoples’, an 
equal amount of weight must be given to whether such a group has suffered a systematic 
and persistent discrimination that warrants a third-state military intervention. In order to 
identify this, a more precise definition must be established of what constitutes such a 
level of discrimination, which in turn can be termed as human rights abuses deemed as in 
extremis. With regards to determining what is meant by ‘discrimination of peoples’, it is 
necessary to point to Paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations Declaration which stipulates 
that: 
…States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus 
possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the 
territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.736 
The final sentence of this citation, which mentions race, creed and color, has been the 
cause of an extensive debate surrounding its meaning in the context of UNC 
secessions.737 This is important as, unfortunately, “the Declaration's travaux 
preparatoires and proces verbaux provide little or no guidance [to their definition, 
meaning that], it has been left to eminent scholars to formulate their own definitions.”738 
For example, Anderson suggests that Cassese’s interpretation of the meaning of race and 
creed creates a pleonasm if interpreted through Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of 
                                                
735 Ibid at 1203-4. For relevant evidence as part of UN instruments that defend each of these points, 
see ibid at nn 78-81.  
736 See Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 144, para 7 [emphasis added].   
737 Anderson, “A Post-Millennial Inquiry”, supra note 13 at 1204. 
738 Anderson, “Declaratory GA Resolutions”, supra note 68 at 355.  
 
175 
 
Human Rights.739 He explains this further by stating that:  
Cassese strictly construes "race" as only connoting physical somatic 
differences, explicitly rejecting any definition that encompasses factors 
such as language or culture. He further postulates that the meaning of 
"creed" is restricted to "religious beliefs, rather than the broader definition 
provided by the Oxford English Dictionary: "a set of opinions on any 
subject." Cassese arrives at this conclusion by arguing that if "creed" 
encompassed the broader Oxford definition, "a set of opinions on any 
subject," a government not representing the opinions of a people, even if 
democratically elected, could be interpreted as violating that people's right 
to self-determination. He therefore concludes that the right to UNC 
secession contained in paragraph 7 is activated only on the grounds of racial 
or religious discrimination against a people.740 
First, with respect to the terms ‘race’ and ‘colour’, it is challenging to not accept 
Cassese’s analysis given that “…it is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a situation 
where two or more peoples may be of a different colour, whilst at the same time not also 
constituting a different race.”741 Second, as can be understood through Anderson’s 
reasoning, Cassese’s narrow definition of ‘race’, “…which is confined to physical 
somatic differences,”742 fails to account for cultural and linguistic ties that are important 
factors when considering the notion of racial discrimination. In fact, Anderson concludes 
his argument by pointing to the synonymy of the terms ‘race’ and ‘nation’ as being 
crucial to the understanding of how discrimination in the context of UNC secessions must 
be interpreted. By pointing to the Oxford Dictionary’s definition of ‘race’, which can be 
construed as being more diverse and expansive than Cassese’s,743 Anderson clarifies what 
was meant by the Declaration on the threshold of discrimination of peoples: 
                                                
739 See UNDHR, supra note 631 ("[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction 
shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or 
territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under 
any other limitation of sovereignty" at art 2). See also, Cassese, “Self-Determination of Peoples”, supra 
note 6 at 112, cited in Anderson, “Declaratory GA Resolutions”, supra note 68 at 356, n 50. 
740 Ibid.  
741 Anderson, “Declaratory GA Resolutions”, supra note 68 at 356. 
742 Ibid. 
743 See Oxford English Dictionary, sub verbo. "Race" Online: 
<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/race>. “Each of the major divisions of humankind, 
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The synonymy between "races" and "peoples" evident above is important, 
as the Charter's travaux also reveals that the word "peoples" captures the 
concept of "nations."…Further evidence of the synonymy between "races" 
and "nations" is provided by the 1966 International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Article 1 of which 
contains the most widely accepted definition of "racial discrimination"…It 
follows that the notion of racial discrimination encompasses distinction or 
exclusion based upon and related to "national or ethnic origin." It may be 
reasonably inferred then that the term "race" not only connotes physical 
somatic differences, but also other factors associated with nationality and 
ethnicity, such as language, culture and customs.744 
Therefore, if one is to adopt Anderson’s interpretation of the Convention, the term 
‘peoples’ can be construed as encompassing factors outside of physical somatic 
differences. Indeed, it can be suggested that in a world that is becoming more multiethnic 
and multicultural, it is difficult to argue that a homogenous group of ‘peoples’ can only 
be determined on the basis of ascriptive features. Therefore, for the purposes of this 
framework, the definition of ‘peoples’ mentioned above can be considered side-by-side 
with their purported discrimination, which can be understood as being based on physical 
somatic differences and such factors as language, culture, customs, religion or ethnicity.  
 Concerning the level of discrimination, it is important to reiterate the difference 
between human rights abuses deemed as in extremis and human rights abuses deemed as 
in moderato. Human rights abuses considered to be in extremis “…must be of a 
deliberate, sustained, and systematic nature, with ‘the exclusion of any likelihood for a 
possible peaceful solution within the existing state structure’.”745 Example of these types 
of  human rights abuses can include such acts as genocide and systemic ethnic cleansing, 
as well as actions considered genocidal (such as the case in Bangladesh, which may have 
not met the threshold of a ‘genocide’ from the perspective of international law, but was 
termed as ‘genocidal’ nevertheless). 746 Alternatively, human rights abuses considered as 
                                                
having distinct physical characteristics…‘people of all races, colours, and creeds’… A group of people 
sharing the same culture, history, language, etc.; an ethnic group. 
744 Anderson, “Declaratory GA Resolutions”, supra note 68 at 357.  
745 Anderson, “A Post-Millennial Inquiry”, supra note 13 at 1218. See also Cassese, “Self-
Determination of Peoples”, supra note 6 at 119-20.  
746 On the term ‘genocidal’ in relation to the Bangladesh conflict, see supra note 533. 
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in moderato can be understood to mean political, cultural, or racial discrimination, which 
can include acts such as supressing a peoples’ political, linguistic and cultural rights, as 
well as repressing their official representation in government. The discrepancy in the 
definition and the level of discrimination by the existing state’s government is expanded 
on by Anderson in the following manner: 
This means that a government must knowingly and intentionally inflict 
discrimination against a people. Mere de minimis or unknowing instances 
of discrimination will not do. Something more is required, namely, 
governmental behavior which evidences dolus, or intentional malice, 
towards a people. Additionally, there must be a fundamental loss of rapport 
between the parties to the dispute, precluding the likelihood of a harmonious 
resolution.747 
In the cases of Bangladesh and Kosovo, a systematic and deliberate attempt to extinct the 
Bengalis and the Kosovars by their respective state authorities through a mass campaign 
of atrocities, provides a clear example of the level of discrimination as reaching in 
extremis levels. Additionally, both case studies effectivelydemonstrated that, insofar as a 
diplomatic solution was available, there was no opportunity for a ‘harmonious resolution’ 
to the territorial conflicts. On the other hand, political and linguistic repressions of the 
Abkhaz peoples in Abkhazia and the Ossetian peoples in South Ossetia, although 
deplorable and denounceable, fail to meet the necessary threshold of dolus and hence, can 
be considered as human rights abuses in moderato.   
 The second requirement as part of this framework is that two valuable pieces of 
evidence must be presented as justification for the military intervention. First, there must 
be evidence, of the UNSC being paralyzed, and unable to act through its enforcement 
mechanism as evinced under the UN Charter.748 It is crucial that evidence of such a 
paralysis exists, as a violation of the prohibition on the use of force in this context can 
only occur through the existence of this circumstance prima facie. More precisely, in 
accordance with Article 27 of the UN Charter, should a permanent member of the UNSC 
                                                
747 Anderson, “A Post-Millennial Inquiry”, supra note 13 at 1241. 
748 Supra note 396. 
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invoke the use of the veto749 or imply that a veto will be used to halt any military action 
in order to solve the issue at hand,750 the process of justifying a right to a military 
intervention can move forward to the third requirement which, if satisfied, can proceed 
unabated.751 Although, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the restrictive school would argue that 
the prohibition on the use of force is absolute,752 and hence, inviolable; the cases of 
Kosovo and Bangladesh provide evidence that such a violation through a military 
intervention is justified and permitted under the specific circumstances outlined in the 
case studies in this Chapter.  
The third requirement relates to the concern outlined by the Non-Aligned 
Movement regarding the true intention of a state or states when conducting a military 
intervention. For example, if one is to consider the 2011 NATO operation in Libya as 
being an example of a ‘humanitarian intervention’, the question can be asked, what were 
the true intentions of NATO states that partook in the military intervention given the state 
of Libya contemporarily (i.e post-intervention)? In order to alleviate this type of criticism 
for third-state military interventions in self-determination conflicts, it is important to 
consider the following course of action, which, if implemented, could alleviate some of 
the discord for the military action by those states who oppose it: the key actors’ military 
force must present a plan for an intervention which includes considerations of 
                                                
749 An example of this is Russia’s use of the veto preventing the UNSC on passing a resolution for 
possible military action or reprisal in the humanitarian crisis in Syria. See Euan Mckirdy, “8 times 
Russia blocked a UN Security Council resolution on Syria” CNN (13 April 2017), 
online:<www.cnn.com>. 
750 An alternative example is a permanent member of the UNSC vowing to impose a veto prior to a 
vote happening. Russia did this with regards to passing a resolution on Syria as well. See Jennifer 
Peltz, “UN Syria sanctions vote sought next week; Russia vows veto” CTV News (24 February 2017) 
online: <www.ctvnews.ca>. 
751 Although Article 27 does not explicitly mention the implied right to a veto by one of the five 
permanent members of the UNSC, an implied consensus of voting on substantive matters provides a 
right for any of the permanent five members to a ‘veto.’ See e.g. UN Charter, supra note 21, art 27. On 
the criticism and challenges of the UNSC use of the ‘veto’ see Bardo Fassbender, ed, “Veto” in Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press) at paras 9-17, online: 
<www.opil.ouplaw.com>.  
752 See section 3.1.2.  
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proportionality,753 as well as post-intervention withdrawal in order to alleviate the 
suspicion of an ex post facto foreign military occupation.754 Such a plan can include 
political, legal and rebuilding considerations, as the likelihood of an effective and stable 
government post-intervention is very minimal (as was demonstrated in the cases of 
Kosovo and Bangladesh). From an international legal perspective, such considerations 
can also include a post-intervention treaty for cessation of hostilities, as well as an 
establishment of a provisional government. This treaty could be signed between the 
former sovereign state, the key actors who performed the intervention and the newly 
formed state.755 Examples of such treaties include the 1995 Austrian State Treaty756 or the 
1979 Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty.757 Although in the instances of Kosovo and 
Bangladesh, treaties were not needed in order for the key actors’ militaries to halt 
                                                
753 ‘Proportionality’ in this case refers to the ‘principle of proportionality’ which can be defined in the 
substantive sense as a principle which should plan to do more good than harm in relation to a 
military intervention. See Rodley, supra note 456 (“…the point is that the interventionist prescription 
cures, rather than aggravates, the malady, much less kills the patient” at 791). 
754 A clear example of this is Russia’s military occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. For evidence 
of the fact that Russia is considered as a ‘foreign military occupying force’ in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, see “OSCE conference discusses Russian occupation of Georgian territories” Agenda.Ge (29 
Jun 2017) online: < http://agenda.ge/news/82452/eng>.  For more on the nature and the definition 
of foreign military occupation under international law, see Adam Roberts, ed, “Military Termination 
of Occupation” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press) 
online: <www.opil.ouplaw.com> (“The term ‘military occupation’ is broad, encompassing a wide 
range of cases in which the armed forces of a State, or of several States, exercise authority, on a 
temporary basis, over inhabited territory outside the accepted international frontiers of their State. It 
refers to belligerent occupations, in the classic form of which a belligerent State or alliance controls 
all or part of an enemy’s territory in the course of a war; and it also refers to other instances in which 
territory is occupied in the absence of hostilities, or in which an occupation continues after 
hostilities, and even a formal state of belligerency between States, have ended. The ‘law on 
occupations’—ie the body of international law governing military occupations—is part of the law of 
armed conflict, often referred to as international humanitarian law. Occupations are generally a 
consequence of international armed conflicts. The main aims of the law on occupations are that 
certain legitimate needs of the occupant ie occupying power and its armed forces should be met; that 
disruption to the lives of inhabitants should be kept to a minimum; and that control over territory 
should be treated as provisional in character until final arrangements are made” at para 3).  
755 Roberts, supra note 754 at paras 21-22.  
756 State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria, 15 May 1955, 217 
UNTS 223, BGBl Nr 152/1955, UKTS 58.  This treaty ended the USSR occupation of Austria and 
established a newly independent Austrian state.  
757 Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty, Israel and Egypt, 26 March 1979, UNTS 17813. This treaty, among 
other things, ensured the complete withdrawal of the Israeli military from the Sinai Peninsula. In 
turn, Egypt agreed to recognize Israel as a state.  
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operations and withdraw, this consideration could further solidify the intentions of the 
key actors, as well as avoid accusations of a foreign military occupation.  
Lastly, the fourth requirement of this framework looks at the international 
community’s reaction to the intervention, which must not include a collective, systematic 
or consistent condemnation. In other words, the majority of the international 
community’s reaction, which could include such factors as condemnations by regional 
organizations, can be measured as providing supporting evidence for the legitimacy or 
illegitimacy of the intervention. A prime example of this has been the condemnation of 
Russia’s military intervention by regional organizations such as the OSCE,758 NATO,759 
and the EU.760 Such condemnations can, given the specific circumstances of the 
intervention, point towards the illegality of the intervention, coupled with other potential 
violations of international law (as in the case of Russia’s intervention in 2008.) More 
precisely, as suggested by Harold Koh, the international reaction to an act by a state can 
be defined as “an ex post exemption from legal wrongfulness.”761 He explains: 
The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility 
recognize, for example, that extreme circumstances such as distress and 
necessity would preclude claims of international wrongfulness against an 
acting state and permit certain forms of countermeasures to stop illegal acts 
by others. Whether the collective action would ultimately be judged 
internationally lawful would then depend critically on what happened next, 
particularly if the Security Council condoned the action after the fact...762 
For example, the response to the intervention in Bangladesh, although originally 
bordering on the negative, quickly gained traction and changed to the positive vis-à-vis 
its respective recognition and the justifications provided by India to the UNSC. Similarly 
                                                
758 “OSCE Chairman condemns Russia's recognition of South Ossetia, Abkhazia independence” OSCE 
(26 August 2008) online:< www.osce.org/cio/50011>.  
759 Helen Womack, “Nato joins US in condemning Russia's response in South Ossetia” The Guardian 
(11 August 2008) online: < www.theguardian.com/world/2008/aug/11/georgia.russia7>.  
760 “EU Condemns Russia Over Georgia Action” VOA News (1 November 2009) online:< 
www.voanews.com/a/a-13-2008-09-01-voa52/402144.html>.  
761 Harold Hongju Koh, “Not Illegal: But Now The Hard Part Begins” Just Security (7 April 2017), 
online: < www.justsecurity.org/39695/illegal-hard-part-begins/>.  
762 Harold Koh, “The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention” (2016) 53:5 Hous J Intl L 971 at 
1010. 
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in Kosovo, the NATO intervention, although heavily criticized, has been largely accepted 
as justifiable in the years following its successful execution. Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that “…what amounts to a breach of international law by a State depends on the 
actual content of that State’s international obligations, and this varies from one State to 
the next.”763 More succinctly, the international reaction towards a violation of 
international law will not preclude or justify on its own the action of the violator.  
 In conclusion, when analyzing a case of a third-state military intervention in the 
context of a UNC secession, these four requirements - that, (i) a ‘peoples’ eligible for a 
UNC secession within an established state are the subject of systematic abuses of human 
rights deemed as in extremis, with no possibility of a negotiated solution between them 
and the state authorities, that ii) evidence of UNSC paralysis exists, that (iii) the true 
intention of the key actors’ intervention should be made clear through factors such as 
proportionality of military operations and post-intervention rebuilding and that, (iv) the 
international community’s collective response to the intervention must not include a 
systematic or consistent condemnation - can become useful elements when assessing its 
legality under international law. Nevertheless, it must be noted that, as UNC secessions 
are often executed differently due to historical, political and regional elements, a legal 
analysis of a third-state military intervention in such situations requires a certain degree 
of flexibility. In other words, this framework can only speak to the main elements 
necessary in a UNC secession, to which the exception of the prohibition on the use of 
force can be directly applied to. For example, such elements can include the 
determination of whether the entity can be identified as ‘peoples’ and, if so, whether their 
right to self-determination has been systematically denied and repressed. On the other 
hand, elements such as the unlawful use of force against civilian minority populations by 
the UNC secessionist entity, or the violation of peremptory norms of international law as 
part of the statehood process, must be evaluated separately on the basis of the foregoing 
situation.  
                                                
763  Crawford, “State”, supra note 194 at para 2. 
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Conclusively, this framework can be used as a general guideline, from which 
determinations of legal or illegal actions can be made on the basis of case-specific 
elements which will depend entirely on how the intervention has been executed, as well 
as the circumstances that precede and surround it. Now that this Chapter has come to its 
conclusion, it is necessary to provide a brief reaffirmation of the primary arguments of 
this thesis, as well as establish a clear argument on the exception to the prohibition on the 
use of force in international law.  
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Chapter 5 
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 The concept of humanitarian intervention, its meaning and its status under 
international law, continues to be a topic of contested debate among scholars, lawyers 
and politicians. As the prohibition on the use of force has crystallized into the ‘most 
secure’ jus cogens norm in international law given its centrality in the UN Charter, it is 
challenging to assert that its violation can be legitimized in any manner under a 
‘particular exception’.764 Indeed, the most basic issue with the concept of a humanitarian 
intervention as having legal standing under international law is that its challenges are not 
normative, but rather operational.765 More precisely, although an extensive list of scholars 
have attempted to argue for or against the existence of a right to humanitarian 
intervention, it can be suggested that state practice along with opinio juris has 
predominantly rejected its existence as an ‘absolutist’ concept.766  
This Chapter is separated into three sub-parts. First, a summary of the preceding 
four chapters’ primary arguments will demonstrate the interconnectivity of several areas 
of international law that support the final argument for this thesis. Second, further 
clarification will be presented on discerning the contemporary doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention (which embraces the R2P principle). This will be done in order to establish 
this thesis’ principle viewpoint on the topic of military interventions, which posits that a 
legal exception to the prohibition on the use of force exists only within the context of a 
UNC secession, coupled with human rights abuses deemed as in extremis. Lastly, a final 
sub-section will offer a number of concluding thoughts with respect to the notion of a 
right to a third-state military intervention in international law.     
                                                
764 Rodley, supra note 456 at 794.  
765 Thomas G Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention, (Hoboken: Polity Press, 2016) at 140.  
766 Sean Richmond, “Why is humanitarian intervention so divisive? Revisiting the debate over the 
1999 Kosovo intervention” (2016) 3:2 J on the Use of Force and Intl L 234 at 255-9. 
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5.1 Chapter Summaries 
Chapter 1 introduced the thesis by establishing the sources of international law 
used as part of the legal analysis of the subject-matter. Additionally, the Chapter clearly 
established the objective of the thesis, providing a distinction between the already-
established doctrine of the right to a UNC secession, and the primary objective of the 
thesis which intended to defend its three primary suppositions: i) that the principle of 
self-determination exists as a legal right under international law, (ii) that the principle of 
self-determination provides a qualified right of a UNC secession, and lastly, (iii) that in 
cases where the principle of self-determination is systematically denied (combined with 
human rights abuses designated as in extremis), a legal right may be invoked to a military 
intervention by a third-state.  
Chapter 2 summarized the history of the principle of self-determination, with the 
intention of drawing a parallel between the principle and the concepts of state 
recognition, statehood and sovereignty under international law. It began by presenting the 
history of the principle of self-determination, which was separated between its 
development prior to and after the 19th century, examining its legal development under 
classical and contemporary international law. Next, it was demonstrated how the 
principle became intertwined with the concepts of recognition, statehood and sovereignty 
throughout the late half of the 19th and early half of the 20th centuries. As the three 
concepts are often conflated in cases of external self-determination, it was necessary to 
emphasize how their interrelatedness plays into considering the legitimacy of an UNC 
Secession. Lastly, Chapter 2 presented an explanation for the existence of a right to a 
UNC secession under international law, while equally presenting its interrelation with the 
right to a UC secession. The connection between the two concepts was made in order to 
demonstrate how colonial oppression can exist outside of the ‘decolonization’ context. 
Overall, Chapter 2 established how the principle of self-determination is corollary to the 
existence of a justification for a right to a UNC secession.  
Chapter 3 focused on examining the international law on the use of force, and 
subsequently, how that law has been applied to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle. First, a history of the jus ad bellum was 
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presented in order to demonstrate its relationship with the classical just war doctrine and 
later with the notion of a ‘humanitarian intervention’. Second, the prohibition on the use 
of force was introduced as part of a general introduction on how international law 
perceives the use of force by states.  Further, the prohibition was analyzed vis-à-vis its 
applicability to the creation of states in international law. This was done in order to 
evaluate what constitutes the legality of direct and indirect third-state support in cases of 
state creation related to UC and UNC secessions. Lastly, a final portion of the Chapter 
focused on connecting how the concepts of classical natural law, humanitarian 
intervention and classical just war theory intersect with regards to their theoretical and 
legal bases. As part of this comparison, a legal analysis of the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention was completed, concluding that its legal status under international law 
remains inchoate and hence, can be considered at most an instrument of soft law.  
Finally, Chapter 4 examined three case studies that shared similar variables of 
being attempted UNC secessions with subsequent military interventions by a third state. 
The first two case studies, Bangladesh and Kosovo, identified the historical, political and 
legal developments that led to their unilateral secessions and subsequent military 
interventions by India and NATO respectively. The intention of the first two case studies 
was to underline how their UNC secessions, even if supported through a unilateral and 
collective third-state military intervention, did not violate peremptory norms of 
international law as part of their statehood creation processes. Additionally, both cases 
had evidence of systematic and widespread human rights abuses deemed as in extremis, 
which justified the violation of the prohibition on the use of force as part of the third-state 
military interventions. Alternatively, a third case study was presented in an effort to 
highlight the difference between a legally-justified and unjustified third-state military 
intervention on the basis of a UNC secessionist claim. In outlining the historical 
developments which led to the ‘secession’ of the de facto republics of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, a clear line was drawn between what constitutes a legitimate and an 
illegitimate claim of a right to external self-determination, as well as the threshold for a 
third-state military intervention through the confirmation of human rights abuses that can 
be deemed as in extremis. The threshold was established on the basis of the following 
methodology: that (i) a ‘peoples’ invoke their right to internal self-determination which is 
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rejected by the state, that (ii) the right of external self-determination is invoked on the 
basis of a right to a qualified UNC secession, which is rejected as well, that iii) the state 
responds by beginning a systematic campaign of human rights abuses, repressions and 
killings considered as in extremis against the peoples in question, and that iv) a third-state 
or a collective group of third states invoke their right to a military intervention to cease 
the human rights abuses and allow for the invocation of the right to external self-
determination to proceed. On the basis of this methodology, a set of four requirements 
was presented which combined the elements identified in the case studies into an 
analytical framework. The objective of the framework was to create a guideline through 
which a third-state military intervention executed under similar circumstances can be 
analyzed from. Overall, the case studies solidified the existence of an accepted state 
practice with regards to the right of third state military interventions under the 
circumstances outlined above. Now that the summary of the first four Chapters has been 
completed, it is necessary to conclude this thesis with a short commentary on the primary 
issues it addressed.  
5.1. The Right to a Military Intervention - Final Comments  
As the act of secession continues to be a topic of heated debate in the international 
legal community, it is important to recognize that the “…the prohibition of the use of 
force represents, besides the protection of human rights, the major advancement of the 
international legal order in the 20th century.”767 Hence, irrespective of its violations, 
whether through excuse or justification, the prohibition has become the cornerstone of the 
international legal order with respect to interstate relations and an overall objection to all-
out inter-state or collective warfare.768 Thus, any ‘exceptions’ to the prohibition on the 
use of force require very strong evidence in both state practice and opinio juris to be 
considered as legitimate. 769 More precisely, the general notion of interventionism in the 
                                                
767 Dorr, supra note 374 at para 51.  
768 Ibid. 
769 For more on the impact of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo as part of international human rights 
law, see Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth “From the Cold War to Kosovo: The Rise and Renewal of the 
Field of International Human Rights” (2006) 2 Annual R of L and Social Science 231 at 234-46. 
187 
 
last two decades has demonstrated that, through an unregulated international 
understanding of this concept, a hierarchy of necessity is created by virtue of which a 
case of human rights abuses must reach in extremis levels prior to a consideration of a 
military intervention. Even more so, this applies to cases of human rights abuses outside 
the ambit of self-determination, which have seen states choose ‘selectively’ when or 
when not to militarily intervene in a given conflict.770 This notion of human rights 
‘selectivism’ is, in the author’s opinion, one of the most divisive issues facing 
international legal scholars in the present moment. Nevertheless, in combination with all 
of the evidence presented in the previous four chapters, it is necessary to establish a firm 
statement with regards to the right of a military intervention only in the context of a UNC 
secession under international law.  
To begin, it is important to reiterate that, within the context of military 
interventions, the qualified right to a military intervention can be interpreted as  
The justifiable use of force to protect [a peoples’ right to a UNC secession] 
…against so persistent and arbitrary abuse as to go beyond the limit by 
which the sovereign nation is presumed to act within justice and reasons… 
[additionally, it can be defined as an act] which recognizes a state's rights 
to exercise through military force international control over acts of another 
states regarding its internal sovereignty when its actions are deemed to 
contradict the laws of humanity.771 
Although it is undeniable that states should be held responsible for a systematic and 
egregious abuse of human rights in armed uprisings and independence-related 
conflicts,772 the basis on which an absolute right for a humanitarian intervention can be 
interpreted as having its weakest legal standing is premised on three crucial 
                                                
770 Nico Kirsch, “International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the 
International Legal Order”16 EU J Intl L 369 at 397-99.  
771  Zaid Ali Zaid, “Humanitarian Intervention in International Law” (2013) 54:2 Acta Juridica 
Hungarica 185 at 187. 
772 International Human Rights Law is a growing discipline of international law which considers the 
primacy of human rights jurisprudence in all major spheres of international law. The core of the 
discipline is governed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See 
generally, Thomas Buergenthal, ed, “Human Rights” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (Oxford University Press) at para 9, online: <www.opil.ouplaw.com>; UNDHR, 
supra note 631; ICPR, supra note 92; ICESR, supra note 144.  
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constraints.773 Respectively, these constraints are, i) the concern evinced by multiple 
states of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention as becoming a concept of neo-
imperialism for powerful states, ii) the continuous promulgation of ‘defensive armed 
conflicts’, such as the ‘war on terrorism’ under which military interventions by states 
(such as the US intervention in Iraq in 2003) have become ‘justified’ for ‘humanitarian 
reasons’, and iii) the notion of human life as being more valuable than the sovereignty of 
states has lost its popularity through the continued brutal armed conflicts in Yemen,774 
Syria,775 Afghanistan776 and Iraq,777 to name a few, whereby the systematic death of 
civilians has resulted in little collective humanitarian military action. 778 Therefore, it is 
necessary to conclude that, on the basis of the evidence presented in Chapter 3, the 
contemporary doctrine of humanitarian intervention which stipulates that  a 
‘responsibility’ exists on a state or states to militarily intervene on behalf of a 
systematically oppressed population has not crystallized as a norm in international law. 
At the very least, this vision of ‘humanitarian intervention’ as a norm can be construed as 
being in its early stages of development, specifically with respect to unilateral or 
collective military action by states regardless of circumstance (i.e. military intervention to 
                                                
773 See Weiss, supra note 765 (“[t]he NAM – with more than 130 members, and arguably the most 
representative group of countries outside the UN itself – has publicly rejected “the right of 
humanitarian intervention,” even if Africans on their own are usually seeking more outside 
intervention to halt humanitarian disasters and the African Union’s Constitutive Act contains a 
bullish Article 4(h).  Developing countries are not alone in their recalcitrance. For example, American 
“sovereigntists” launched three lines of counterattack: the emerging international legal order is 
vague and illegitimately intrusive on domestic affairs; the international lawmaking process is 
unaccountable, and the resulting law unenforceable; and Washington can opt out of international 
regimes as a matter of power, legal right, and constitutional duty” at 141). 
774 Rebecca Tan, “The war in Yemen has led to the worst cholera outbreak in the world”, VOX (26 June 
2017) online: <www.vox.com/world/2017/6/26/15872946/yemen-war-cholera-outbreak-saudi-
arabia-us-airstrikes>.  
775 Julian Borger, “Civilian deaths from US-led strikes on Isis surge under Trump administration”, The 
Guardian (6 June 2017) online: < www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jun/06/us-syria-iraq-isis-
islamic-state-strikes-death-toll>.  
776 “Afghan Civilians” Watson Institute of Public and International Affairs online: 
<watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/civilians/afghan>.  
777 “Iraq” Watson Institute of Public and International Affairs online: 
<watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/civilians/iraqi>. 
778 See Weiss, supra note 765 at 140-2.  
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stop systematic human rights abuses against anti-government protesters in Libya)779 and 
outside of UNSC approval (such as the current extremely bloody civil conflict in Syria). 
More concisely, the R2P principle has become engrained as the leading contemporary 
interpretation of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, which purports to obligate 
military action by states in cases of humanitarian crises.780 This obligation has, to date, 
been unable to earn the necessary normative and operative strength to become an 
accepted law under the well-accepted sources of international law. In the qualified sense, 
such operative and normative support exists for a third-state military intervention only 
through the pretext of the principle of self-determination, and under very particular 
circumstances which must include a UNC secessionist entity invoking that principle on 
the basis of its systematic denial.   
Nonetheless, the law on the use of force as it stands must continue to progress 
towards a more relaxed understanding of its operative strength. In fact, one positive 
aspect that can be noted is that its progression has been noticeable since its inception in 
1945. For example, as stated by one jurist on the ever-evolving international law on 
interventionism: 
In 2017, we live and operate in a world order that is distinctly different from 
that which operated between 1945 and 1989. This is so, even though it might 
be difficult to pin down the specific moment of change. Unlike the 
                                                
779 UNSC Resolution 1973 authorized the use of ‘all necessary means’ to protect the Libyan civilian 
population from attacks by the government run by Muammar Gaddafi. Although the military 
intervention by NATO and other Western allies resulted in the abdication and subsequent death of 
the Muammar Gaddafi, the intervention was considered by a number of scholars as an example of 
‘regime change’. Most such scholars disagree with NATO’s interpretation of the UNSC Resolution as 
allowing for collective ‘humanitarian’ intervention sub silentio. See e.g. Fox, supra note 315 at paras 
45-52; Lowe & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 18 at para 17. 
780 The notion of an ‘obligation’ in international law holds an extremely high threshold. In essence, an 
obligation would, as argued by Dr.Halil Basaran, ‘governmentalize’ the process of military action in 
response to egregious atrocities and abuses of human rights around the world. See Halil Basaran, 
“Identifying the Responsibility to Protect” (2014) 38 Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 195 
(“[u]ltimately, R2P represents a subtle mechanism. It consists of observations, suggestions, and 
stimulations as epitomized by the 2001 International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome, and by General Assembly and Security Council 
resolutions. R2P, as a form of knowledge, aims to indirectly and subtly govern states. These subtle 
procedures of governmentality run counter to positivism…R2P has still not distinguished itself from 
humanitarian intervention, and these two concepts remain terminologically interwoven” at 196-
202). See also ibid at 204,208. 
 
190 
 
dethroning of the post-World War I order by the U.N. system, we cannot 
point to a precise moment at which the changes can be said conclusively to 
have occurred, nor can we point to specific texts (or even clear-cut rules) in 
defining and framing those changes. Nonetheless, that the international 
system now operates under distinctly different norms-and perhaps 
objectives and aspirations-are, in my view, beyond cavil.781 
As expounded on in the citation above, a slow, yet steady progress with regards to the 
contemporary jus ad bellum can be noticed if analyzed on the basis of its consistency 
since its codification in the UN Charter. However, outside of this progress, as this thesis 
has clearly demonstrated, blatant violations of the prohibition on the use of force in 
recent history should be seen as exactly what they are perceived to be under international 
law: blatant violations. Exceptions in international law only exist insofar as they can be 
supported by a breadth of evidence necessary to confirm their existence. With regards to 
military interventionism in particular, the emphasis must remain on self-determination as 
the leading factor behind the strength of its justification only in the UNC context. In large 
part, this is due to the fact that “…self-determination is a progressive force that has 
challenged the political status quo throughout history”782 and, hence, continues to 
similarly challenge it on the prohibition on the use force if coupled with its systematic 
denial and human rights abuses deemed as in extremis. All things considered, it should 
also be noted that even as a progressive force, each case of self-determination throughout 
history requires an aggressive and detailed analysis, in order to determine the elements 
necessary to confirm the legitimacy behind its claim, specifically with regards to the 
emergence of new states. 
Conclusively, it can be suggested that the only right to the use of force outside of 
the current legal parameters, exists in the context of an UNC secession which meets the 
criteria for an oppressed ‘peoples’ on the basis of an external self-determination attempt, 
and whose secession is coupled with human rights abuses deemed as in extremis. It is 
necessary to underline that the direct support of a third state or states in an effort to halt 
                                                
781 Maxwell O Chibundu, “International Law and the Legitimation of External Coercive Measures in 
Aid of Internal Change” (2017) 31 Temp Intl & Comp L J 123 at 131.  
782 Anderson, “A Post-Millennial Inquiry”, supra note 13 at 1201.  
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the human rights abuses will violate the peremptory norm of the illegal use of force783 
regardless of circumstance; however, the scope of the military intervention, coupled with 
the intent, the execution and the adherence to the requirements presented in the analytical 
framework, can provide a justification for the violation of the peremptory norm of the 
illegal use of force. Ultimately, the combined supremacy of the principle of self-
determination, state practice and UN instruments, if considered side-by-side, provide an 
exception of the prohibition on the use of force under customary international law; the 
only such exception to the prohibition.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
783 Anderson, “The Use of Force”, supra note 9 at 239. 
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